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3 Feb-M-TB-1-1-Cohen (Int Evand) 
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Official Transcript of Military Tribunal V, Case VII in the matter of the 
United States of America against Wilhelm List, et al, defendants, sitting 
at Nurnberg, Germany on 3, February 1948, 0930, Judge Wennerstrrm 
presiding. 
 
THE MARSHAL: The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V.  Military 
Tribunal V is now in session.  God save the United States of America and 
this Honorable Tribunal.  There will be order in the court.   
 
THE PRESIDENT:  Mr. Marshal, have you ascertained that all the defendants 
are present in this court? 
 
THE MARSHAL:  May it please your Honors, all the defendants are present 
in court. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  It was my understanding that the prosecution was to 
present their argument at this time.  Are they ready? 
 
MR. RAPP:  If your Honors please, the prosecution is prepared to offer 
its closing argument at this time.  I would merely like to make one 
request for the record.  I have checked our files are there are still a 
small number of photostatic copies in the hands of the defense counsel 
which have not been returned.  I will give Dr Laternser during the recess 
a list of those numbers and I ask that you be kind enough to return them 
as soon as possible. 
 
PROSECUTION’S CLOSING STATEMENT 
 
Case No. 7 
 
It is a challenging and formidable task for any advocate to sum up a 
record of almost 10,000 pages in a trial which has lasted for almost 7 
months.  When the panoramic events of several years of military and 
political history in four different nations are the subject matter of a 
judicial proceeding, when nearly 700 Prosecution documents - orders, 
reports, war diaries, photographs and even films - are introduced into 
evidence, when 50 odd witnesses have personally appeared before the 
Tribunal and more than a thousand by affidavit - then in summation one 
can do little more than outline in incomplete highlight the contents of 
this sordid and depraved text. 
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Many things may be said in future days about this trial. No one enjoys 
the process of being tried and judged, and it would be too much to expect 
from the defendants praise of the fairness and detachment with which this 
litigation has been conducted. But it must be obvious even to them that 
they could not have found a more dispassionate forum anywhere in this 
world.  
 
No matter what might be said by history about this proceeding, of one 
thing we can be sure. No fair minded critic may ever say that not all was 
said in these defendants' favor which might have been said.  
 
It has been somewhat more than a year since the International Military 
Tribunal handed down two historic decisions involving the criminal 
responsibility of high ranking officers of the German Army for the 
outrages of German troops during World War II. In one, Keitel and Jodi 
were held to be as guilty as Goering and Ribbentrop for the aggressive 
acts and wars, with their inevitable consequences, that marked the period 
of German hegemony in Europe. In the other, it was held that the group of 
military leaders indicted as the German General Staff and High Command 
was too amorphous a collection to be dealt with as a group or 
organization. But in commenting on the evidence concerning the guilt of 
individual German officers the Tribunal made this clear and unequivocal 
pronouncement: 
 
"They have been responsible in large measure for the miseries and 
suffering that have fallen on men, women, and children. 
 
"Many of these men have made a mockery of the soldier's oath of obedience 
to military orders. When it suits their defense, they say they had to 
obey; when confronted with Hitler's brutal crimes, which are shown to 
have been within. their general knowledge, they say they disobeyed. The 
truth is they actively participated in all these crimes, or sat silent 
and acquiescent witnessing the commission of crimes on a scale larger and 
more shocking than the 
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world has ever had the misfortune to know. This must be said.  
 
"Where the facts warrant it, these men should be brought to trial so that 
those among them who are guilty of these crimes should not escape 
punishment."  
 
By filing the indictment here, the prosecution was in effect carrying out 
the mandate of the International Military Tribunal. The defendants in the 
dock all fit the description of tllose officers whom the International 
Military Tribunal believed should not be allowed to escape the 
consequences of the vile acts which they either fathered, furthered, or 
allowed to be carried out by their subordinates without a murmur of 
protest.  
 
Since these crimes all occurred either in territory where active fighting 
was taking place or in territory which was being occupied by the German 
Army-since, in a word, they took place in areas where the German Army 
constituted the only real source of political or military power and where 
the only organizations of any kind were either directly or ultimately 
controlled by the armyi't is only to be expected that the nature of these 
criminal acts follows a more or less uniform pattern. Indeed, it would be 
surprising if this were not the case. Most of these defendants, as has 
been said, served on the Russian front before being transferred to the 
Balkans. One does not ordinarily expect to see a total change of 
character and habits of thought effectuated by an individual's transfer 
from one place to another, especially if he serves in the name capacity 
in both places.  
 
Further, the nerve center of the entire German Army was in Berlin, and 
German troops, wherever they were stationed, were influenced to a certain 
extent by the broad policy directives which issued from the OKW, so that 
one would expect to nnd, as in the case of any army, a certain uniformity 
of policy and, within a broad framework, certain accepted ideas and 
methods of action. The defendants, of course, seize 
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on this unifying direction and attempt to balance on the pin point of the 
OKW a whole absurd inverted pyramid of argumentation to the effect that 
most of the indefensible acts committed by their troops and auxiliaries 
can be laid at the door of the OKW, and that they, who were mere 
lieutenant genel'als, generals, and field marshals, were completely 
stripped of any discretion whatever. This tendency to minimize their own 
importance is a characteristic which does not appear in their biographies 
prior to the date the indictment against them was filed.  
 
We will deal with this newly developed self-abasement presently. What is 
pertinent for the moment is that this identity of personnel, especially 
in the higher ranks in various theaters during the course of the war, 
plus this centralized direction of policy reduces the number of legal 
issues to be considered in this litigation.  
 
Especially in the case of the execution of hostages is the legal issue 
simple and clear. The prosecution takes the position that the killing of 
a civilian whose only proved offense is that he or she lives in the 
neighborhood of a place where some unidentified person did something 
which displeased the German occupation power is simply murder, no more, 
no less. This seems to be a principle which is utterly indigestible to 
the Defense.  
 
We might say parenthetically that it is rather amusing that they, on the 
one hand, can argue with apparent seriousness that it is perfectly 
legitimate to drag a man out of his house, stand him up against the wall 
and shoot him witho.ut even asserting that he is guilty of anything, and 
yet on the other hand, with an equally straight face, they are able to 
quiver with indignation at the outrage on their private rights which was 
perpetrated when they were relieved of their medals by some souvenir 
collecting GI in 1945. But this is only one of the many spectacles of 
moral acrobatics to which we have been treated in the course of this 
trial.  
 
And the factual issues are really little more complicated. Lifted  
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out of the morass of detail with which the record is deliberately and 
unnecessarily encumbered, the case is impressive in its simplicity. The 
prosecution has had no trouble establishing that the German Army carried 
out executions of innocent hostages and other savagely disproportionate 
reprisal measures, that it killed prisoners of war of lawful belligerents 
by the thousands, and that it participated in the round-up and 
incarceration in concentration camps of the Jews, gypsies, and other 
groups classified as inferior by the philosopher friends of Hitler. It 
was easy to show that the army often was used as a uniformed press gang 
to shanghai foreign workers for the German war machine.  
 
The only complication that arose was in showing where these men were and 
what positions they held at a given point in time. . In order to do this, 
we have had to go up and down chains of command like so many squirrels. 
We have had to go into the question of temporary absences from duty 
caused by sick leaves, holiday leaves, emergency leaves, and every other 
sort of furlough recognized by the German Army.  
 
The accuracy of self-preserving personal diaries and prejudicial 
affidavits of orderly officers with amazingly unerring memories is 
somewhat more than questionable. But this defense causes us little 
difficulty. The crimes perpetrated were on so enormous a scale and so 
continuous in time that there is more than enough to go round for each 
defendant. Even making allowance for a few days' or weeks' absence from 
headquarters means at best but a slight deduction from a still staggering 
totality. The major characteristic which this proceeding has in common 
with all of the other war crimes trials heard here in Nuernberg is that 
the prosecution's case is based principally upon captured records of 
unchallenged authenticity which these very defendants, and their closest 
subordinates and collaborators themselves prepared, unwittingly and 
dispassionately enough, in the ordinary course of their business of 
running a war." Ordinarily, in a criminal case, documentary evidence 
plays a minor role. Most of the proof consists of the oral testimony of 
the persons who were present or near by when the crime was committed. But 
for the prosecution to prove by  
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oral testimony all of the murders, and arsons, and unlawful arrests, and 
deportations committed by the agencies which these defendants directed 
was quite impossible for a number of reasons. In the first place, a 
person charged with a crime is ordinarily tried within a fairly short 
time after the act is committed. In a friendly country where the majority 
of inhabitants are on the side of the law and the wrongdoer is an 
outcast, the latter will, in the usual case, be readily apprehended. But 
it took several years before anyone German general could be called to 
account for atrocities committed by his troops in the occupied 
territories of Europe. The bulk of the criminal acts which have been the 
subject of this litigation were committed between 1941 and 1944. The 
lapse of time and the press of events which occurred subsequent to their 
-commiSSIon in themselves made it impracticable to attempt to give the 
commission of these acts by oral testimony.  
 
Further, in the normal criminal case only one crime, or at the most two 
or three, are charged against the defendant; and even if more than one 
criminal act is involved, all of the acts will at least have taken place 
within a reasonably small area. The courts of one locality are generally 
spared the task of trying persons who are charged with having committed 
crimes outside its usuaIly restricted borders. Here, on the other hand, 
we are dealing with a series of deeds which are only limited 
geographically by the perimeter of the German Army's territorial 
conquests. It is not even entirely accurate to use the term "series," 
because some of these crimes occurred simultaneously in different parts 
of Europe. List and Foertsch, for example, were killing hostages in 
Serbia at the very same time when Kuntze, Lanz, and Leyser were executing 
commissars in Russia.  
 
Finally, in the conventional murder case the prosecution is usually able 
to find someone who was in the vicinity of the place where the crime was 
committed and who lived to tell the tale. Frequently, the murders which 
form the subject matter of this litigation were committed in such a way 
that this is not possible.  When twenty hostages were marched out of a 
camp, stood up against a wall, and shot by German troops, it was unlikely  
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that anyone except the German troops actually witnessed the scene and 
lived to describe it.  
 
The proof of the commission of a criminal act by documentary evidence has 
certain advantages. It eliminates uncertainty and avoids the hazards of 
human frailties which living witnesses are heir to, such as poor 
memories, mistaken identifications, and good or bad demeanor on the 
witness stand. It enables the Prosecution to be more detached and reduces 
the number of controversial factual issues.  
 
But unfortunately, though documents have some advantages, they are not 
entirely satisfactory. The dry and dull figures of hanged -hostages, shot 
partisans, and helpers do not and cannot reflect the destroyed homes, 
shattered hopes, the disillusionment, and misery, and pathos that lie 
behind them. The human mind perhaps fortunately for our own ultimate 
well-being-is capable of absorbing only so much tragedy. If one single 
murder is brought into sharp focus we can take it in, comprehend, and 
be moved emotionally. But when crime is piled upon crime, as has been 
done in this case, we are in danger of losing our sense of proportion, of 
allowing the meaning to blur, and our mora] judgment to become numbed and 
ineffectual. It is only by considering a cumulative effect that one can 
shake off the anesthetizing influence of these documents upon one's 
reason and one's sensibility.  
 
Recorded evidence is handicapped in another respect--documents cannot 
talk back. They cannot get on the witness stand to annihilate some flimsy 
explanation, to correct some obvious misinterpretation, or to contradict 
some outright lie. T'o the extent that the prosecution's case is based on 
documentary evidence, the defendant always has the last say. We can prove 
that "a defendant ordered a given excess to be committed and we can prove 
that it was committed as a result of his order, but we cannot prove that 
the defendant did not read the order which he signed or that he did not 
mean what he said.  
 
But the prosecution's case does not rest entirely on documents.  
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Despite the difficulty of seeking out and transporting witnesses from the 
countries where these crimes took place, the prosecution managed to 
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produce some-a Yugoslav, five Greeks, and two Norwegians. They were 
unsophisticated folk of the laboring classes who simply described what 
they had seen done by German troops under the command of these 
defendants. It is unlikely that their memories were inaccurate. When a 
man sees practically all of his fellow villagers, including a good many 
members of his own family, murdered before his eyes, it is probable that 
the incident will make a sharp and indelible impression on his mind.  
 
Though the German firing squads missed scarcely a man in Kragujevac 
during the 3 days that no Serb will ever forget, somehow they failed to 
kill Zivojin Iovanovitch. He lived to relate that 2,300 of his fellow 
townsmen were rounded up, marched off, and sent to their deaths in the 
last of the three 100:1 reprisal executions that makes October 1941 a 
blemish on German arms that can never be erased.  
 
By sheer good fortune, Stephanos Pappas was able to give an eye witness 
account of the burning of his village of Konneno  and of the 
indiscriminate slaughter of his friends and neighbors. And in what must 
certainly be the most miraculous and -breathtaking of all escapes, Takis 
Sipliopoulos told in quiet and subdued detail the story of his own 
execution. Had one of Felmy's executions not chanced to omit the crucial 
coup de grace, one might never have known of the massacre at Kalavritha.  
 
The prosecution also used four German witnesses. These men were grilled 
on cross-examination with particular severity, but with negligible 
profit. It may be that one reason those witnesses stood up so well was 
that they knew what they were talking about in the first place.  
 
General Felber certainly knew whereof he spoke when he discussed the 
nature and purpose of reprisal measures; Bach-Zelewski had more than 
enough experience to support his conclusions on the subordination 
relationship of higher police and SS leaders to Army military commanders; 
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and General Ferdinand JodI demonstrated some courage in violating caste 
loyalty to denounce his one-time commander in chief for militarily 
unnecessary devastation in Norway. Significantly enough, in spite of the 
self-proclaimed opposition to national socialism of every last defendant 
in the dock, it remained for the prosecution to turn up, in Willy Finger, 
the only genuine anti-Nazi who appeared in Court during this entire 
case.  
 
Oftentimes German soldiers, not anticipating subsequent capture and 
search by the enemy, roguishly photographed their own gruesome work. A 
number of these photographs were introduced by the prosecution. Can he 
who had once seen them ever forget the stark horror of their reality: 
bent figures poised on the edge of a shallow ditch with the raised rifles 
a moment before the command to fire; the brutal beheading with an axe-in 
four separate scenes-of a captured partisan; the scattered bodies at 
Sabac and the German soldier calmly documenting the carnage; the grinning 
army troops and the burning thatched village in the background; the 
bodies grotesquely hanging from street poles along the main street in 
Belgrade; and the revealing humor of the postcard photographer of three 
men hanging from a tree and the perverted caption, "Trees in Bloom in 
Serbia, Spring 1941."  
 
But notwithstanding the films on Greece and Norway and the photographs 
and witnesses from Yugoslavia and Greece, the prosecution has necessarily 
been forced to rely upon the verichrome records, orders, and 
communications of the German Army itself in order to prove precisely what 
the German Army did. These records were kept with no thought of damning 
or exculpating either their authors or their recipients. They are the 
most. trustworthy evidence of the events to which they relate that can be 
imagined.  
 
Such is the general character of the prosecution's proof. What has the 
defense adduced to meeet it? Principally, their evidence has consisted of 
disquisitions by the defendants themselves. We will take up 
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the general burden of their song when we discuss their common 
defenses.  They have also brought in a number of witnesses.  Most of 
these defense witnesses have been former subordinates of the defendants, 
whose self-interest have been former subordinates of the defendants, 
whose self-interest and bias isso palpable that it merits no extended 
discussion. 
 
 General Hoelter and General Vogel are but two examples who come 
readily to mind.  Hoelter, Chief of Staff of the 20th Mountain Army 
during the evacuation of Finnmark, might well have found himself in the 
deck alongside his Commander-in-Chief charged with complicity in 
perpetrating the very same crime.  And Vogel’s credibility- aside from 
the fact that he was a corps commander under Rendulic during the same 
operation- is clearly indicated by the fact that all of his testimony 
about the piety and modesty of the defendant Rendulic was squarely 
contraverted by the entries which the witnesshad [sic] made in his own 
personal diary during the war. 
 
 There was also Dietloff von Winning, the ubiquitous supply officer 
not only of the 12th Army but of its successors Army Groups E and F, who 
appeared on behalf of all threeof [sic] his former superiors, List, 
Kuntze, and Foertsch.  Though he had never commanded troops and never 
smelled powder, von Winning was an authority on everything from objects 
of art in the White Castle in Belgrade to the number of calories required 
to keep a Greek hospital patient from dying of malnutrition.  Though he 
knew all about the death of the German members of the 521st Signal 
Regiment, he could not recollect any action on the part of the German 
troops in reprisal because retaliation measures were outside his sphere 
of activity.  And in his own orbit of work he could not possibly recall 
furnishing concentration camps with rations or other supplies. 
 
 Dr. Gerd Feine was called to testify concerning the capitulation 
agreement signed by Germany and Yugoslavia towards the end of April 
1941.  Dr. Feine got off to a shaky start by confessing, of all things, 
to having been extremely well treated during his recent trip to 
Yugoslavia 
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in connection with an investigation of the work of the German Legation in 
Belgrade prior to the war.  Dr. Feine stated that the Cinear Markovic, 
the former, and deposed, Foreign Minister of Yugoslavia, signed the 
capitulation agreement on behalf of the Yugoslav Government.  Oddly 
enough, King Peter, as well as Prime Minister Simovic, who was not only a 
general in the Yugoslav air force but also Commander-in-Chief of the 
Yugoslav Army, had already left their country for England and could not 
accept Field Marshal von Weiches’ cordial invitation to enter into 
contractual relations.  Dr. Feine talked about a mysterious power of 
attorney which Simovic had allegedly given to a General Kalafotocvic, who 
in turn was gracious enough to pass it on - apparently without so much as 
a by your leave from Simovic - to power-conscious Markovic.  This whole 
transaction - is clothed in deepest obscurity.  But what really makes the 
whole suspicious structure collapse is the fact that Dr. Feine, though 
present throughout the entire capitulation proceedings, never actually 
saw the magic document which Markovic offered as his authority to 
transact the business of surrender in Simovic’s place and stead. 
 
 Friedrich von Sidow allowed the prescribed form of oath to be 
administered to him without any spoken word of protest though, judging 
from his testimony, with a good many unuttered reservations.  Like the 
rest of the defense witnesses, he too did no German evil, saw no German 
evil, and heard to German evil.  He knew only about vicious attacks by 
partisans in Serbia in 1941; that he did not know which partisans and 
never bothered to ask did not appear to strike him as at all unusual for 
one who, like he, was a major in the German Army.  Only 300 Serbs, not 
almost 1800 asthe [sic] captured documents show, were killed at Kraljevo, 
if you believe his testimony, and that only because 300 Germans had been 
killed in previous attacks.  And even the 1:1 retaliation taken was not 
for attacks simply at Kraljevo but, to be sure, for attacks which had 
occurred all over Serbia.  Though Sidow claims he was 
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in Serbia throughout October 1941, he never heard the slightest rumor 
about three large German mass executions at Valjevo, Kraljevo, and 
Kragujevae.  He knew nothing at all about the execution of hostages, 
about concentrations camps or about villages burned in reprisal.  Indeed, 
Mr. von Sidow’s sense of honor was outraged at the mere suggestion that 
such had occurred.  His parting answer can scarcely have passed 
unnoticed: no, he said, he was not joking, he really had been in 
Yugoslavia in 1941. 
 
 The other "star" witnesses were the self-styled Balkan experts, 
both longtime members of the Nazi Party and co-followers with Rosenberg 
and Streicher of the muse of history.  One of them, Dr. Rudolf Ibbeken, 
had never taught or been taught a single course in Balkan history, he did 
not speak Serbo-Croat and he had been in Yugoslavia the extended period 
of six to nine months.  He demonstrated his comprehensive grasp of the 
intricacies of his special field by being unable to answer questions 
about Balkan personalities which a sixth-grade student in good standing 
could have covered without great difficulty.  Considerably embarrassed by 
Dr. Ibbeken’s ignorance, the Defense produced a slightly more informed 
Balkan expert in the person of Professor Georg Stadtmueller - a man so 
filled with regard for the triumph of international law that even if his 
country were invaded by an aggressor, and his relatives and friends 
killed through reprisal notions, even then his deepseated [sic] concern 
for the majesty of law would have restrained him from taking any hostile 
actions against the enemy occupier.  The convincing effect professor 
Stadtmueller made with this personal confession was dissipated somewhat 
by the unobjectivity [sic] of his conclusion that the Balkan nations had 
made no recognizable contribution to the European culture.  Yet one ought 
not to deal too severely with professor Stadtmueller’s testimony.  On 
more sober reflection he did concede, however grudgingly, that yes, the 
Greek-discovered concept of democracy was something of a contribution to 
Western civilization after all. 
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 We have talked of the "testimony" of the defendants and of the 
defense witnesses.  The word "testimony" is too charitable: it would 
really be more accurate to describe what went into the record on direct 
examination as the depositions of the defendants and their witnesses, 
because they all took with them to the witness stand reams of paper on 
which were written all the questions that they were to be asked and all 
the answers with which they were to respond.  So far as these people are 
concerned, the court can give no more weight to their demeanor on the 
witness stand during direct examination than it could if they had never 
come into the courtroom. 
 
 In addition, the defense has introduced several bushels of 
affidavits.  A word about these would not be out of place.  It was 
obviously impossible for the Prosecution to call all of these affiants to 
the witness 
3 Feb.-M-BK-3-1-Love (Int. Evand) 
Court V, Case 7 
 
stand for cross-examination without prolonging the trial for another six 
months.  We, therefore, attempted to choose a representative cross-
section.  Out of more than a thousand affiants we selected fourteen and 
requested that they appear in Court.  Twelve of them did.  The result was 
very edifying. 
 
 On the basis of their testimony and documents submitted during 
their examination, it appeared that one group of affiants might either 
have been assigned their own particular seats in the defendants’ docksor 
[sic] else have been immediately arrested for the lesser charge of 
perjury.  Colonel von Harling, the Ic or Intelligence Officer of Army 
Group F, followed the established ling in swearing that no Allied 
commandos were ever executed in the Southeast.  This declaration was made 
just before the Colonel was shown his own handwritten signature on orders 
which sent three named individuals, and an untold number of other 
commando prisoners, to the SD for "special treatment" that Harling 
himself in an unexpected burst of candor admitted it meant 
liquidation.  General Winter was another such witness.  Winter, though he 
succeeded Foertsch as Chief of Staff of Army Group E and later of Army 
Group F, did not know anything about reprisal ratios.  He learned things 
after the war, of course, but to be perfectly honest, he had to tell this 
Court that from his recollection of his time in the Balkans he could not 
remember any such ratios.  The Tribunal will remember his sputtering and 
bewildered explanations when he was shown the document containing notes 
on a speech that he himself delivered at a conference of chiefs of staff 
on 9 December 1943 in which a 50:1 hostage ratio for German dead and a 
10:1 hostage ratio for German wounded was ordered.  Later in that same 
conference Winter was quoted as having said "unfortunately it is not 
feasible to behead everybody". 
 
 It developed that another class of affiants had absolutely no 
knowledge whatever on which to base the statements made in their 
affidavits.  General Dehner’s chauffeur, was dusting off his desk one day 
and 
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happened to notice a piece of paper.  He did not know who had written the 
paper, or what was on the paper, or where the paper had come from, but it 
was his impression that it had something to do with hostages.  On the 
basis of this he made a statement in his affidavit that General Dehner 
frequently interceded with agencies which were not subordinate to him 
when the measures which these agencies took were too severe.  Another 
witness, Hans von Selchow, made an affidavit which contained three 
paragraphs explaining that the Railroad Security Service was not 
subordinate to the LXIXth Reserve Corps.  On the stand it developed that 
he did not even know what divisions were in the LXIXth Corps.  So far as 
the Security Service was concerned, he did not know what their duties 
were, who their commanding officer was, to what extent the activities 
were coordinated with those of German troops in the area, or whether the 
Corps or the Railroad Security Service had the greater number of troops. 
 
 But there is still a further category of affidavits which differ 
from those which the Court struck only in that the affiants have not been 
formally indicted.  When one of the defendants here was formerly a Corps 
commander at the time the Prosecution alleged certain outrages were 
committed by German troops of that particular Corps, it is a standard 
practice to produce the affidavits of several of the Corps commander’s 
subordinates who have an obvious self-interest in having this Court find 
that these outrages were never committed.  Still another class of 
affidavits is comprised of those which eulogize the character and deep 
religious instincts of the defendants.  If any of the defendants ever 
helped a blind man across the street or petted a dog, the incident is 
probably described at length in some affidavit as an example of his 
sympathetic and benign attitude towards the Universe and as proof 
positive that he could never possibly have done anything unkind.  It is 
true that a casual examination of many of these affidavits will reveal 
that the affiant has not seen the defendant for 10 or 15 years, but the 
assertions that the latter is by nature utterly 
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incapable of doing anything that is not recommended by the Sermon on the 
Mount are apparently thought none the weaker for that.  In one case the 
affiant even dwelt at length on the fact that one of the defendants had a 
very moderate appetite because of some stomach ailment.  The object of 
this was apparently to show that the defendant was not immortal. 
 
 The question of the credibility of a witness is usually arguable 
and even a lawyer making a wholesale onslaught on the character of the 
opposition’s proof in the heat of advocacy ordinarily admits to himself 
that there might possibly exist some ground for disagreement on the 
matter.  But when one witness after another gets on the stand and reads 
off a series of self-serving declarations from a prefabricated script 
only to burst like a paper bag on cross-examination and when this process 
continues almost without exception for seven months, we have no inner 
misgivings when we make the statement that nine-tenths of what has gone 
into this record as so-called defense testimony, including the 
affidavits, is completely unworthy of credence. 
 
 So much for the general character and credibility of the evidence 
produced by the Defense.  We turn now to the specific assertions and 
denials made by way of defense.  Since most of the defendants have 
sought  sanctuary in certain common arguments, repetition can be avoided 
if these are taken up generically before going into the specific use 
which each individual defendant tried to make of them.  If a certain 
standard defense is invalid on general principles, it evidently is 
worthless in a particular application.   
 
 First, the defendants maintain that the documents do not mean what 
they say.  Several ingenious schemes have been contrived to support this 
thesis.  Among these is the "telegraphic style" argument.   According to 
this, the documents must be viewed with caution and alarm because they 
contain numerous daily reports which were sent either by teletype or 
radio and therefore do not possess the same profusion of adjectives, 
modifying clauses and so forth in which we have luxuriated here for  
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the past several months.  We can appreciate the abhorence (sic) in which 
these defendants hold a telegraphic style.  After having listened to them 
testify, it is obvious how painful it must be for them to read or hear 
anything that does not bristle with semi-colons, prepositional phrases, 
and complex-compound clauses inserted parenthetically into the middle of 
the sentence just to let the speaker get his breath before he makes his 
last 400-word sprint to the period.  But the defendants profess that the 
brevity and curtness of these reports leads to ambiguous 
interpretation.  Therefore, they have all testified that these reports 
are in large measure completely incomprehensible to them.  The answer to 
this is that there were no complaints made about their clarity and 
meaning at the time they were sent and that they were clear enough to 
enable the defendants and their subordinate to operate the German Army. 
 
 But the telegraphic style argument, handy as it is, will not answer 
every purpose.  When a daily report states that "50 men were 
standrechtlich erschossen" by German troops, there is not much doubt that 
fifty men were shot and that they were not shot in combat.  When another 
report says "200 people transferred to Zazaviza concentration camp" by a 
certain army unit, we have no trouble comprehending what 
happened.  Again, when a report reads "400 conscripted workers shipped 
off to Germany" by a certain Wehrmacht unit the meaning seems to be 
fairly clear.   The defendants dispose of this by the simple device of 
bringing forth a new set of definitions they assure us that we are 
confused is we interpret these messages as meaning what they say.  The 
standrechtlich erschossen does not mean summarily shot, but shotafter 
court martial.  "Concentration camp" does not mean concentration camp, it 
means collecting camp.  "Conscripted workers" really means voluntary 
workers.  We have not been furnished with a copy of the dictionary which 
the defendants use but it would be interesting to know, for example, 
assuming the term "concentration camp" really did mean 
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something else, what term should be used if the word "concentration camp" 
were meant.   
 
 If the test of any given report is perfectly unambiguous and if 
even the lexicographical talent which has veen displayed here cannot 
redefine it into incoherence, the defendants still have several shafts 
for their bow.  Generally, the first one to be shot is the non-
subordination argument.  In the area of command of each corps and army 
were stationed certain troops or groups of armed men all of whom were 
assigned some part of the Army.  Among these organizations were the 
Security Police, the Einsatz Commandos and other elements of the SD, the 
indigenous troops belonging to the armies of the puppet states which the 
Germans had set up, as well as certain non-uniformed guerilla groups who 
were technically not part of any army but who operated in close 
cooperation with the German forces.  In one repor after another the 
butcheries and plunders committed by these auxiliary organizations are 
described.  It can be seem from many of those reports that these 
atrocities were committed while the group in question was in the course 
of carrying out a certain operation under the tactical command of or in 
conjunction with the Army. 
 
 In others, it is not specifically shown that at the tie these 
crimes were committed, the organizations involved were acting with the 
Army in achieving a specific aim but it does appear that they were 
committing their atrocities within the area of a given Army Division and 
that they were sending constant reports to that Division on the nature 
and location of their activities.  In both cases, however, the defendants 
disavow any responsibility for acts committed by these units. 
 
 But they go further than this in their disclaimer of 
responsibility.  A third class of reports exists.  In these, a given Army 
division merely reports to its corps headquarters that 50 hostages have 
been hanged in a given locality within the divisional area. Nothing more 
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is said.  In every case where the daily report does not fit with 
certainty the company or battalion or regiment which pulled the trigger 
or tied the hangman’s knot, the defendants have argued that these things 
were probably done by the SS or the SD or the Police or the Ustacha or 
the Kosta Pecanac Chetnicks or the Ezones or by some other unit which was 
either not subordinate to the Army or else was subordinate only for 
"tactical" purposes. 
 
 There are several answers to this argument.  First, it is the 
Prosecution’s contention that when the 173rd Infantry Reserve Division 
reports that 50 hostages were hanged and 50 shot on the same day within 
the divisional area and makes no mention of any of these other 
organizations in that connection, it is to be fairly inferred that some 
unit of the 173rd Infantry Reserve Division did the hanging and the 
shooting.  The defendants all deny that this was so.  They say that the 
division reported everything that happened within its area, whether it 
was done by the division or not, and that unless the report puts the 
finger squarely on the second platoon of Company C of the 3rd Battalion 
of the First regiment of that particular Army Division no responsibility 
can be fixed. 
 
 We submit that this is an affront to common sense.  Time and again 
these defendants have testified to the way that indiscriminate 
mistreatment of the population and ill-advised executions, arrests and 
deportations by the police and the SD merely added to the Army’s 
difficulties in keeping the population pacified and subdued.  On the 
other hand they have testified one after the other that reprisal measures 
properly directed and carried out with sufficient force had a most 
salubrious and soothing effect on the natives.   
 
 Now, assuming what they have said to be true, does it make sense 
that an Army division, in reporting the execution of a reprisal measure 
within its area to corps headquarters, would simply reports that 100 
people had been hanged if it thought that corps headquarters would have  
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any doubt as to who had done the hanging?  If this had been the case, the 
reports would have been less than meaningless.  Corps headquarters would 
have had no way of knowing, when it received intelligence or the 
occurrence of one of these massacres, whether to expect calm and 
tranquility in that particular are for a while or whether be anticipate 
new outbreaks of rebellion, acts of sabotage and attacks on German troops 
and install ations (sic).  Moreover, when a particular action was 
committed by any of these extraneous agencies, the Division’s report 
precisely said just that.  We contend that the only sensible 
interpretation to be placed on one of these reports made by an Army 
division in which the carrying out of a reprisal measure in question was 
carried out by that division, unless some other group is specifically 
named, and that in fact corps headquarters when it received such a report 
placed that identical interpretations on it. 
 
 But let us, as devil’s advocate, assume for the moment that the 
chaotic system which the defendants claim was actually followed in making 
these reports and that corps headquarters, when it received the news that 
a few hundred hostages had been liquidated in the area of a certain 
division, had no way of knowing who had ordered and carried it out or 
what its consequences were likely to be.  Are these defendants to be 
exonerated from responsibility for these outrages which were committed by 
their satellite organizations?  When the relationship between these 
organizations and the Army is examined it will be seen that it was the 
Army authorities and no one else who were in a position to forbid, avoid 
and prevent those slaughters from being committed.  
 
 First, let us take the relationship between the Army and Croatian 
Domobrans.  Shortly after the Germans ijvaded (sic) Yugoslavia the so-
called independent state of Croatia came into being.  As one of the 
defense witnesses said, "Germany (sic) created the state of Croatia."  It 
was and remained a puppet state of the expansive Third Reich.  Any doubt 
as  
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to this would be quickly quieted by the tone of unctuous servility in 
which the communications addressed by the Croatian government to the Army 
occupation authorities were couched.  The convenience of establishing 
such a state from the German standpoint is so obvious that is scarcely 
need be mentioned.  By this simple device the German Army transformed 
itself from a conquering army stationed in occupied territory to an 
"allied" force invited to remain in the common struggle.  As such, it 
could sponsor the formation of a Croatian army to be used for its own 
purposes while at the same time masking its own reeking activities behind 
the façade of Croatian marionettes. 
 
 The nature of this parasitic regime, made up of jackals and 
scavengers who would stop at nothing, not even, the murder of thousands 
of their innocent countrymen, for the few bones which fell from the 
German stable is so evident that one wonders how anyone can stand in this 
courtroom, as at least six persons have already done and as three persons 
will certainly do during the next several days, and hold forth to this 
Tribunal about the 
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"independent Croatian Government." 
 
 But we are not so much interested in the general nature of the 
Croatian Government as we are in the relation which the Croatian troops 
bore to the German commanders.  To begin with, the Croatian army was 
organized and trained by the Germans.  Their officers and men, as the 
documents here show, were screened by the Germans so that all "unreliable 
elements" could be purged.  Once they were trained, they were then 
equipped and armed by the Germans, and then sent to their permanent 
stations by the Germans.  Now, since all of the "independent state of 
Croatia" was included in the area of one of the three German Army corps 
stationed there, and since each of those corps were divided into 
divisional areas, no matter where the Croat troops were stationed they 
were bound to be in the area of some German division.  Within the 
divisional area, the Germans indicated where the Croat troops were to be 
stationed and what their tasks were to be, whether it was the guarding of 
a bridge by a Domobransunit or the patrolling of a railroad line by a 
detachment of Ustashi.   
 
 Then, from time to time, the Croat units would be notified that the 
German troops intended to carry out a certain tactical operator.  Usually 
these operations consisted of "mopping up" or "combing out" certain areas 
in an effort to reduce the activities of the partisans – either by 
destroying their hospitals and bases of supply or by arresting al the 
able-bodied men in the locality.  The Croat troops in such an operation 
were assigned a certain definite role to play in conjunction with the 
German troops.  When the operation was finished, the German divisional 
commander would then instruct the Croat troops to take up their old 
stations and resume their railroad 
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security activities or whatever else they had been doing. 
 
 This is what  Rendulic, Dehner and Leyser mean when they say that 
the Croat troops were not "subordinate" or that they were only 
"tactically" subordinate to them.  It is precisely what Lanz, Felmy and 
Spedel mean when they correspondingly deny responsibility for the 
excesses of Greek "volunteer" units.  In both cases the evidence is 
irrefutable that these sets of gangsters were, from start to finish, no 
more than the uniformed tools and hirelings of the German army.   Dehner 
and Leyser repeatedly protest that they could not order a member of the 
Domobrans to be tried by a German court martial.  In that they may be 
technically correct – but neither, for that matter, could they order a 
German soldier to be tried before a court-martial.  Only a divisional 
commander dictates to his superior at Corps headquarters?  The record 
here shoes that the power of the German corps commanders in Croatia was 
such that they could even remove the Croatian civil officials when it 
pleased them.  It is utterly fantastic for them to say that they could 
take no measures to curb excesses committed by these Croatian 
janizaries.   
 
 We have singled out the relationship between the Domobrans, which 
was the regular army of the Croatian "independent state", merely as an 
illustration.  What we have said about them applies with equal force to 
the Ustascha, the Croatian counterpart of the Waffen-SS.  It applied with 
perhaps even more compelling force to the groups of Serbian non-uniformed 
irregulars – the Kosta Pecanac, Danzic, and even certain branches of the 
Mihailovic Chetniks – who were armed and used by the German Army whenever 
it suited their convenience.  It applies, in short,  
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to all of the countries in Southeastern Europe in which the Germans set 
up puppet regimes and used indigenous troops to murder their 
compatriots.  The relationship between a principal and an accessory 
before-the-fact to murder does not depend on the word "subordination" and 
the use of that term as these defendants here attempt to apply it to 
these indigenous troops is as false as the premise upon which it rests –
i.e. the myth of the independence of these puppet governments who were 
installed and kept in power solely at the whim of German arms. 
 
 The defendants seek also to escape responsibility by the use of 
their famous subordination principle for the acts of units of police 
troops which operated within their areas of command.  The witness Korn 
exploded the theory of the independence of the police troops from Army 
jurisdiction.  According to him, during the 18 months hewas (sic) in the 
Southeast the police troops only once carried out an operation alone – 
that is it say, without the help of the Army.  The police troops received 
their ammunition, transport and supplies from the Army and it was 
impossible, he said, for the police to carry on an operation of any size 
or importance without first obtaining the consent and approval of Army 
authorities.  This is fully borne out by what the witness Bach-Zelewski 
had to say of the close cooperation between the police troops and the 
first Cossack Division in the course of Operation Arnim.  The defendants 
say that they were not informed of the activities of the police; but the 
documents show that the police periodically reported to the Army on 
precisely what they were doing.   
 
 The defendants say that they and their Army subordinates protested 
against the activities of the police from time to time.  They may have 
done so, but that their  
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protests  were not nased (sic) on any human considerations was shown by 
the testimony of one of the defendant’s own witnesses, General von Behr, 
who testified that he as divisional commander objected to the activities 
of the police only because they were not carried out with enough troops 
to be really effective:  In other words he was not protesting against the 
severity of the measures taken by the police, but because they were not 
sever enough. Of further import is the significant fact that evidence of 
these protests is strangely missing from the captured German Army 
documents. 
 
 The next group which operated within the area of the Wehrmacht 
command were the Einsatzkommandos of the SD.  The defendants now disclaim 
any responsibility for what these people did and say that they had no 
idea of their operations and no means of curbing them even if they had 
known.  This, of course, flies into the teeth of the many documents here 
which show that on most of the large scale mopping up operations carried 
out by the Army, units of the SD were attached to each Army unit for the 
purpose of screening the inhabitants, cleaning up the rear area after the 
Army troops had advanced, taking care of the persons who were arrested 
and who were subsequently to be transferred  either to concentration 
camps or hostage camps or shipped off to Germany for forced labor in 
factory and mine.  The SD was the most murderous and dreaded organization 
in Germany, with the possible exception of the Gestapo, and it is 
understandable that the defendants are a little sensitive when it is 
pointed out that the German Army and the SD frequently worked in close 
cooperation.  But the proof showed beyond any doubt that close harmony 
existed between the two organizations and that when the Army had any need 
for the special services which the SD was so expert in 
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furnishing , they joined hands and worked together as on a common 
enterprise. 
 
 Finally, the defendants seek to throw as much of the blame for this 
complex of outrages as possible on their favorite whipping-boy, the 
Waffen-SS.  Here again it is claimed that the Army had no authority over 
the SS except in a purely "tactical" sense.  One example is sufficient to 
show how elastic this term "tactical subordination" is, as used by the 
defendants.  The court will remember General von Leyser’s description of 
the partisan attack on an armed truck convoy in Albania, in the course of 
which three German female employees who were being evacuated from Tirana 
were captured.  From the war diary of the XXIst Mountain Corps we 
discover that an SS Oberfuehrer has ordered an SS major to burn down some 
villages in the locality of the attack and to kill the population.   The 
report goes on to say: "The approval of the Corps is still 
missing.  Major Frank asks whether the Corps agrees to the carrying out 
of these reprisal measures and asks for an immediate reply".  Two days 
later a report shows that the SS Division Skanderbeg is holding hostages, 
who were presumable seized in connection with this same attack.  Still 
later, we find Corps headquarters directing the SS Division Skanderbeg 
not to carry out the shooting of 50 hostages, because such an action 
might jeopardize the negotiations with the partisans for the return of 
the three German women. 
 
 Now, if the SS was only "tactically subordinate" to the Army, then 
we can only conclude from this report that the shooting the hostages and 
the burning down of villages are to be considered as strictly tactical 
measures.  Obviously, the SS would not have asked the Corps for 
permission to do these things unless it was necessary to obtain 
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permission  from the Army before doing it.  This one representative 
example – an illustration which could be multiplied many score, will 
suffice.   
 
 SS atrocities occurred not in spite of Army opposition but because 
they were an integral part of, and consistent with, German Army 
occupation policy.  But even when "disciplinary" as opposed to "tactical" 
jurisdiction of the Army over one of the conventional scapegoat agencies 
is proved – as was thecase (sic) with Felmy and the Rosenberg detachment 
operating within his area of command in South Greece in 1941 – then we 
are told, surprisingly enough, that "disciplinary" authority is of no 
particular importance since it refers only to such minor questions as 
proper dress, military courtesy and the like.  Thus when they don’t have 
it, it assumes proportions of importance limited only by the defendants’ 
endurance and vehemence of speech.   
 
 The tribunal should keep in mind in considering all of these 
attempts to shuttle the responsibility from the Army to one of these 
other organizations that we have been told time and ggain (sic) by these 
defendants and their witnesses that within a given divisional area the 
division commander was held primarily responsible for everything that 
happened and that he was the highest German authority there.   The same 
was true of the Corps commanders to an even greater extent.  The German 
Army was always by far superior in numbers, power, prestige and influence 
to any of the other units which have been mentioned.   The fact that the 
police the SD and indigenous troops are named in these reports show that 
the army authorities were kept fully posted on their activities.  Without 
the full 
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knowledge and consent of the Army these organizations could not have come 
into a given divisional area at all, much less functioned independently 
after they got there. 
 
 The picture which has developed from the exaggerations made by 
these defendants in their effort to shift responsibility from the Army 
other agencies in (sic) completely ridiculous.  We are supposed to 
believe that within any given sector assigned to an Army division; there 
were all sorts of odd groups – police, SS, the SD, various units of 
indigenous military and semi-military personnel, and even certain 
elements of the Wehrmacht itself, such as parts of the notorious 
Brandenburg Division, wandering around, stumbling over each other, 
getting in each other’s way and working at cross purposes.  They would 
have us understand that these units simply marched over the division area 
at random, hanging, shooting, burning and plundering without giving the 
Division any idea who and where they were, what their purpose, and how 
they were achieving it.  Merely to sum up this description is enough to 
demonstrate its absurdity.  If this were actually what took place, then 
it would have been the Germans much more than the Croats, Serbs, 
Albanians, or Greeks who were the partisans.  The truth is, as we have 
already shown, that the commanding officers of the Army possessed all of 
the power necessary to restrain these auxiliaries and they not only had 
the power but also the duty, since it was they who were primarily 
responsible for maintaining peace and security within their areas of 
command.  Since they had both the power and the duty to prevent these 
outrages, it is they and no one else who should be held accountable for 
their having occurred. 
 
 We pass on now to the next excuse offered by the  
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defendants – that they were ignorant of the commission of these 
crimes.  When they are asked to explain a daily report from one of their 
subordinate units which mentions the burning down of several villages, or 
the hanging of a dozen-odd hostages in reprisal for an attack on a truck 
convoy or a railroad blasting, they say it is very difficult for them to 
do this, because although this report was made to their own headquarters 
they did not read it and only saw it here at Nuremberg for the first 
time.  How often have we listened to that enervating chant – "I learned 
of these things for the first time here in this courtroom." 
 
 General Dehner offered as proof of his ignorance the fact that many 
of these daily reports addressed to his corps from the various divisions 
which formed it did not show his initials, whereas it was his invariable 
custom, he said, to put his initials on every such report that he 
read.  On cross-examination, however, it developed that the presence or 
absence of his initials on a document had little or no bearing on his 
knowledge of the events described in I because, in the first place, the 
papers which he initialed were frequently the first drafts while the 
documents presented in evidence here were the final drafts; and, in 
addition, because whether he read the report or not make very little 
difference since his chief of staff had a duty to give him oral summaries 
of all reports which he did not actually read.   
 
 Geitner’s testimony on the subject of his initials was even more 
involved.  According to him he had two methods of initialing.  In both 
cases he used the letter "G" but if the letter was "a long cursory ‘G’" 
that indicated that he had seen the order only after his commander had 
signed it; whereas in the rare instances in which he saw the particular 
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order before it went to the commander for his signature, the letter was 
made in a more precise, formal and soldierly fashion.  Following this 
discourse on calligraphy the number of subjects which had not been bought 
into this case as a matter of defense was reduced to two – falconry and 
the occurrence of sun spots – an omission attributable no doubt to 
oversight rather than to lace of diligence on the part of counsel. 
 
 But judging from the testimony of the other defendants, 
particularly List, Kuntze  (sic?) and Foertsch before him and Felmy and 
Speidel after him, General Dehner’s case was typical.  Each in his turn 
has testified about briefings and the daily morning and evening 
conferences when the various situation reports from the field were 
discussed.  One of the main purposed of these conferences was to enable 
the commanding officer to find out from his Chief of Staff, the Ia and 
the Ic officers, and various other experts exactly what was happening 
within his area of command.   
 
 But it is not necessary to go into a detailed analysis of all the 
wonders to which we have been treated in the course of the attempts make 
to bolster these professions of ignorance.   These men were the highest 
ranking members of the German Army within their respective areas.  But 
even if they did not know of this constant campaign of terror and murder 
of the civilian population being carried out by their troops, reports of 
which were being sent to their headquarters at least daily, and usually, 
twice a day, it makes no difference from a legal standpoint.  They were 
charged with the duty of knowing it.  It was 
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 It was their business to know what was being done by their troops 
and they cannot escape the responsibility for these atrocities by saying 
that they did not bother to read what was furnished them for the specific 
purpose of allowing them to know.  This interpretation of the duty of 
commanding officer is not novel.  In U.S. v. Oswald Pohl, et al., the 
court said, "The law of war imposes on a military officer in a position 
of command an affirmative duty to take such stops as are within his power 
and appropriate to the circumstances to control those under his command 
for the preention of acts which are violations of the law of war".  (Tr. 
8123).  That Tribunal pointed out that the Supreme Court of the United 
States had already announced this principal in the Yamashita case.   
 
 Another popular fable is the sick leave or holiday 
explanation.  This is given in two different situations.  In the first 
ono (sic), the defendant formulated an order for some criminal acts, 
passed it on to his subordinated and then went to the hospital or took a 
few days leave.  In this courtroom he takes the position that no blame 
can attach to him if he was not actually sitting in his office at the 
time the culpable act was carried out.  That such an argument is even put 
forward shows the desperation of the person making it.  If a terrorist 
leaves a time bomb with a 24-hour fuse in a London railroad station and 
ten people are subsequently killed by the explosion, it is hardly a legal 
defense to the charge of murder that the man who planted the bomb was in 
Dublin when it went off.  This is precisely analogous to the argument 
which the defendants make here.  
 
 Then there is another situation in which the holiday or sick leave 
argument is advanced.  Here the defendants himself did not actually give 
the specific order before he left his headquarters.  It was given either 
by his Chief of Staff or by whoever happened to be his responsible deputy 
during his absence.  The defendant, therefore, disavows any 
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responsibility  for the order even though upon is being advised of it, he 
took no steps either to rescind it, to reprimand the officer who actually 
signed it, or to forbid the issuance of similar orders in the future.  
 
 Now one can well imagine the subsequent fate of a subordinate who, 
having temporarily taken over his superior’s duties during a short 
absence, attempted during that time to issue an order to kill people 
without having first assured himself that any orders of this kind would 
meet with his superior’s full approval and be ratified and defended upon 
the latter’s return.  Yet these defendants seriously argue that every 
time they went to the hospital or to the homeland for a few days their 
chiefs of staff or deputies not only issued orders which effected a 
complete reversal of all policies which had been necessary for every 
commanding officer in the German Army to stay awake and alert twenty-four 
hours a day, seven days a week, in order to insure against one of his 
subordinate’s bringing about a complete shambles every time he turned his 
back.   
 
 This last variation of the holiday-sick leave argument is merely 
one of a number of means which have been employed in an effort to achieve 
the same end.  The end is not very pretty, but then these defendants are 
in no position to pay too much attention to aesthetic 
considerations.  The aim is simply to shove the responsibility for these 
crimes on their fellow officers in the German Wehr acht.  They will first 
try to place the onus on the police or the SS, but if that maneuver is 
too far-fetched, they then cast about to find some other German Army 
officer to bear the blame.  As was to be expected, their first choice for 
the role of scapegoat is generally some officer of lower rank than their 
own, such as divisional commander.  But if that is not feasible, then as 
a last resort they say that the responsibility  
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rests with their superiors.  Then does every defendant, be he a full Army 
or but a Corps commander conveniently place himself in a pivotal position 
from which he can, as the winds seem to blow, pass criminal 
responsibility either up or down the military pyramid.   
 
 Now this all a ticklish business, of course, and has to be 
approached with care and circumspection.  It is not strategically 
advisable simply to blame any superior officer who may be lying around 
handy.  After all, the German Army must be vindicated, and that aim 
cannot be accomplished if all of its high-ranking officers are to be 
sneared  (sic) with accusations of participating in the kind of 
indefensible butcheries that we have heard discussed here.  So a 
technique has been devised to meet the requirementsof (sic) the delicate 
situation.  In blaming their superiors, the defendants here have been 
careful to do one of two things: they have either phrased their language 
in vague, corporate terms by saying that the OKH or the OKW was 
responsible, without naming particular individuals; or else, if it seemed 
more expedient to unload the blame onto a specific individual, they have 
been careful to choose individuals who are dead.  
 
 First, take the case in which their subordinate have been selected 
to bear the responsibility.  This excuse is patently based upon a 
deliberate distortion of the whole concept of military organization, not 
only as ti was known in the German Army, but in every army in the 
world.  When the general of an army issues an order, it is to his corps 
commanders that he looks for its execution.  If the order is disobeyed or 
clumsily carried out, it is the corps commander who is called on the 
carpet.  Perhaps the order was not carried out because some major general 
was derelict in his duty.  Possibly the fault is really that of some 
colonel or major. 
 
 But an army commander is not disposed to be interested in first 
causes.  It may be that for want of a nail the shoe was lost and that 
eventually for want of the shoe the battle was lost.  But neither the 
3 February 48-M-ATD-5-4-Maloy (Int. Evand) 
Court 5, Case 7 
 
blacksmith  nor the horse is held accountable by the commanding 
general.  He is not interested in hearing that an order miscarried 
because of the obstinacy or stupidity of a divisional commander.  If a 
corps commander attempted to render such an explanation he would be told 
nine times out of ten that it was his job to have discovered the 
divisional commander’s inadequacy long before and to have sacked him and 
replaced him with some more capable person.   
 
 This is not only the practical way in which an army operated but it 
is the only logical way. All armies are pyramidal in their 
organization.  There is not time for an army commander or an army group 
commander to call a convention of all his divisional and regimental 
leaders every time he issues an order.  The function of the corps is to 
make this unnecessary.  The corps commanders are told what they are 
supposed to do and there, so far as their superior is concerned, the 
matter ends.  If this were not so, the phrase "chain-of-command" would 
have no meaning.  Aside from the fact that it is more than a trifle 
cowardly for these men to try to shift the responsibility to their 
subordinates for having executed orders which these men passes on after 
they were received from higher headquarters, the whole concept is 
grotesque.   
 
 Then take the case in which they have blamed their superiors.  He 
Prosecution has already pointed out in its brief that the plea of 
superior orders is no defense at all.  We shall not repeat here the 
abundance of authorities which we have already cited in support of our 
position on this legal issue.  But a few remarks should be made with 
reference to some of the testimony on the subject.   
 
 The defendants themselves have not been consistent in the stand 
which they have taken on the issue of obedience to superior 
orders.  Several of them are charged with having carried out the 
notorious Commissar Order. Every one of those has steadfastly denied that 
troops under his command summarily murdered political commissars in 
compliance 
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with that unquestionably criminal mandate.  All have admitted having 
received the order or at least having been apprised of its contents.  Now 
it should be remembered that the Commissar Order was Fuehrerbefehl, which 
is to say that it was issued by the highest possible authority.  Yet the 
defendants say that they deliberately neglected or refused to obey it 
because they felt it was illegal, unsoldierly, and inhumane or because 
they believed it would have the precise opposite effect from that which 
was intended.  In that matter they insisted upon substituting their own 
judgment for that of Adolf Hitler and Field Marshal von Brauchitsch.  Yet 
the very defendants who have testified in that vein about the Commissar 
Order have said that they had no right to forbid or discourage the 
shooting of hostages because executions had been ordered by the OKW.   
 
 Another general observation might be made about the testimony which 
has been offered on the superior order defense.  Except for Brigadier 
General von Geitner, the lowest-ranking defendants in this dock were 
Lieutenant Generals who commanded between 50,000 and 100,000 
troops.  Career officers who spent their lives learning their profession, 
they obtained their rank because in the opinion of their superiors they 
possessed the intelligence and judgment which the responsibility of such 
a position demanded.  Within the framework of the broad directives given 
to these men, they were allowed and expected to exercise a wide 
discretion in carrying out their duties.  We could hear testimony 
until  doomsday that a Lieutenant General of a Colonel General of a Field 
Marshal was only a loud speaker through which the commands of his 
superiors were amplified or echoed and it would still not be convincing. 
 
 If these men had disagreed with the policies which were being 
executed within their respective spheres of command, whether such 
policies affected the treatment of the civilian population, the 
discipline of the German troops, or the political and racial programs 
behind 
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the directives handed down from higher echelons, that disapproval would 
have manifested itself immediately in a hundred different ways. If they 
were the tools through which the murderous theories of Streicher, Himmler 
and Hitler were implemented, it was because their compliance was 
completely voluntary. The criminal liability for what they did cannot be 
shunted up the line.  
 
A corollary of the superior order defense is the one predicated upon the 
assumption of the legality of orders emanating from Hitler and the OKW. 
Every defendant, without exception, has said that when such orders 
reached him, it never occurred to him to question their legality no 
matter what the subject matter or how severe the measures prescribed. 
They argue that there was a multitude of legal experts at OKW 
headquarters in Berlin and that they could not be expected to doubt that 
every OKW order had been subjected to the scrutiny of these jurists 
before it was sent out.  
 
One would have to be credulous indeed to believe that professional 
soldiers with decades of active service and the experiences of a previous 
world war behind them were so ignorant as not to know that orders which 
denied the belligerent status to their enemies, which forbade the taking 
and indeed commended the execution of prisoners of war, and which 
established arbitrary hostage execution ratios of 50 and 100-to-1, were 
in patent violation of every recognized standard ever set by civilized 
nations for the conduct of warfare. This plea would have no validity as a 
legal defense even if we believed them. The maxim ignorantia juris non 
excusat is as well recognized by the criminal codes of the continent as 
it is by Anglo-American law.  
 
But how can one possibly accept this argument as sincere? High-ranking 
military judges were readily available at Army and Division, and in 
Lanz’s case even at Corps, headquarters if legal advice had been desired, 
which it clearly was not. Moreover, none of these very defendants, as 
they were eager to point out, assumed that the Commissar  
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and Commando and Military Mission orders were valid, even though 
they,[sic?] too, stemmed from the evil triumvirate in Berlin. Nor, on 
other occasions, when they were anxious to demonstrate their basic 
humaneness, did they hesitate to describe their misgivings about those 
same hostage, reprisal and band warfare regulations whose legality they 
insist had to be presumed. Consistency is a word which apparently is not 
found in their dictiunary[sic].  
 
Along with superior orders, military necessity is the most basic of the 
defenses herein advanced. This defense is almost always yoked together 
with a long description of what the defendants call "Balkan mentality". 
We have been told that this particular "Balkan mentality" is 
incomprehensible to the western European mind; that all of southeastern 
Europe is populated by uncivilized savages who are and were incapable of 
appreciating the finer things of life such as the presence of 20 or 30 
divisions of German troops whose only purpose was to act as missionaries 
of culture and to protect these helpless people against an invasion by 
the American, British or Russian "enemy". We have been told that the 
disappointing[sic] response of the Balkan peoples to all the advantages 
of a German occupation was proof in itself that that occupation was a 
positive boon to the region. The Serbs, Croats, Montenegrins, Albanians 
and Greeks have been depicted as having had only one desire – to murder 
as many Germans and as many of each other as possible. We have been 
informed that the racial and religious hatreds which exist between the 
various groups in the Balkans are so deep-seated and bitter that had it 
not been for the Germans they would have annihilated each other 
wholesale. This is the picture of "Balkan mentality" as the defendants 
have painted it.  
 
From this they go on to say that in dealing with such a situation 
ordinary measures were insufficient. To a man all of these defendants 
have testified that in their opinion it was impossible to govern in 
Yugoslavia and Greece without the use of reprisal measures.  
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The execution of hostages, the burning of villages and the shooting of 
captured partisans was, therefore, a case of military necessity.  
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The argument of the defense of military necessity is unconvincing here 
for several reasons. In the first place, it is the prosecution’? 
conTention that the plea of military necessity can never be used as a 
defense for the taking of an unarmed civilian’s life, if he is innocent 
of any hostile conduct against the occupying power. Section 24 of the 
American Army Field Manual correctly states the accepted definition of 
that term in international law. It reads:  
 
"Military necessity admits of ---  
 
1. All direct destruct of life or limb of armed enemies, and of other 
persons whose destruction is incidentally unavoidable in the armed 
contests of war."  
 
The emphasis of the word "armed" in the test necessarily excludes from 
the class of persons whose killing may be justified on the grounds of 
military necessity persons such as those who were used by the German 
troops as hostages.  
 
In the second place, it is inconsistent to attempt to defend the same 
action by the plea of superior orders and also by that of military 
necessity because the two are mutually exclusive. If an act was committed 
solely because of superior orders, then presumably there was no military 
necessity for doing it; whereas if it was done because of military 
necessity, it would have been done anyhow regardless of the existence or 
non-existence of superior orders.  
 
In the third place, the defense of military necessity flies into the 
teeth of all the available evidence here. In addition to the oral 
testimony of such witnesses as General von Greiffenberg, Bach-Zelewski, 
and even General Winter, there are among the documents Many complaints 
made by responsible German officers, who pointed out that the technique 
of reprisal measures had proved to be a boomerang in that it  
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resulted in a stiffening of partisan resistance in the areas where these 
measures were carried out.  
 
We need not here go into a long refutation of what the defendants have 
said about "Balkan mentality". They were not in a position while in the 
Balkans to get a very clear or detached view of it, any more than the 
Balkan peoples were able to view from a favorable vantage point what 
could be conceivably argued to be a unique German mentality. The 
mentality of the Serbs, the Croats and the Greeks was undoubtedly a 
source of frustation[sic] and bafflement to the defendants, just as 
perhaps the British mentality was. Whatever the present or future 
relations between the United States and the Governments of Yugoslavia, 
Albania and Greece may be, the tenacious and inextinguishable spirit with 
which these people resisted the German occupation, sustained for two long 
and bitter years only by their own determination, will always be 
remembered as one of the greatest demonstrations of courage displayed 
during this or any other war. Resistance against enslavement has absorbed 
a good deal of these people’s time during the past 100 years. It has been 
less than a century since the Serbs and Greeks threw off the Turkish 
yoke, and scarcely more than two decades have passed since those same 
heroic Serbs battled unaided for almost four years against the armies of 
the Triple Alliance. The Germans knew this, of course, when they invaded 
Yugoslavia, but these defendants and their brother officers thought that 
by applying von Clausewitz’s theory of unrestricted warfare with 
sufficient ruthlessness they could break the spirit of these long-
suffering people as even the Turks have failed to do before them. The 
long record of crimes which have been described at the bar of this 
Tribunal are the natural result of the practical  
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application of this method of restoring quiet to the Balkans. It not only 
failed but it stirred up such a hornet’s nest of resistance that tens of 
thousands of soldiers desperately needed elsewhere were immobilized to do 
nothing but garrison and police duty – all because of this obstinate 
"Balkan mentality".  
 
The contention predicated and the allegedly binding effect of the 
surrender of the Greek and Yugoslav armies is just as infirm as the other 
so-called defenses. General Tsolocoglu who signed the capitulation 
agreement on the part of the Greek Epirus Army was not the commander-in-
chief of that Army but only its deputy commander-in-chief. Further, there 
is no evidence whatever that Tsolocoglu was authorized either by the 
Greek Government, headed by King George II, or by the actual commander-
in-chief of the Epirus Army to sign that capitulation agreement. The 
defense had not even attempted to prove who signed the capitulation 
agreement on behalf of the Greek Thracian Army or that that capitulation 
tOo was authorized by the Greek Government.  
 
The situation is even clearer in the case of the capitulation of the 
Yugoslav Army. The surrender agreement there was signed by the former, 
and deposed, Foreign Minister of Yugoslavia, Cincar Markovic. The 
commander-in-chief of the Yugoslav forces, General Simovic, who was 
simultaneously Prime Minister of King Peter’s government, not only did 
not sign the agreement of surrender of the Yugoslav armed forces but had 
previously fled the country along with the rest of his cabinet for exile 
in England. In this case not even the deputy commander-in-chief of the 
Yugoslav armed forces, General Kalafotovic, signed the agreement of 
surrender to the Germans. So much for the facts regarding the defense  
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based upon the capitulation of Greece and Yugoslavia.  
 
The legal theory of the defense on this point seems to be this – when an 
officer signs an agreement of surrender, even though he is not only not 
authorized but specifically forbidden from doing so, then it is unlawful 
thereafter for any of that officer’s countrymen under any circumstances 
to take up arms against the conquering power. If this reasoning is valid, 
then all of the American forces in the Pacific after April 1942 could 
have been treated as francs-tireurs simply because General Wainwright, 
their fellow American, had surrendered on Corregidor. Before the 
defendants can justify themselves for having refused to accord 
belligerent status to a particular partisan on this ground, it must first 
be shown that the partisan in question had formerly been a member of the 
Yugoslav Army and was, therefore, constructively bound by the surrender 
agreement. One need not labor the obvious by remarking that no such proof 
has been offered.  
 
The defense with respect to these capitulation agreements has still a 
further flaw. It was said that following the collapse of Greek resistance 
in April 1941, the Greek prisoners were allowed to return to their homes 
with the understanding that they would not in the future take up arms 
against the conquerer[sic]. Prisoners of war, who are set at liberty on 
parole, are bound, on their personal honor, scrupulously to fulfill the 
engagements they have contracted. PresumablY one of those engagements 
which the surrendered Greek soldiers contracted to fulfill, though the 
evidence is flimsy to say the least, was to never again take up arms 
against Germany. But even if any evidence of such a parole agreement at 
the time of the surrender of the Greek forces had been made out by the 
defense, it would not be binding here for several reasons.  
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First, prisoners of war be set at liberty on parole only if the laws of 
their country allow and there has, of course, been no proof of what Greek 
law is on this matter.  
 
Furthermore, there can be no paroling on the battle field, no paroling of 
entire bodies of troops after battle, and no dismissal of large number of 
prisoners by a general declaration. Even if one accepts the scant proof 
offered by the defense on this point, it can scarcely be doubted that 
this forbidden type of parole was exactly the kind that the German Army 
there adopted at the time of the Greek surrender.  
 
In addition, a prisoner of war cannot be compelled to accept his liberty 
on the parole nor is the hostile government obliged to accede to the 
request of a prisoner to be set at liberty on parole. There has been no 
proof that the Greek government-in-exile ever consented to or ratified 
the discharge of captured members of the Greek Army on parole – even if 
there was any such discharge on the part of the German Army at that time. 
The only evidence adduced by the defense would indicated that the Greek 
prisoners of war were merely disarmed and sent home without further ado 
to save the German Army the trouble of feeding them.  
 
Further, the conquerer[sic] has certain duties and obligations to perform 
to the conquered even in a case of an unconditional surrender. The making 
of an unconditional surrender does not free the victor from his 
obligation to observe international law; and when the Germans commenced 
their campaign of indiscriminate shootings and hangings of the civilian 
population, even former members of the Greek and Yugoslav Armies, who had 
given their individual paroles – if such there were – were perfectly 
justified in using whatever means  
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they could to rid their country of this plague.  
 
The last of the common defenses is to the effect that since the partisans 
were not entitle to the status of lawful belligerents, the German Army 
was not bound to follow the rules and customs of war in combatting[sic] 
them. The defendants themselves have skirted the fringes of some of the 
subsidiary arguments involved here rather cautiously. For example, none 
of them has been willing to rest his contention that the partisans were 
unlawful upon any one ground.  
 
In the face of the German intelligence reports concerning the 
organization, strength, armament, and location of the partisan units, the 
names of their officers, the elaborate courier, postal, judicial and 
governmental administrative systems in force in the large areas under 
their control, it is hardly arguable that the partisans were not a 
regular and highly effective military-political-economic organization, 
which is the basic test for determining whether an enemy group is 
entitled to the status of a belligerent.  
 
The defendants have realized how feeble it is to maintain that the 
partisans were not military organized and have fallen back on the 
completely irrelevant complaint that the designations which the partisans 
gave to their units, such as battalions, regiments and brigades, did not 
correspond to the German nomenclature. It is perfectly apparent that in 
Yugoslavia, for instance, the partisans had a perfectly well-defined 
chain-of-command which went from Tito down to every company and platoon. 
If from time to time a small unit of partisans was cut off from the main 
body of troops to which it belonged and was unable to communicate with 
them, they were no more disorganized for that reason than were  
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segments of the German Army which were frequently in the same situation.  
 
It is unnecessary for us to take up here the other subsidiary contentions 
which have been – those to the effect that the partisans were not in 
uniform, did not carry their arms openly, and systematically violated the 
laws and customs of war. It is enough to say that the evidence which has 
been produced to support such arguments smells very strongly of ex post 
facto justification. Time after time the documents mention that the 
partisans wore uniforms or readily identifiable insignia. The defendants 
say that this may have been true, but that the uniforms were not 
standard; that the distinguishing insignia of the Tito and Mihailovitch 
partisans in Yugoslavia and the Edes and Elas Andartes in Greece were not 
identical; that some of them wore parts of Germans, Italian, British and 
American uniforms. But what possible factual difference could that have 
made then, or what legal difference now. The Hague Rules prescribe no 
standards of sartorial elegance. The object of the rule requiring the use 
of a uniform is to enable a combatant to recognize his enemy. And in 
Yugoslavia or Greece it was distinctly understood that any one who 
wandered around in a uniform had invited himself to become a target, 
regardless of its cut or color.  
 
The fact of the matter is, of course, that no matter how elegantly the 
partisans had dressed, they would have been shot upon capture in any 
event. List made that incontestably clear when he admitted that un-
uniformed Kosta Pecanac Chetniks were permitted to collaborate with 
German troops against the Tito and Mihailovitch partisans and Foertsch 
was even more forthright when he testified that the German Southeast 
Command  
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concerned itself only with considerations of military expediency and not 
the Hague Rules in dealing with the partisan problem.  
 
One word as to the testimony about partisan tactics. One examines the 
official reports and records of the German Army in vain if his object is 
to find descriptions of mutilations inflicted by the partisans. Yet the 
defendants have produced several pounds of affidavits describing these 
things in detail. We have tried to reconcile the strange silence in the 
official reports with this endless recital in the affidavits. The 
simplest and most likely explanation is that the events described in them 
also have as their factual basis some paper that was lying on General 
Dehner’s or General Kuntze’s or General Geitner’s desk that the affiant 
did not read.  
 
This interpretation is bolstered by the disparity between fact and 
testimony which occurred in the case of the Instruction of the Communist 
Party in Serbia for the conduct of band warfare. List, Kuntze and 
Foertsch testified at length that they had read captured copies of these 
instructions and that the gist of them was to encourage and incite the 
partisans to mutilate German prisoners and kill German wounded. Then the 
defense, peculiarly enough, produced these very instructions from the 
mass of doc uments[sic] which were sent from Washington. There was not a 
single word in their entire ten-odd pages which by any stretch of the 
imagination could have been construed to mean what the defendants 
testified they themselves had read in them.  
 
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Yust[sic] one more paragraph, Your Honors. So much for 
the common defenses and explanations, which like a loud yet dissonant 
chorus, the defendants all chanted together. We turn now to a necessarily 
incomplete and  
3 February-M-IL-6-9-Maloy (Int. Evand)  
Court V Case VII  
 
undetailed review of the main evidence for and against the individual 
defendants.  
 
THE PRESIDENT: We shall take our morning recess for 10 minutes.  
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THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.  
 
MR. RAPP: On 6 April 1941, from Bulgaria, Field Marshal Wilhelm List, 
Commander in Chief of the Twelfth Army launched the German invasion of 
Greece and Yugoslavia. The campaign was short-lived. Within a fortnight 
Greece was prostrate and the Yugoslav Army had been defeated. By the end 
of May, 1941, the strategic island of Crete had also fallen before 
Germany’s armed might.  
 
From that point on, Yugoslavia meanwhile having been carved up and 
sections parceled out to Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania and the 
fictitious State of Croatia, it was List’s job to manage the German 
occupation of Serbia and Greece. He was charged with primary 
responsibility for its success and to that end was given almost unlimited 
power over the lives of the civilian population. By virtue of Fuehrer 
Order #31 he was given the famous executive power which meant that under 
the guise of maintaining "peace, order and security" he could snuff out 
the existence of the native citizenry at will. He had full authority over 
all matters affecting the military administration of the entire German-
occupied areas of southeastern Europe. Within an area larger than Germany 
itself his reign was as absolute as Hitler’s and the only person in all 
of Europe to whom he was subordinate was the Fuehrer himself.  
 
List was a potentate who was jealous of any attempt to infringe upon his 
dominion. He kept the activities of Dr. Gunther Altenburg, who had been 
sent to Greece by Ribbentrop’s Foreign Office to organize the Greek 
government, under careful observation and incidentally challenged every 
move the latter made that tended to reduce his own power. It is 
positively laughable for List now to assert that his authority as Armed 
Forces Commander Southeast was restricted or crossed by any German 
agency.  
 
When on 9 June 1941 List was named Armed Forces Commander Southeast, 
Greece was relatively quiet. There were, however, vague rumblings of 
disturbances in Serbia though nothing really alarming as yet.  No 
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trouble was anticipated as a result of the withdrawals of the combat 
troops who were needed for the invasion of Russia, the match which set 
off the Balkan powderkeg. The Germans, however, had already made up their 
minds how to answer individual unrest or local rebellion. Field Marshal 
von Weichs, who has since disaccepted our invitation to this Balkan 
reunion, had already given the cue. In April, 1941, von Weichs had issued 
an order to kill 100 civilians in retaliation for the death of each 
German soldier and had published posters which proclaimed that it had 
been carried out. List was not afflicted by originality. He was not too 
proud to recognize and adopt a good idea when he saw one.  
 
The insurrection in Yugoslavia took shape during July and August, 1941 – 
by the end of which time, as can be seen from Cartillieri’s accurate and 
detailed account, the Germans had already shot approximately 1,000 Jews 
and "Communists" in reprisal. List has reiterated that he was home on 
leave during part of this time. But before he left[t], he had already 
received numerous reports of the execution of severe reprisal measures by 
his troops. Just two days before he left Athens, the death of the German 
General Lontschar was reported to XII Army headquarters by the Commanding 
General in Serbia who[m] had ordered 52 "Communists and Jews" to be 
killed in retaliation. Although List conferred with General Bader just 
one day after that massacre took place, he now cannot remember having 
discussed it. The event was evidently considered too trifling to be worth 
mentioning. List’s memory faded out again when he was asked whether at a 
conference with General Stahl the shooting of captured prisoners by 
Stahl’s Division the day before was on the agenda.  
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List’s troops were overaged[sic?], poorly trained and inadequately 
equipped to do battle with the partisan units which were everywhere 
harrassing[sic] under-manned German garrisons and outposts. He repeatedly 
asked for reinforcements. When they did not come, he tried to make up 
with terror what he lacked in military efficiency. On the[e] 1st of 
September he sent his Chief of Staff, General Foertsch, to Serbia with 
combat directives for his subordinate commanders. Accurately fore 
shadowing the tenor of things to come, List ordered "few prisoners to be 
brought in". (Cartillieri report, p. 24).  
 
Three days later, on September 4, 1941, he issued another of the criminal 
orders with which he is charged here. The troops were instructed to 
practice the "use of arms without consideration". The author explains 
that the term "severest measures" meant that the soldiers should "use 
those weapons they had at their disposal" and that by "reckless use of 
weapons" he meant "the employment of all those weapons which were 
available." This is another example of the re-definition[sic?] technique 
which have been already analyzed elsewhere.  
 
Apparently, however, List was not satisfied that the language used in 
this order was not clear enough. So he supplemented it by another order 
the next day, the famous order of 5 September 1941, which, more than 
perhaps any other single order, List now wishes he had never issued. In 
that order he announced that attacks on German troops and installations 
were being carried out by strong, well-armed, well-organized and well-led 
partisan bands. To counterattack their power List demanded "ruthless and 
immediate measures against the insurgents, against their accomplices and 
against their families. (Hanging, burning down of villages involved, 
seizure of more hostages, deportation of relatives, etc. into 
concentration camps)."  
 
The explanations which he gave on the witness stand for the publication 
of this contribution to German culture are somewhat muddled and self-
contradictory, but they have one characteristic in common: they  
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are all uniformly unbelievable. Once he admitted that he knew the order 
was violative of international law. Later he changed his mind and took 
the position that the order could be justified on the ground of military 
necessity. This, of course, is inconsistent with his assertion that he 
never would have issued such an order if it had not been for the very 
heavy pressure which was being put on him by the OKW.  
 
Another thing that List has never explained is why this order was never 
rescinded. He knew that his headquarters had placed more than an academic 
interpretation upon it. It is evident from the reports which he received 
that excessively severe reprisal executions were taking place even before 
the much-blamed Keitel directive saw the light of day.  
 
Om July 25, 1941, a 16-year-old girl was arrested in Belgrade for 
throwing a bottle of gasoline at a German vehicle. A hundred Jews were 
shot to death in reprisal four days later. On August 15, 1941, an Armed 
Forces Commander Southeast report stated that in retaliation for an 
attack upon a German police car, the town of Skela was burned down and 
"two Communists" hanged. On 2 September 1941, twenty "Communists" were 
shot in retaliation for the three German soldiers killed in an attack on 
a mine at Rtanj, Serbia, and the following day, 3 September, 50 Serbs 
were shot in reprisal for the soldiers of the 724th Guard Regiment shot 
by "Communists". A few days, on 9 September, 50 or more so-called 
"Communists" were shot in the reprisal for the death of a single German 
soldier.  
 
During the month of September 1941, the growth of the insurrection had 
become so alarming that it received the personal attention of Hitler and 
of the OKW. To solve the problem List proposed the sending of one of his 
corps commanders, General Boehme, to Serbia as Plenipotentiary Commanding 
General with full power and authority over all German military units, as 
well as civilian offices stationed there.  
 
Hitler agreed and sent an order directly to List charging him with  
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the task of quelling the insurgent movement in the Southeast. Hitler did 
not give specific directions, but merely counseled in general terms the 
"application of the most severe means". On the same day, 16 September 
1941, Keitel issued his basic directive, the much-discussed Prosecution 
Exhibit 53, which described the revolts in the occupied areas as part of 
a movement centrally directed from Moscow and suggested that "in general" 
50 to 100 Communists should be killed in retaliation for every German 
soldier who lost his life.  
 
As we have already seen, the notion of reprisal ratios reaching as high 
as 50:1 was nothing new in List’s area of command. His troops had been 
carrying out such measures for over two months prior to the time the 
Keitel directive was written.  
 
List had no duty to pass on to his subordinates such a general 
recommendation unless he wanted to. In view of the immense discretion 
with which he had been invested by Hitler himself he could have simply 
filed away this "directive" and kept it in the oblivion it deserved 
without subjecting himself to criticism from anyone. Nevertheless, he 
chose to pass this flexible "50 to 100" to 1 proposal of Keitel’s on to 
his subordinates without any qualifications or comments of his own. He 
could only have expected his subordinates to interpret this act as an 
expression of approval of the suggestions contained in the Keitel 
directive and as a command by List that the proposed figures be applied 
at once.  
 
List now says that he disapproved of Keitel’s order "for [p]purely humane 
reasons". The difficulty is that Field Marshal List’s humanity is almost 
six years too late in finding expression. He told his operations officer, 
Kuebler, to express his protests to the OKW. Kuebler is dead so there is 
only List’s unilateral version of this private conversation. Nor is there 
any note or record that Kuebler ever passed on such a protest.  
 
List followed the same procedure when he received the OKW’s next  
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brain-child on 28 September suggesting that military commanders keep at 
their disposal a number of hostages of different political persuasion – 
nationalist democrats and communists – so that the executiins[sic] could 
be more selective. This directive List also passed on to the units under 
his command.  
 
Meanwhile General Boehme had taken over his new post as Plenipotentiary 
Commanding General in Serbia. On 4 October List decided to unburden 
himself of his own thoughts on the subject of reprisal measures. This 
took the form of an order directed to Boehme in which he directed that 
all men in the insurgent areas, whether they had taken part in combat or 
not, were to be seized as hostages in the event of the appearance of 
bandits or of attacks against the Wehrmacht. Most severe measures of 
punishment "without further investigation" were prescribed for localities 
in which or near which such occurrence happened, and particularly against 
the male population of such villages.  
 
In weighing the credibility of List’s protestations here, the Tribunal 
might put itself in the position of one of his subordinates in the month 
of October 1941. Such a man would have had received three orders signed 
by List since the beginning of September which directed that ruthless 
measures be taken against the civilian population in the event of attacks 
or sabotage by the partisans. These had been followed by the Keitel 50 to 
100 to 1 directive which had been passed on with no limitations whatever 
by List, and by the OKW order of 28 September. Then on 4 October List 
issued the pronouncement which has just been de scribed[sic].  
 
What was one of his subordinates to conclude from all this? Is it likely 
that he was under the impression that List had moral reservations 
concerning the justice or humanity of executing hostages? We have seen a 
rather large assortment of German generals in this courtroom and we have 
heard them say some fairly incredible things but none of them has claimed 
that it was necessary for him to be psychic in order to interpret the 
orders of a Field Marshal.  
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General Boehme seems to have been temperamentally qualified for his job. 
On 10 October he issued an order changing the elastic "50 to 100 to 1" 
Keitel ratio to the flat and arbitrary quota of 100 hostages for each 
German soldier or Volksdeutsche killed and 50 for each one wounded. List 
was informed of this improved version of the Keitel directive, but again 
those humane instincts that he had described here fail somehow to make 
themselves heard. He never uttered a murmur of disapproval of Beohme’s 
action.  
 
Early in October the incident at Grabovac occurred. The partisans had 
forced certain farmers there to cut down ten telegraph poles. One of the 
farmers was released after an interrogation by the police. List opinioned 
to Boehme that the farmer should not have been turned loose and asked 
what reprisal measures had been taken against the inhabitants of the 
village for the damage to the telegraph poles. The response came in two 
installments, the first of which reported that Boehme had ordered every 
fifth house in the village to be burned down. This was supplemented later 
by the information that the whole village had been burned and that 73 
inhabitants had been shot. List now says that Boehme was harsher than he 
intended. We submit that Boehme’s only fault was that he was literal-
minded. In any case, List did not communicate his misgivings about the 
correctness of the measure to anyone at the time.  
 
Three more of Boehme’s actions are worthy of mention. On 2 October, 
twenty-one members of a German signal regiment were attacked and killed 
by a detachment of partisans. Two days later, on 4 October, General 
Boehme ordered that 2100 Serbs be shot. List now says that the 
communications between Athens and Belgrade were constantly being 
interrupted and that he did not hear of Boehme’s order until after it had 
already been executed. He was certainly informed about the attack on the 
German unit and of the number of German losses.  
 
Boehme had already given sufficient proof of the stuff of which not only 
his dreams but his actions were made to put any sane man  
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on notice that after an incident of this kind step steps should be taken 
to find out what Boehme intended to do next, especially in view of the 
orders to Boehme which List had previously issued or passed on. There was 
ample time for List to make such an investigation. The report shows that 
the executions did not begin until 9 October and that only 449 people had 
been shot by the 11th. List had more than a week to inform himself of 
this impending slaughter and to stop it. He made no effort to do so and 
he now put forth the feeble excuse that he did not hear about the order 
before 8 October and at that time he went to Crete on an inspection tour 
and did not get back until October 11th. Who could possibly be convinced 
by such fanciful make-believe.[sic]  
 
Boehme carried out two massacres during October 1941. He ordered 2200 
Serbs to be executed in reprisal for German losses totalling[sic] ten 
dead and twenty-four wounded near Topola and 2300 more to be shot at 
Kragujevac for German losses totaling[sic] nine dead and twenty-six 
wounded suffered at Gr. Milanovac. The first incident occurred on the 
10th and the second on the 20th. List says that he was sick in the 
hospital at the time these took place. What we have already said about 
the holiday-sick leave argument in general is sufficient answer to this. 
Further, Boehme was List’s personal representative in Serbia. He received 
his directives only from, and was answerable only to List. Not a single 
one of these butcheries would have been ordered by him if List had 
expressed his disa[p]pproval. On the other hand, there is not a single 
one of these measures which is not fully authorized and justified by the 
series of orders which Boehme had received from List. Whether List was 
physically present in a hosp[p]ital in Athens, or in his headquarters 
office, or in the mountains of the moon is completely irrelevant. He put 
the bomb in the mail box before he left.  
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The same can be said of the manner in which he seeks to avoid guilt for 
the two mass executions in Greece on 17 October 1941. In the course of 
these glorious martial enterprises the entire population of two villages, 
Ano and Kato Kerzilion, was shot. The martyrdom of these people may not 
have been well publicized as that of the inhabitants of Lidice. When the 
Germans had finished, they had done just as thorough a job in Greece as 
they had done in Czechoslovakia. Again List is bold enough to assert that 
he was in the hospital when all of that happened.  
 
The Prosecution has charged these defendants with having employed the 
Army to carry out the anti-semetic ideals of the Third Reich. Like a 
Brahmin among untouchables, List denied that anything of this sort was 
done by the troops under his command. Nevertheless, the entire Jewish 
population of Belgrade was incarcerated in a concentration camp in the 
summer and fall of 1941. Nor was it accidental that so many Jews were 
exterminated in the reprisal measures of July to October. For example, 
all of the victims of the carnage ordered by Boehme on 4 October were 
Jews. List’s capacity for contributing to the richness and depth of the 
German language by giving ordinary words definitions that are almost 
startling in their noveltyhas[sic] already been pointed out. The 
documents repeatedly mention the concentration camps at Sabac, Zasaviza 
and Semlin. List met this by another performance of semantic alchemy; 
after the word "concentration camp" had bubbled and glowed in his alembic 
and crucibles, it came out marvelously refined and transmuted to mean 
"collecting camp".  
 
The connection between List and the Rosenberg detachments may tend to be 
forgotten, overshadowed as it is by the other enormities which we 
hav[sic] mentioned. The object of these units was to comb Europe for rare 
books and art treasuries besides Jewish and Masonic literature and to 
haul the former back to Germany and burn the latter before it could 
"contaminate" further. List’s indignation at being associated with this 
dacoital organization, like his disapproval of the policy of executing 
hostages, come  
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a little late. There is in evidence an order of the XII Army dated on 19 
April 1941 announcing that a Rosenberg unit had permission to operate in 
the area. Four days later Rosenberg informed the Nazi Enoch [a]rden, 
Martin Bormann, that Field Marshal List had made it possible for his 
units to be employed in close liaison with the SD at Salonika, one of the 
largest Jewish centers in Greece. In May, 1941 the commandant of rear 
army area #560 ordered his subordinate headquarters to cooperate with and 
support the Rosenberg units in the execution of their tasks. Their tasks 
were set forth without apparent shame. In October, List’s Chief of Staff, 
the defendant Foertsch, issued an order assigning a Rosenberg detachment 
to General Felmy for ration, quarters and discipline. It seems a little 
superfluous even to suggest that the Rosenberg detachments worked hand in 
glove with the Army because it is obvious that they could not have gone 
into occupied territory without the Army’s permission in the first place. 
But these examples merely show the extent to which these three specific 
defendants -- List, Foertsch and Felmy -- were involved in this robbery. 
Their denials of any such connection are simply one more indication of 
the weight which should be attached to their testimony. 
 
Finally, List is charged with having carried out the Commissar Order. He 
was Commander in Chief of Army Group A in Russia from 7 July to 10 
September 1942, and he now says that he never even heard of the order, 
much less of its execution during that time. The improbability of this is 
shown very clearly by the testimony of General von Leyser who was only a 
divisional commander in Russia at that time. When he was asked whether he 
knew about it, his response was, "Yes, this Commissar Order was generally 
known and everyone was talking about it." If everyone was talking about 
it and if corps commanders were discussing it at meetings of their 
subordinates, it seems unlkiely [sic] that an army group commander, who 
was also the fifth ranking Field Marshal in the entire German Army, could 
have been successful in isolating himself from 
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reality to the extent that List claims for himself. What makes it even 
more unlikely is that we have introduced in evidence here three examples 
of reports made by units subordinated to List at that time in which the 
execution of commissars is described. These denials and confessions of 
ignorance on List’s part are so transparent that it is embarrassing to 
repeat them. 
 
 The details as to the exact time when Field Marshal List ceased to 
be held responsible by OKW for events within this area of command are a 
little blurred. During rebuttal we introduced an order signed by List on 
30 October 1941, a time when he was supposedly too infirm to know, or to 
be able to rectify if he cared, about excesses within the army. List’s 
annoyance at the resurrection of a decree which he had long believed 
would never be discovered was matched only by the vociferousness of his 
counsel’s objections to its admissibility. List was embarrassed not only 
because of the reflections case upon his credibility but also because the 
basis of his very own theory of military immunity, in addition to his 
claim of physical and mental incapacity, was brought under serious fire. 
 
 List set the tone for the German occupation of Greece and Serbia. 
He put in motion the machinery that murdered thousands of innocent 
people. There was no one except Hitler who could alter his course and 
Hitler did not attempt to interfere. List was given a free hand. He used 
it to wield the Knout (German: Knute) and the bludgeon, to give the 
signal to the handman and the firing squad. He is the very source and 
fountainhead of the misery to whichthese [sic] unfortunate people were 
subjugated during the German soldiery in the Balkans. 
 
 By 30 October 1941, however, General Walter Kuntze was already in 
Athens. On his way there from Berlin he had stopped in Belgrade for a 
conference with General Boehme  whose blood-letting activities were 
beginning to reach their peak. Kuntze does not recall whether he and 
Boehme mentioned the three masse executions involving over 6,000 people  
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which had taken place in a three-week period just prior to their meeting. 
Even though there were doubtless more important items on the agenda, one 
would have thought that this matter would have been warranted at least a 
casual reference.  
 
 A word about Kuntze’s relation to List. Kuntze was sent to Greece 
as Deputy Armed Forces Commander Southeast and Deputy Chief of Staff on 
the 12th  Army. He arrived in Athens on October 26 and assumed command 
the following day. List remained physically in Greece until 6 December 
1941 and retained his title as Armed Forces Commander Southeast and 
Commander-in-Chief of 12 Army until August 1942.  
 
 To what extent List was consulted by Kuntze during the time that 
elapsed before List returned to Germany we do not know. It seems 
inconceivable that Kuntze should not have consulted with his predecessor 
at least for the purpose of informing himself as to what policies had 
been followed up till then and particularly since he didn’t anticipate 
remaining long. At any rate, Kuntze does not attempt to lay the 
responsibility for events which happened during his period on this. And 
after List left Greece, it is clear that Kuntze though acting as his 
deputy had every right and power which his predecessor had ever 
possessed.  
 
 Kuntze admits that he was briefed in detail by Foertsch his Chief 
of Staff, when he arrived in Athens but his recollection of what took 
place in this meeting is as sketchy as his memory of the subjects 
discussed between him and Boehme a day or so earlier. He recalls that 
Foertsch told him about the revolt in Serbia but he does not think he was 
given any information about the reprisal measures which were taken by the 
Germans in order to suppress them. 
 
 If you believe this testimony, Kuntzehad [sic] no knowledge of the 
Keitel directive of 16 September until some time in December.  
 
 Meanwhile the blood-bath was being continued by the worthy Boehme 
with undiluted energy. As soon as List passed off the stage and Kuntze 
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stepped into his shoes, then he, of course, became Boehme’s chief and 
responsible for Boehme’s action to the same extent as List had been. The 
citation of just a few of the orders issued by Boehme between the time 
Kuntze took over and the time Boehme left Serbia on December 6 will 
suffice to indicate the nature and extent of the kind of activity which 
Kuntze condoned: 
 
October 30: 800 hostages are to be shot for the murder of eight German 
prisoners.  
 
October 31: 200 hostages are to be shot in retaliation for the attack on 
a railway train in which one German soldier was killed and two wounded. 
 
November 19: 250 hostages reported shot in reprisal for losses of the 
3rd Battalion of the 697th Inf. Regt. 
 
November 20: 385 hostages are to be shot in retaliation for losses by the 
same unit. 
 
November 29: 100 hostages are to be shot in retaliation for the death of 
Corporal al Bernhard Schmidt. 
 
Boehme of course followed the highest ratio mentioned in the Keitel 
directive: 100:1 in the case of German deaths and 50:1 in the case of 
German wounded. Kuntze says that this ratio was repugnant to him and he 
points with pride, as evidence of his own humane attitude, to the fact 
that Boehme’s successor, General Bader, reduced the quotas to a mere 50:1 
and 25:1. Kuntze claims, but without offering any documentary 
confirmation, that this innovation was brought about as a result of his 
intercession, itself a denial of the independence of the subordinate 
field commanders that has been vaunted so much throughout this case. 
 
It is difficult to say that the behavior ov [sic] the German troops after 
Kuntze’s arrival was worse than it had bee[n] before because of the 
inherent dificultyof [sic] applying a qualitative measure to brutality. 
Let us say then that some new practices, intended to make the German 
reprisal machinery run more efficiently, began to be accepted as part of 
the normal order of things. Captured partisans were shot on principle. 
This applied 
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to the wounded as well. It is hard to tell what Kuntze’s defense is to 
the proof which we have brought of these practices. He seems to say that 
no apology need by [sic] made for shooting captured partisans because 
their activities were unlawful in the first place, although he does think 
it regrettable that the wounded were also slaughtered. On the other hand, 
he said that some of the reports show that the captured partisans were 
standrechtlich erschossen which he contended meant "shot after a summary 
court martial", that is, after a full legal hearing. The expression "shot 
after interrogation" usedso [sic] often in the reports, was just another 
way of saying the very same thing, Knutze [sic] blandly remarked. If any 
ambiguity remained on the meaning of this term in actual practice, it was 
removed by the testimony of Dr. Lattmann, an army judge at OKH 
headquarters, who said that the phrase conveyed the meaning that no legal 
proceedings whatever were taken prior to the shooting. Kuntze permitted 
the basic reprisal orders of List and Boehme to remainoutstanding [sic] 
and [sic] and acted upon though he was constantly informed of the 
terrible harvest being reaped in Serbia as a result of them. But Kuntze’s 
actions were not only negative in nature. He, too, made certain positive 
contribution to the German campaign of senseless butchery. 
 
 In his order of 6 February 1942 he announced: 
 
 "The treatment of prisoners in the course of operations requires 
application of a more severe criterior. Prisoners taken in combat can not 
be innocent. People who loiter in the combat terrain and are not in their 
residence, will be mostly considered as having participated in combat and 
consequently must accordingly be shot to death. The mild conception of 
the troops is to be combatted most rigorously in view of the same 
conception during the past summer end the ensuing consequences!" 
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 On 19 March 1942 he issued an even more brutal order which, to 
insure wide circulation, he distributed in 100 copies. Kuntze urged the 
end of indulgence in "false sentimentality", stating that it was 
preferable that 50 "suspects" be liquidated than that one German soldier 
lose his life. Other provisions instructed that partisans and civilians 
be used to clear up mines, and that villages in the neighborhood of which 
partisan attacks or sabotage actions took place be destroyed, and the 
inhabitants sent to concentration camps. Finally, he directed that if it 
were not practicable to apprehend those who participated in the revolt, 
reprisal measures of a general nature be taken- 
 
 "For instance, the shooting to death of all male inhabitants for 
the nearest villages according to a definite ratio. (For instance, 
one German dead – 100 Serbs, one German wounded – 50 Serbs)." 
 
So much for Kuntze’s initiative in Serbia. The reports leave no doubt 
that Kuntze’s effort of 19 March was not just baying to the moon. 
 
 The picture in Greece was only slightly less gory than that in 
Serbia. In Kuntze’s report of 3 June 1942, it was stated that 50 hostages 
had been shot to death in Crete in retaliation for sabotage and attacks 
on the airport at Iraklion. On 10 June a report, signed by Foertsch, said 
that hostages had been shot in Athens in retaliation for attacks on 
armored cars and that a number of hostages had been shot in Crete as a 
reprisal measure for the murder of officials appointed by the German 
authorities. 
 
 To unravel Kuntze’s incomprehensible explanations for this sanguine 
record is a task which we willingly hand over to his defense counsel. It 
seems to be a mixture of lack of knowledge, military necessity, superior 
orders, plus an argument that more of the reprisal victims were captured 
partisans rather than innocent civilians. All poured together in no 
particular proportions nor in any special sequence. He says in one breath 
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that he was forced to do various things because of the heavy pressure 
which was put on him by the OKW, and in the next that he deserves credit 
for having circumvented and modified the orders of the OKW.  
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 In the latter connection he said that in order to deceive the OKW, 
many partisans were reported to be "temporarily arrested". Kuntze says 
that the High Command assumed that these people were to be shot, whereas 
in fact they were not. As at least four documents introduced here show 
that persons in the temporary arrested categories were shot in large 
numbers, we are inclined to doubt that there was any such deception. 
 
 Kuntze also denies that that [sic] the Army had anything to do with 
the Jewish extermination program or with the institution of concentration 
camps, As time and again in his reports we find refernces to the number 
of Jews in concentration camps mentioned alongside the figures showing 
the number of hostages and reprisal prisoners being held, Kuntze’[s] 
memory appears to be wholly unreliable. 
 
 So far as the Commissar Order is concerned, we have introduced a 
report made by the Field Gendame Squad attached to the 61st Infantry 
Division which was subordinate to Kuntze’s 42nd corps in Russia. This 
report enumerates the execution of 18 commissars and politruks over a 
two-day period alone. The rest of the report is riddled with references 
to the shootings of additional commissars and politruks. Kuntze, of 
course, says that his commanding general had instructed him, in spite of 
the Commissar order, to treat captured commissars as prisoners of war, 
and that he in turn instructed his subordinate units to the same effect. 
The reliability of the report as opposed to Kuntze’s credibility is the 
issue before the court on this point. 
 
 If the guilt of these men is to be measured by mere statistics, it 
is true beyond question that Kuntze has the blood of more innocent people 
on his hands than any defendant in the dock. 
 
FOERTSCH AND GETTNER 
 
 We turn now to the defendants Foertsch and Geitner. It is natural 
to consider them together because within their respective commands they 
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occupied identical positions. Both were Chiefs of Staff and both attempt 
to base their defense mainly upon the nature of the powers, duties and 
responsibilities which were the concomitants and appurtenances of the 
position of chief of staff. Of all the defendants in the dock these two 
men stayed longest in the Southeast. The three men who held the position 
of Commanding General of the 12th Army were List, Kuntze, and Loehr. The 
12th Army was succeeded by Army Group E and Army Group F commanded by von 
Weichs. Foertsch was Chief of Staff to all four of these men, which is to 
say that he occupied the position of Chief of Staff to the highest 
authority in Greece and Yugoslavia from the beginning of the German 
occupation until March 1944. It was through him that continuity in the 
policies of the German Army in the Balkans was preserved. 
 
 Geitner occupied the corresponding position on the staff of the 
German Commanding General in Serbia and later the Military Commander 
Southeast. He went to Serbia in July of 1942 as Bader’s Chief of Staff 
and continued to serve under Bader’s successor, General Felber, until 
October 1944. 
 
 We have already given a few examples of the crimes which were 
committed in Serbia and Greece during the reigns of List and Kuntze. It 
is our position that the blame for these murders ought not to rest 
altogether on them but should certainly be shared by their Chief of 
Staff. By asking the court to give Foertsch part of the credit for these 
occurrences, we do not feel that we are causing List and Kuntze any real 
deprivation. There is enough crime to go around. 
 
 Further, it would be unfair not to give Foertsch, the tactical and 
political high priest of the Southeast Command, some of the credit. We 
have mentioned the variousorders [sic] which List and Kuntze either wrote 
or passed on to their subordinates. Foertsch had a hand in almost every 
one. He actually forwarded the Keitel order of 28 September 1941, which 
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decreed that persons from all walks of the population be arrested as 
hostages and shot in the event of hostile actions against the occupation 
power. He passed on the OKW order of 7 February 1942 which demanded that 
fewer partisans be taken prisoner and that brutal police measures be used 
to break the backbone of the insurgent movement. He advised Kuntze to 
issue the order of 19 March which has already been mentioned – the one 
which stated that it was preferable for 50 "suspects" to be liquidated 
than for one German soldier to be killed, - and after he had prepared the 
draft which Kuntze signed, it was Foertsch who passed the order on.  
 
 But his activities continued, of course, long after List and Kuntze 
had departed. It is unnecessary to recapitulate the text of the infamous 
Commando Order of 18 October 1942. Foertsch passed this on to the 
subordinate units and ten days later drafted and initialed a supplement 
to it which General Loehr then signed. When Foertsch originally described 
this supplement on the witness stand, he said that it in effect 
countermanded the Commando Order. At that time the document itself was 
not in evidence. Then a photostatic copy of the supplement was shown to 
him on cross-examination. He then said that the supplement had no 
reference to the Commando Order whatever but only applied to the 
partisans, despite the fact that it sets out in black and white that the 
method of warfare employed by British and American commandos is unlawful 
and that those who engage in it are not to be regarded as members of an 
armed power. No paraphrase could do justice to the vicious language which 
Foertsch employed. Nor could anything we say about the credibility of his 
testimony be as damning as a comparison between the actual contents of 
this order and the explanations which its author gave of it on the 
witness stand. 
 
 Foertsch contends that the Commando Order was never even intended 
to be carried out in the Southeast and that he went out of his way to 
advise the commanders of subordinate units to treat captured commandos 
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as prisoners of war. This is contradicted by the documents introduced 
during the cross-examination of the defense affiants Colonel von Harling 
and General Winter, both of whom personally participated in the turning 
over to the SD of at least three different groups of commandos. Winter, 
Foertsch’s successor as Chief of Staff of Army Group E and later Army 
Group F, testified that he and Foertsch discussed the question of the 
treatment of commandos captured during a raid on the Greek island of 
Alimnia. On 27 April 1944, scarcely a month after Foertsch’s physical 
departure from Army Group F, the Commander-in-Chief Southeast ordered 
Army Group E to retain the English radio operator Carpenter and the Greek 
sailor Lisgaris, captured on the island of Alimnia, for interrogation 
purposes. The remaining prisoners captured in that particular commando 
raid wereordered [sic] turned over to the SD for interrogation and then 
final "special treatment", the latter a term whose meaning von Harling’s 
testimony saved from ambiguity. There can be little doubt that the 
Winter-Foertsch conversation referred to this very group of commandos. 
Those men, and the many other commandos captured in the Southeast, would 
never have been murdered if the Commando Order together with its vicious 
supplement had not been passed on down the line by Foertsch.  
 
 So far we have only mentioned acts which were committed by Foertsch 
in conjunction with his commanding officers, but there is a multitude of 
iniquities for which he is solely responsible. When General Lontschar was 
killed in Serbia, Foertsch noted in his handwriting on the margin of the 
report, "What counter-measures? Why no hostages in Waljewo?" The burning 
of Skela and the hanging of fifty inhabitants because they had not warned 
the Germans ahead of time that a vehicle would be attacked there. This 
was done by Foertsch’s specific order which he gave over the telephone to 
Colonel von Gravenhorst. The war diary kept at Felber’s headquarters 
contains an entry on 26 November 
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1942 that the Army chief of staff had requested by telephone that all 
mayors who remained passive were to be shot to death. The report which 
Foertsch made on 15 December of the same year is still another example of 
his handiwork. In it he concluded that civilians should be used for the 
patrolling of railroad tracks and that in case of damage by sabotage the 
persons assigned to the patrolling measures should be called to account 
and, if necessary, shot. The report also advises the use of the 
population "extensively and ruthlessly for the construction of 
fortifications." 
 
 What has been said already about the connection of List and Kuntze 
with the liquidation of Jews, concentration camps, and the activities of 
the Rosenberg units applies even more strongly to Foertsch. It is 
conceivable perhaps that List of Kuntze were not aware in detail of all 
the happenings within their area of command. But for a Chief of Staff to 
plead lack of knowledge is tantamount to an argument by him that he 
deliberately neglected his duty. It was his business to know the 
intelligence officers and operations officers who were his immediate 
subordinates. If Foertsch had been inefficient or ignorant, he would not 
have remained as Chief of Staff from 1941 until 1944 and have been 
successively promoted from Colonel to Major General.  
 
 It is most significant that Foertsch never once criticized Boehme 
or Bader to his commanders-in-chief and that he never recommended that 
any disciplinary measures be taken against Stahl or Buebler or any of the 
other divisional commanders whose troops had engaged in these murderous 
orgies. Indeed, it would have been completely incomprehensible for him to 
have criticized them for having allowed or ordered their troops to do 
what Foertsch had unceasingly counseled and recommended. 
 
 Before we discuss the defenses which Foertsch attempts to use, let 
us first look at the evidence against Geitner, his counterpart in Serbia. 
We have already described the bestialities committed by the German troops 
in Serbia under General Bader. They were continued after 
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his replacement by Felber. Geitner was Chief of Staff to both. The 
evidence shows that during this entire period, hostages were being killed 
regularly in numbers based on the standard ratio of 50-to-1 and sometimes 
100-to-1. At the same time, villages were being burned, captured 
partisans shot, partisan suspects thrown into concentration camps and the 
relatives of partisans given the third degree. The documents show that 
Geitner interested himself in the management of the Semlin concentration 
camp, that he requested an increase in the deportation of Serbs to 
Germany, and was present at conferences on the so-called Croatian labor 
recruitment program. 
 
 The carnage that went on under the aegis of Bader and Geitner is 
almost indescribable. The orders which they issued excel in brutality 
even the directives of the OKW. They ordered, for example, that the 
established reprisal quotas for dead and wounded should be extended to 
missing German soldiers. Later, the ratios were also applied to Serbian 
civil servants, although since a Serbian life was less valuable than a 
German life, the ratios were naturally smaller; only ten hostages were to 
be executed for each Serb killed and five for each wounded. 
 
 Generally, the philosophy behind hostage executions was that if the 
actual perpetrator of a hostile act were not apprehended, other people 
would be punished in his stead. Geitner and Bader, however, passed beyond 
this. For example, on 4 December 1942, two officers were fired upon and 
wounded by a 20-year-old woman who later shot herself. In spite of the 
fact that the assailant was known, the division to which the two officers 
belonged obtained authority to execute 50 hostages in reprisal. When one 
of the officers later died, they obtained permission to shoot an 
additional 25 hostages.  
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 The ferocity and obvious senselessness of such measures, from a 
deterrent standpoint, can only lead one to believe that so far as Geitner 
and his commander were concerned, the main object of these killings was 
simply to thin out the Serbian population upon any or no pretext. Geitner 
himself in an unguarded moment on the witness stand admitted that the 
main purpose of these executions was vengeance and the extermination of 
the Serbs. 
 
 It goes without saying that Geitner’s initials appear on almost all 
of the orders and reports concerning the carrying out of 
reprisalmmeasures [sic]. One order dated 5 January, 1943, directs that 35 
hostages be shot in retaliation for the killing of two village elders and 
a Serbian border official and for the wounding of a civil servant. 
Geitner’s memo is signed to this document. A week later Geitner initialed 
another order approving the execution of ten hostages for the murder or a 
Serbian mayor. The citation of further examples could go on almost 
indefinitely.  
 
 Geitner could not even remember the Commando Order but he was 
absolutely positive that no commandos were ever executed in the 
Southeast. This must have been an accidental lapse of memory because the 
proof shows that on 22 May 1944, five British soldiers captured in the 
course of a commando operation on the Adriatic island of Oljet were 
turned over by the Army to the SD in Belarade. The documents which we 
introduced as Exhibits 551 and 652 make it quite clear that these men 
could only have been handed over to the SD on orders of Geitner of 
Felber. 
 
 So much for the evidence against these men. We now turn to the 
defense on which they rely most heavily, the argument that it is legally 
erroneous to hold a chief of staff criminally liable for acts committed 
by troops subordinate to the staff. The duties of the chief of staff, 
they say, are purely ministerial in nature. He is, in fact, nothing more 
than a combination secretary, proof-reader, office boy and postman for 
the commanding officer. It is evident as one considers their testimony 
that any normal 14-year-old boy could have performed this function as 
well as anyone else, and one wonders at the outset how the German Army 
could have 
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been so improvident of its money, manpower, and brains as to waste a 
person of the rank, experience and intelligence of Foertsch and Geitner 
on such unimportant assignments. Having established their insignificance 
and having deprecated their tasks almost to the point of non-existence, 
they say that it would be a monstrous injustive [sic] for them to be 
allotted any of the blame for the orders which they drafted, for the 
orders which they signed, for the orders which they read, corrected and 
initialed, and for the part which they played in seeing to it that these 
orders were carried out. This necessitates a brief analysis of the powers 
and duties of a chief of staff in the German Army and his relationship to 
his commanding officer.  
 
 Prior to the Hitlerian era, a chief of staff in the German Army 
occupied the status of an absolute equal of the troop commander. The most 
powerful group within the German Army were the members of the General 
Staff Corps who over a period of years had entrenched themselves as a 
corps d’elite which had arrogated unto itself powers which were almost 
unique. The amazing result of such a development was that a chief of 
staff whether he was attached to a corps, an army or an army group could 
take exception to anything that the troops commander did, whether it 
dealt with strategy, tactics, or basic policy; and in case the two could 
not reach agreement, the chief of staff could take an appeal through a 
separate channel of command to the Chief of the General Staff of the 
entire German Army. 
 
 This situation continued until 1938 when Hitler, jealous and afraid 
of this military oligarchy, stripped the Genral [sic] Staff of these 
extraordinary powers and decreed that the final decision on the issuance 
of orders in case of a disagreement with his chief would rest with the 
troop commender [sic].  
 
 It is this change in the status of the chief of staff upon which 
Foertsch and Geitner rely in their effort to exonerate themselves from 
the charges brought against them here. That the effect of this change was 
not nearly so radical as these defendants would have us believe is 
clearly shown by the Rote Esel, or "red donkey", the familiar handbook 
for General Staff officers which was issued after the change was made. It 
reads in part: 
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 "At the head of the Staff stands the Chief of the General Staff. He 
is the first counselor of the Commander-in-chief in all fields. Close 
relationship and confidence between both are indispensable as an enduring 
basis for the beneficial labor of the commanding authority….. 
 
 "The Commander-in-Chief has to listen to the Chief of the General 
Staff, if instant issuing of commands is not necessary, before 
operational and tactical decisions are made. The Chief has the right and 
the duty of presenting his point of view and making suggestions….. 
 
 "The Chief of the General Staff examines all drafts before they are 
presented to the Commander-in-Chief." 
 
Further, even though the purpose of Hitler’s decree was to do away with 
the command function of the Chief of Staff, even this was not fully 
achieved, because the handbook went on to say: 
 
 "Simultaneous absence of the Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of 
the General Staff from the command post should be avoided. If the 
situation demands a quick decision and the Commander-in-Chief is absent 
and not to be reached at once, the Chief of the General Staff is required 
to decide and command…. 
 
 "Except concerning those soldiers senior to him, the Chief of Staff 
of an Army Group or an Army has the disciplinary powers of punishment of 
a divisional commander, the Chief of Staff of a Corps, that of a 
Regimental commander." 
 
 It frequently happened during World War II that a German Chief of 
Staff would issue orders on his own initiative during the absence of his 
commander. An example of this kind was discussed during the cross-
examination of General Dehner whose Chief of Staff had issued a rather 
basic and general order concerning the combat of partisans while Dehner 
was on leave.  
 
 We have already mentioned that the Chief of Staff was in charge of 
the administration of intelligence and operations. He received reports 
from subordinate units; evaluated the enemy position and strength; 
outlined strategy; suggested, drafted, signed and distributed orders; and 
forwarded the reports from subordinate units on to higher headquarters. 
He called conferences of the various commanders; consulted with military, 
political and diplomatic representatives; and helped to formulate basic 
policies for the military and civilian administration of the occupied 
territory. It was a rare commander indeed who was egotistical or reckless 
enough to make an important decision without first consulting with his 
Chief of Staff.  
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 The General Staff bible, to which we have already averted, states 
that a Chief of Staff must feel the pulse beat of his unit at all times 
and that he be "distinguished by clear creative thinking and logical 
behavior, determined energy, untiring working power and self-discipline, 
and physical freshness". These are rather high standards to require of a 
combination secretary-messenger boy. 
 
 We can easily see from Foertsch’s own literary production, "The 
officer of the New Wehrmacht", how likely it was that he restricted his 
activities to the licking of stamps and the dusting of desk-tops while 
Chief of Staff to the most powerful man in the Balkans. 
 
In that book Foertsch wrote: 
 
 "Soldierly leadership rests on the joy of responsibility. It is one 
of the finest but also one of the most difficult virtues of a leader. The 
greatest enemy of true leadership is anonymity. This appears in various 
forms; at times in the nameless authority of an office, i.e. in 
bureaucracy; at times in the conscience crawling behind a higher order, 
law or regulation; at times in the attempt to deny ‘responsibility’ in 
the event of failure in a given act." 
 
Since the whole theory of the guiltlessness of the Chief of Staff is 
based upon a variation of the superior orders plea, the irony in this 
passage is particularly pointed.  
 
 What has already been said should be enough to demonstrate the 
incongruousness of arguing that because a man was Chief of Staff he ought 
to be exonerated of all responsibility for the orders which his Commander 
issued, particularly when he had a hand in their making and at times even 
issued them above his own signature. Field Marshel Keitel made the same 
argument before the International Military Tribunal. Keitel was Hitler’s 
Chief of Staff and he testified that as such it was his duty to express 
his opinions regarding matters upon which Hitler propsed to act. Jodl was 
Hitler’s Ia or operations officer.  
 
Just as the operations officer served as deputy for the Chief of Staff 
when the latter was away from headquarters, so Jodl acted as Keitel’s 
deputy during his absences. Both men made contentions similar to those 
being 
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advanced by Foertsch and Geitner here. Both were convicted and sentenced 
to be hanged. So far we have not Foertsch and Geitner on their own 
ground. Actually all this legalistic quotation of the "Rote Esel" is 
completely wide of the mark under the provisions of the Allied control 
council Law No. 10 as far as a defendant is a substantial participant in 
the commission of a crime whether he is – I shall better start from the 
beginning: We can meet Foertsch and Geitner on their own ground so to 
speak in dealing with their arguments, Actually this legalistic – do you 
not have the script. It was handed to you or your colleague. I will go 
slowly. Actually allot this legalistic refinement, all of this quotation 
of the "Rote Esel" this argument about the meaning of German Internal is 
wide of the mark: Under the provision of Control Council Law 10 so long 
as the defendant is a substantial participant in the commission of a 
crime, whether he is classified as a principal, an accessory or one who 
took a consenting part or one connected with plans or enterprises 
involving commission recognized as a criminal. The close connection of 
Foertsch and Geitner with those crimes is divided. The crimes were 
carried out by their orders without their commanders being aware of them. 
This is the ultimate answer.  
 
 So far we have just discussed the argument which is common to the 
defense of both of these defendants, but Geitner evolved a theory which 
was a refinement on every prev[i]ous description of the function of a 
German military staff that we have ever heard. According to him, the 
staff was divided into two parts, one of which was concerned with 
tactical matters and the other with purely administrative affiars. [sic] 
He contends that he was only chief of the tactical staff. The tasks of 
the administrative staff were not described. Even if this dichotomy had 
in fact existed outside of Geitner’s agile mind, it is difficult to see 
what difference it would make since Loehr’s orders of 10 August 1943 
explicitly stated that the carrying out of reprisal measure are "not 
matters of administration but rather measures of combat." 
 
 But Geitner attempted to complicate matters even more. He refers in 
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his testimony to some un-named lieutenant who was a legal export and who 
was solely responsible where reprisal measure were concerned. This 
fictional creature was supposed to be a member of Geitner’s staff and 
subordinate to him, but he kept a private pipeline to Bader and Felber 
for the transmission of affairs concerning hostage executions and the 
like. This fairy tale is not mentioned because it requires any refutation 
but because it would be almost unfair to let Geitner’s inventive 
fertility pass unrecognized. It seems perfectly logical to us that 
General Bader should have used his Chief of Staff merely to correct his 
spelling errors and sharpen his pencils while he sought out some 
lieutenant to act as his advisor and collaborator in carrying out 
reprisal measures throughout Serbia. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT: Does that complete a divison? 
 
 MR. RAPP: No, your Honor, I have one more page. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT: You may complete the page. 
 
 MR.RAPP: The measure of responsibility which the German army 
considered a chief of staff for the conduction of his troops could not be 
better illustrated than by a letter sent by the 15th Mountain Corps to 
the SS Division Prinz Eugen shorly after the Italian capitulation.  
 
This letter was later after the decision had been made to shoot officers 
of Italian units who refused to allow the Germans to disarm them – this 
letter passed on a comment made by the 2nd Pazner to the following Army 
effect: main culprits and accomplices are to be shot to death. 
Accomplices generally are: all the commander and general staff officers.  
 
 Geitner also developed another explanation which ought not to pass 
unnoticed. When report after report and order after order concerning the 
Serbian butcheries all boaring Geitner’s signature were produced for his 
comment, he came forth with the bland explanation that they were false. 
He said that the German officers in Serbia disapproved of the 
bloodthirsty attitude of the OKW and decided to circumvent its harsh 
directives by reporting imaginary executions. Aside from pointing out 
that the Fischer affidavit demonstrates the complete absurdity of this 
contention; that 
3-FEB-M-JP-11-7-Cohen  (Int. Evend) 
Court V Case VII 
 
Geitner was unable to point to a single specific example of a mock 
execution in all of the reports shown him; aside from the fact that 
Geitner’s testimony was contradicted by General Felber who, one would 
think, has every reason for clutching at any straw himself; and that one 
of the conspirators named by Geitner in this scheme was SS-
Obersturmfuehrer Dr. Schaeffer who had borrowed a gas van to exterminate 
the Jews in Belgrade, we are at a loss to know how to answer this 
defense.  
 
 It is impossible to take up all of Geitner’s defenses, but his 
arithmetical explanation should not pass unmentioned. There is in 
evidence here an affidavit signed by Geitner’s counsel, sworn to before 
himself, containing long lists of numbers compiled by persons unknown 
from sources only specified generally. The apparent purpose of the 
affidavit is to show that the retaliation ratios were 1:6 instead of 
50:1. The German losses set out in this tabulation included combat losses 
of the Germans but nor of the partisans. What this is intended to show, 
aside from the fact that someone had a passion for playing with figures, 
is more than a little difficult to understand. If the ability to spin 
gossamer fabrics of fantasy could compensate for a procession of murders 
that would bring blench to the cheek of a Borgia poisoner, then Geitner 
would have good reason to be hopeful of his fate. Fortunately, the law 
sees through all such irrelevant talents. 
 
THE PRESIDENT: We will take our noon recess and reconvene at 1:30. (A 
recess was taken until 1330 hours.) 
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(The Tribunal reconvened at 1330 hours, 3 February 1948.) 
 
  THE PRESIDENT: The tribunal is again in session. 
 
  MR. FULKERSON: General Lother Rendulic is several defendants 
rolled into one. As commander of the 2nd Panzer Army he was the superior 
of Dehner and von Leyser while they were in the Balkans. But in 1944 he 
was named Commander-in-Chief of the XX Mountain Army and transferred to 
Norway. The ruination and misery which he left in his wake in that 
country’s province of Finnmark constitutes a separate chapter in itself. 
To make for a more orderly presentation, therefore, we discuss first the 
activities of Leyser and Dehmer, to return later to the subject of their 
mutual superior. 
 
 Croatia was, at least during the period under discussion, divided 
into three parts or corps areas. In the north was General Dehner’s LXIX 
Reserve Corps; in the center and including most of the coast was the area 
of the SV Mountain Corps successively commanded by Generals Lueters, von 
Leyser and Fehn, and in the south was the V SS Corps with which we are 
only incidental concerned.  
 
 General von Leyser was practically suckled on Prussian militarism. 
His father was a Lieutenant General in the German Army. He was put into a 
military school himself at the age of ten, eventually became an officer 
and stayed in the Wehrmacht until it was reduced to 100,000 men in 1920. 
Then he was transferred to the police, where he languished until 1936 
when he was able finally to go back into the German Army. In describing 
the unrest in Germany before 1933 and the reasons why he joined the 
Party, he made a statement which was far more significant than he 
intended when he said: 
 
  "I hoped that in a strengthened Germany which the Party had 
promised I could take up again my old profession as a soldier, as an 
officer." 
 
In half a sentence, von Leyser summed up one of the strongest appeals 
which Hitler had to the members of the old officer class and cones- 
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[Frequently] one of the principal reasons for the world catastrophe of 
1939-45. 
 
 By the time of the outbreak of the war with Russia, he had risen to 
be a Brigadier General and was the commanding officer of the 269th 
Infantry Division, which was subordinate to the XXXI Panzer Corps under 
General Reinhardt.  This corps was in the northern sector of the front 
and in October Leyser’s division found itself before the defenses of 
Leningrad, having swept all the way from the old Russo-German frontier. 
Leyser waspromoted [sic] to Major General as a result of this 
achievement. After participating in the attempted encirclement of 
Leningrad, his division waspulled [sic] out and moved to the Wolchow 
sector on the shores of Lake Ladoga, where it stayed until von Leyser was 
transferred from it in August 1942. 
 
 We now go back to June 1941, just before the outbreak of 
hostilities with Russia.  The court will recall that the "Commissar 
Order" was issued by the OKW on 6 June – at least two weeks before Russia 
was attacked.  Von Leyser said that he first heard about it at a 
conference of the various commanding generals and divisional commanders 
of the 18th Army, to which his division had been attached before it was 
transferred to General Reinhardt’s corps.  He said that although he was 
not shown the order, he was apprized of its contents and that "we 
generals objected to this because it was against our own feelings and 
because we did not think this order could be carried out". 
 
 The Commissar Order was discussed a second time at a conference of 
the divisional commanders of the XXXXI Panzer Corps.  There, General 
Reinhardt said that the Panzer troops would advance so fast that there 
would not be time to sort out the commissars from among the other 
prisoners and that, therefore, the order would not be carried out, but, 
rather, every Russian soldier captured would be treated as a prisoner of 
war and sent back in the customary manner to the rear. Thus, 
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von Leyser said, the order was not even passed on to his division, much 
less carried out.  He added, however, that even though there was no 
official circulation of the Commissar Order, it was known everywhere, not 
only to the Germans, but also to the Russians. 
 
 General von Leyser said that the order was not carried out by his 
division for two reasons.  The first was that in view of the speed with 
which the Panzer troops advanced, it was impracticable for the commissars 
to be sorted from the other prisoners.  It is difficult to see how the 
separation of the commissars could have taken much time, since they wore 
a distinctive insignia on their uniforms. 
 
 Further, the break-neck ract [sic] across Russia came to an abrupt 
halt once the division reached the outskirts of Leningrad in October 
1941.  Thereafter, its daily advance could be measured almost in meters. 
Von Leyser himself said, "It was more or less a war of position." 
 
It should be remembered that von Leyser remained with the 269th Division 
for nine months after this "war of position" began.  So much for his 
first reason as to why the Commissar Order was not carried out. 
 
 The second reason the order was not executed, he said, was that it 
was contrary to his own personal feelings.  We will go into the question 
of General von Leyser’s personal feelings presently: we believe the 
evidence shows that it has undergone a radical metamorphosis since 1941. 
 
 But it is not necessary to discuss the reasons he gave why the 
Commissar Order ought not to have been executed.  There may have been 
many such reasons, but the fact remains that on at least three different 
occasions the order was carried out by his troops.  At least, if his 
troops were not aware that they were carrying out the order, on three 
different occasions they did exactly what they would have done had they 
been following it to the letter, and they did not wait long before they 
began.  On 9 July 1941, the Signal Battalion of the division sent the 
following message to the headquarters of the Reinhardt Corps: 
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     "34 Politruks liquidated."  
 
General von Leyser conceded that a politruk was the designation for a 
political commissar.  On 28 September, the Signal Battalion reported: 
 
"Special occurences: 1 female commissar shot.  1 woman who was in contact 
with partisans likewise shot."    
 
On 20 November, the Artillery Regiment reported that: 
 
 "2 Russian prisoners of the First Battery were shot upon order of the 
Battalion Commander.  These were 1 commissar and 1 Russian high-ranking 
officer."  
 
 General von Leyser did not recall any of these incidents.  He said 
that he had no recollection that any commissars were ever shot by the 
troops of the 269th Division.  General von Leyser’s memory, in common 
with the memories of the other defendants, has a chronic tendency to fade 
out completely whenever he is asked an embarrassing question. 
 
 We have said that we would go into the question of General von 
Leyser’s personal feelings, since he has made an issue of them in this 
case.  We deal first with his attitude toward the civilian population of 
the territories occupied by the German troops.  There are three separate 
books of documents submitted on his behalf.  More than half of their 
contents consist of affidavits submitted by his acquaintances and former 
comrades in arms.  Time after time, these affidavits describe how touched 
von Leyser was by the suffering which war had visited upon the civilian 
population, and how considerate, forebearing [sic] and sympathetic he was 
toward them. Here are a few samples of these testimonials: 
 
 "consider him incapable of committing an act described as a crime 
according to the laws of humanity or the penal code.  This applies to him 
even more as he has the quality of exceptional sympathy toward a 
stranger’s fate, especially pronounced in his whole family according to 
my knowledge."  
 
* * * * * * * * * 
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"I could give still more examples which show the disinterested and 
completely unquestionable behavior of General von Leyser, especially his 
sympathy toward the inhabitants and prisoners".  
 




"The pacification which General von Leyser had in his mind could not be 
accomplished completely........because his great and generally recognized 
kindness of heart interfered." 
 
* * * * * * * * * 
 
 It is difficult to believe that this kind and sensitive being, 
whose heart was so filled with goodwilltoward [sic] his fellowman, could 
have issued and signed the following order on 8 August 1941: 
 
"Hard and ruthless attack by the responsible leaders.  Every 
consideration and mercy is weakness and means danger.  Ruthless 
prevention of every threat by the enemy civilian population.  
 
 "Favoring or aiding partisans, stragglers, etc. on the part of the 
civilian population is to be regarded as guerilla warfare.  Suspicious 
elements are to be turned over to the Einsatzgruppen and detachments of 
the SD."  
 
 We will have occasion to refer as we go on to the various orders 
which were signed by Leyser or at least passed on by him.  The more one 
sees of the sentiments which Leyser expressed while the war was going on, 
the more puzzling it becomes to reconcile them with the feelings which he 
now professes to have.  For example, a few months after he issued the 
order to which we have just adverted, he had occasion to deal with the 
question of the treatment of prisoners of war. 
 
 On 3 November, the followint[sic] directive was issued from his 
headquarters: 
 
 "Commander-in-Chief of the Army has decided that mines, other than in 
combat or in case there is danger in detail, are to be detected and 
cleared only by Russian prisoners in order to spare German blood.  This 
is also valid for German mines."  
 
 When we asked about this order, von Leyser’s recollection blacked 
out again, so we do not have the benefit of his explanation 
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except that he attempted to minimize the order in importance by saying 
that at the time it was issued there were no mines in the sector of his 
division.  The section of his cross-examination in which this matter was 
discussed is a classic of double-talk and evasiveness.  Von Leyser 
followed the battle of attrition concept on the witness stand.  In order 
to get him to admit what time of day it was, it was necessary to specify 
that he was to answer in terms of mean instead of sidereal time and to 
furnish him with the latitude and longitude of the Palace of Justice. 
 
 Aside from the light which it sheds on General von Leyser’s 
"personal feelings", this order that Russian prisoners of war should be 
used to clear mine fields is interesting in another connection.  He says 
that he did not carry out the Commissar Order because it was contrary to 
these personal feelings.  How could it have jolted his sensibilities less 
to send untrained Russian prisoners of war out on tasks which were 
adjudged too dangerous for the German sappers?  If he issued the order 
reluctantly and only because he was afraid not to carry out a directive 
of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, how was it that he was not haunted 
by the same fears so far as the Commissar Order was concerned?  Is it 
likely that he would feel obliged to carry out an order issued by the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Army and at the same time feel free to 
disregard a Fuehrerbefehl?  We submit that von Leyser did not disregard 
the Commissar Order, that these executions were reported by his division 
to the Army for the purpose of showing that the order was being obeyed. 
 
 We now turn to von Leyser’s activities in Croatia.  He arrived 
there in October 1943 but did not take over the command of the Corps 
Headquarters formally until the first of November.  During this two-week 
period, he wasted no time.  On 20 October he had a conference with three 
men: Kasche, the German ambassador to Croatia, and two of the Croatian 
ministers.  The subject of this discussion was General von Leyser’s 
authority, and the minutes of the meeting record that at the 
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end "General von Leyser demands concise, unilateral, executive authority 
in case of an increase of tension in the situation which was conferred to 
him by the ministers."  The term "executive authority" is somewhat 
ambiguous and General von Leyser was asked to give his understanding of 
what it meant.  He said that he would explain it by saying that a man who 
had it was "Lord over life and death, if I may put it that way"; that it 
meant a telescoping of all political and military authority and of all 
governmental functions – executive, 
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judicial and legislative – into one. 
 
 Despite this document, von Leyser repeatedly denied that he had any 
executive authority in Croatia.  On cross-examination, however, he 
admitted that he was the person who was to decide whether "an increase in 
tensi[on] [sic] in the situation" existed, which is tantamount to saying 
that he had this authority when he announced that he had it.  The joker 
which he slipped into this part of the testimony was, however, that he 
could only exercise this authority in the event that he was not able to 
get in touch with the Croatian officials.  He admitted that this 
condition was not stated in the documents, but he said that it was 
"inherent" in them.  At any rate we know that von Layser [sic] did 
exercise executive authority in Croatia for example and instance of its 
exercise is found in his dismissal of the Gualeiter of Banja Luka. 
 
 Leyser lost no time in familiarizing himself with the technique of 
reprisals.  Two days after the corps was formally put under his command 
one man and four women were arrested and twelve houses were burned down 
to atone for a railroad dynamiting.  The following day an unspecified 
number of hostages were hanged on the spot where another railroad 
blasting occurred. 
 
Leyser professes not to be able to understand what this second incident 
was all about.  It is contained in a supplement to a daily report of the 
Railroad Security Service.  Both he and General Dehner attempt to disavow 
all responsibility for hostage executions committed by this organization 
on the ground that it was not subordinate to them.  What we have already 
said about the weakness of this defense of non-subordination applies with 
particular emphasis to the Railroad Security Service whose duties were 
described as the patrolling and guarding of the railway line – duties 
which were performed jointly with the other army troops.  It is fantastic 
to contend that Leyser and Dehner had no control over an army unit 
operating in their area whose function – the safe-guarding of lines of 
communication – was described by both men as one of their own heaviest 
responsibilities. 
 
 On 5 December, the 114th Division reported that fourteen partisan[s] 
had been standrechtlich erschossen.  The meaning of this phrase has 
already 
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been discussed.  On 27 January, twenty-two additional hostages were 
hanged on the site of another railroad blasting.  The next day another 
unit arrested and transferred 32 persons to the SD.  On 7 February a 
Chetnik reconnaisance [sic] detachment captured fifteen prisoners and 
shot all but three.  Leyser testifi[ed] that those Chetnik units had been 
armed by the Germans and were used as auxiliaries of the German Army.  On 
5 June it was reported that Croatian combat groups had destroyed a bandit 
hospital and that 95 wounded and sick had been killed in addition to the 
partisan combat losses. 
 
 These examples from the reports to the XV Corps are sufficient to 
demonstrate the general trend of events.  But it would perhaps give a 
clearer picture to take a typical operation and trace its origin and 
development. Leyser’s first large-scale undertaking was the "Operation 
Panther" which he planned soon after he took over his command.  In order 
to prepare his strategy, Leyser had daily tactical conferences with 
various members of his staff, especially with hi [sic] intelligence 
officer who, of course, was continually receiving information from the 
various divisions on the strength, organization, armament, leadership and 
location of the partisan groups. 
 
 We happen to have one of the divisional intelligence reports for 
November, 1943 and we also have a compilation or general survey made b y 
[sic] the corps intelligence officer on 2 December, so that we are 
unusually well situated to gauge the information upon which von Leyser 
b[a]sed his tactical judgments at that time.  We can confine our 
examination to the "Enemy News Sheet" of 2 December.  In it the Corps 
intelligence officer stated that the partisan units in the area of the XV 
Mountain Army Corps were made up of the IX Partisan Corps which was 
subordinate to the Main Staff Croatia (Tito’s staff).  The IX Partisan 
Corps was comprised of three divisions : the 7th (Banija Division), the 
8th (Korduri Division), and the 13th Partisan Division.  The 7th Partis[a]n 
Division was made up of four brigades and two mountain detachments.  The 
8th Partisan Division was compos[ed] of three brigades one mountain 
artillery detachment, and three mountain detachments.  The names of the 
commanders, political commissars and other officers, not only of the 
divisions but also of the brigades and battalions 
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are given.  In some instances the prewar professions of these officers is 
mentioned.  This list is so complete that in one case even the name of 
the battalion veterinarian was included.  The number of heavy weapons and 
the approximate man-power strength of every battalion is set out as well 
as the approximate locations.  The code numbers and locations of the 
Partis[a]n Army post officers are listed.  The insignia of the officers 
of the 7th Division is described. 
 
 In considering this document, one should keep in mind the 
affidavits submitted on Leyser’s behalf which declare in effect that the 
partisans were merely an unorganized mob of armed hoodlums.  "Operation 
Panther" was classical in its simplicity of concept.  The German troops 
wer[e] to enter the regions which the partisan forces occupied.  Every 
chicken, eve [sic] cow, every horse was to be seized and taken away and 
every able-bodied man between the ages of 15 and 55 was to be arrested 
and deported.  Leyser sent his proposal to General Rendulic’s 
headquarters on 27 November. 
 
 "Corps Headquarters proposes to evacuate the entire able-bodied male 
population in the area to be mopped up."  
 
 This is the part of the text of the proposal which Leyser made 
three weeks after he had taken over the command of the XV Mountain Army 
Corps.  It is to be noted that the idea originated with him. 
 
 Army Headquarters answered by giving its blessing to the project 
and also by making an improvement on it.  Leyser had merely suggested 
that the male population be evacuated.  The Army made this rather 
ambiguous term more specific.  It said that it appeared feasible to ship 
all these men to Germany for labor.  The proposal, as modified by the 
army, was sent to the Plenipotentiary General in Zagreb and the XVth 
Corps was notified that this had been done.  Leyser registered no 
objection to his troops being use[d] for a wholesale shanghaiing 
expedition. 
 
 Leyser self-righteously testified on direct examination that the 
purpose of the evacuation w[a]s to give these able-bodied men an 
opportunity to serve in the Croatian Army and fight for their 
fatherland.  On cross-examination he was asked why, if that was the 
object in wanting to evacuate 
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them, he did not demur when the purpose of the evacuation was changed by 
the Army to that of kidnapping imprisoned laborers to work for the German 
Reich.  His response was that it was no affair of his where these people 
were sent, that he was only concerned with the "tactical" aspects of the 
operation.  Leyser’s corps was expected to furnish guards for the 
internment camps where these men were to be kept until they could be 
shipped to Germany. It is stretching the meaning of the word "tactical" 
to the breaking point when it is used to include such an activity as 
this. 
 
 In any event, von Leyser’s proposal, as revised by the 2nd Panzer 
Army, was too strong for even the German Plenipotentiary General.  He 
responded that the political repercussions in Croatia which would follow 
a wholesale shipment of all the able-bodied men in the area von Leyser 
intended to comb were too risky, and that the corps should evacuate only 
band suspects and people found wandering outside of their villages.  It 
was suggested that detachments of the SD could be sent along with each 
division for screening purposes and it was estimated that some 6,000 
persons would be apprehended and deported under this revised scheme. 
 
 The operation began.  Three German divisions, together with their 
satellite detachments of SD, were deployed in their respective positions. 
The great mopping-up operation was under way.  The Germans trudged 
through the mud and snow, scrambled up the hills and [p]enetrated at 
length into the very heart of the area. With what result?  According to 
their own figures they killed some 900 partisans and took almost 200 
prisoners, as against a total of 70 German dead and 24 missing.  These 
are the figures for combat losses.  And what of the evacuation plan?  The 
alarm had been given: The birds had flown.  The report ruefully states 
that only 96 persons were evacuated, but hastens to explain rather lamely 
that nonetheless the operation was successful because "a rich booty of 
cattle was brought back" and "the operational intention of the Croatian 
Main Staff to make an attack reserve out of the 8th Division has been 
frustrated by the action." 
 
 This operation has been singled out for attention because it seems 
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to be typical of the activities in which Leyser’s troops were engaged the 
whole time he commanded the XV Corps.  The code names of these operations 
follow each other with a bewildering rapidity, but whether they were 
denominated as "Roesselsprung", "Napfkuchen", "Ristow", "Klettersteig", 
"Druznica", "Dergweise", or "Renate", their order was much the 
same.  Villages were burned, livestock was confiscated, Jews were 
deported, able-bodied men were arrested and hauled off, and the women, 
children, and old people were left to fend for themselves as best they 
could in the smoking desolation which the Germans left behind.  These 
were the tactical accomplishments of the XV Corps.  Even General von 
Panniwtz, the commander of the 1st 
 
Cossack Division, who should have been fairly insensitive to shock, 
complained that operations such as "Brandfackel" in which whole areas had 
to be devastated "on orders" had a tendency to demoralize his troops. 
Leyser’s excuses and explanations for these things are so amazing that 
they need not be gone into in detail.  A fair sample can be found in his 
comments on the use of all the male inhabitants who were evacuated from 
the Dalmatian coast as forced laborers to build the German 
fortifications. Leyser said that these men had nothing to complain about, 
they were allowed to stay in Croatia.  A response such as this may be 
interesting to a psychiatrist but it needs no comment by any lawyer. 
 
 There is scarcely a crime mentioned in the indictment which 
Leyser’s troops did not commit.  They shot capture partisans, they hanged 
hostages, they acted as press gangs for the slave labor program and the 
puppet Croatian army, they deported Jews, they wrecked hospitals, they 
burned whole villages in reprisal for the wounding of one German, they 
hired and armed gangs of Chetniks whose tactics were more bestial than 
the Germans say the Partisans were.  They worked hand-in-glove with the 
SD on expeditions whose original purpose, as proposed by Leyser, even 
turned the German Plenipotentiary General pale.  For variety of crimes 
the XV Corps under General von Leyser holds its own with the best the 
German occupation forces in the Balkens could offer. 
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General Ernst Dehner was appointed commander of the LXIXth Infantry 
Reserve Corps in August, 1943, immediately after the staff of the 2nd 
Panzer Army was transferred to the Balkans.  The area of the Corps was 
the northern third of Croatia and its main function was to protect that 
section of the vital Vienna-Salonika railroad which passed through the 
corps area between Zagreb and Belgrade. 
 
 The troops which Dehner had at his disposal were for the most part 
slightly superannuated.  They were supplemented, therefore, by the young 
hot blood of about 25,000 Cossacks who were commanded, on paper at least, 
by General von Pannwitz.  Actually, from the reports concerning this 1st 
Cossack Division, General von Pannwitz must have led a rather full life 
during these days.  He seems to have spent so much of his time signing 
death warrants for members of his division who had been court-martialed 
for lootings, murders, mutilations, and rapes that one wonders when he 
found an opportunity to attend to tactical matters. 
 
 Another source of the corps’s strength was the 173rd Infantry 
Division whose commander, General von Behr, visited here some ten days 
ago to explain some of the statements in his affidavit which were not 
entirely clear to us.  Finally, there was the 187th Infantry Reserve 
Division.  The other troops attached to the corps, with the exception of 
the Railway Security Service play only a small part in these events 
either because they were so small or because they stayed in the area such 
a short time. 
 
 It will be remembered that the Rendulic order prescribing a 50:1 
ratio was issued on 15 September 1943.  Prior to that time we find no 
report[s] of hostage executions in the area of the LXIX Corps, but 
General Dehner, like General Boehme, was literal minded.  Once Rendulic 
had suggested the desirability of hangings and shootings, Dehner wasted 
no time.  On 20 
 
September, the 187th Reserve Division reported its intention to hang ten 
hostages and to burn down some villages for an attack on a truck of one 
of its regiments.  The next day it was reported that these people had 
been hanged.  Dehner said that he was on leave at the time this took 
place and, 
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in addition, that he never had heard of it because this particular report 
was not cleared through his corps.  In any event, he did not long remain 
in ignorance of the way the wind was blowing.  To go into all of these 
incidents in detail would take too much time.  Even to give the dates and 
occurrences in tabular form would be monotonous.  November 1943 seems to 
have been an active month.  It has the additional advantage in that 
Dehner admits he was in his corps area during that time.  We will, 
therefore, summarize the executions during this 31-day period. 
 
 3 November - three bandits hanged by reconnaissance patrol. 
 
 5 November - 100 bandits hanged for attack on the railroad and on a 
police unit. 
 
 6 November - unspecified number of bandits and suspects hanged. 
 
 7 November - 19 Communists hanged. 
 
 8 November - 21 hostages shot. 
 
 12 November – 20 hostages hanged and 20 hostages shot for sabotage 
of railroad attack on a patrol. 
 
 15 November - 13 hostages hanged for attack on passenger train. 
 
 30 November - 15 bandit "suspects" executed after attack on recruit 
transport. 
 
 There appears in the documents a total of at least eighteen such 
incidents reported by the 173rd and 187th Divisions in Dehner’s corps. The 
total number of persons murdered in the course of these operations is 
something over 450 people.  Arithmetical exactitude is impossible, 
because in certain instances the number is not given.  But the figure 450 
is a safe, round estimate. 
 
 To go into Dehner’s defenses would be even more tedious than to 
enumerate the crimes which his troops committed.  He exhausted the entire 
arsenal with the exception of the defense of superior orders. Each 
document was handed to him.  Twenty times he was asked, "Herr General, 
haben Sie dieses Dokument unterschrieben?"  Twenty times he anwere[d] 
"Noin".  One had the impression of being in a chamber of echoes. 
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 His Counsel omitted this standard question with respect to the 
document reporting the hanging of bandits and people suspected of being 
bandits on 6 November, nor wasit [sic] asked in connection with the 
report containing the news that 21 hostages had been shot on 8 
November.  The reason possibly was that his initials appear on both.  Nor 
was he asked it in connection with another report that four hostages were 
hanged on 2 December.  His signature appears on this one. 
 
 The first defense that Dehner makes is that the tacticular incident 
probably never happened.  Next, if it did happen, he never heard of 
it.  Besides that, it was probably not carried out by the Army at all but 
by the Croats, the SS, or the Police.  When the document points its 
finger unerringly at some army unit, then it just happens that this unit 
had a very special status in his corps area; it was operating 
independently of his authority and was not subordinate to him in any way. 
 
 The importance Dehner attaches to the presence or absence of his 
initials on a document was alluded to during the earlier discussion of 
the defenses common to all the defendants.  It will be remembered that by 
his own admissions Dehner proved that this fact had absolutely no bearing 
on whether or not he was actually informed of a given document’s 
contents. 
 
 More than any of the other defendants here, Dehner has attempted to 
push off the responsibility for those hostage executions on to his 
divisional commanders.  More than any of these other defendants, he has 
needed to resort to this tactic.  There are not as many avenues to use as 
an outlet of probative pressure in Dehner’s case as there are in the case 
of many of the other defendants.  He hasto [sic] push the criminal 
responsibility either sideways on the police and the Croatians or else 
thrust it down his chain-of-commands to his divisional commanders. 
 
For if he tries to heave it up, it will land squarely in the lap of 
General Rendulic, an awkward result to say the least. 
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 We have already described the absurdity of Dehner’s contention that 
General Rendulic issued a hostage order and then completely [r]elieved 
his corp commanders from the responsibility for seeing that it was 
carried out.  Dehner would have us believe that he spent half of his time 
away from headquarters, visiting his various troop units to familiarize 
himself with the local situation, and that despite the flood of reports 
which were coming in to him, as the tabulation we have given illustrates, 
though he never discussed the matter of hostage executions or reprisal 
measures with any of his divisional commanders. He tries to disociate 
[sic] himself from this sordid business by saying that he had no judicial 
authority and that it would have been meddlesome of him, a Lieutenant 
General, to discuss these affairs with his direct subordinates. 
 
 If there is any remaining doubt of Dehner’s responsibility for 
these garrotings and shootings, it should be removed by a consideration 
of two different remarks which he made in the course of his testimony. He 
was asked whether in his opinion these reprisal measures were effective; 
that is, whether they achieved the desired result of establishing peace 
and quiet.  He answered that they did: in fact he previously testified 
that in his opinion it was impossible to keep order in the Balkans 
without the use of reprisal measures. 
 
 The second remark which is significant as showing who was 
responsible for carrying out those measures wasmade [sic] in the course 
of trying to explain away a certain hostage execution.  Dehner said that 
it was probably done by the Croatians.  He was asked why he thought 
so.  His response was that the incident which provoked it was an attack 
on a Croatian unit, so that one would normally expect the retaliatory act 
to have been committed by the Croatians. 
 
 Using General Dehner’s own logic which is based, of course, on his 
knowledge of local customs in his corps area, we can draw some con- 
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clusions of our own.  One of his most relied-on arguments is that even 
though a given mass hanging was reported by the 173rd Infantry Division, 
it is not clear that the officers of that division ordered the hanging or 
that the troops of that division fashioned the nooses. We do know, 
however, both from General Dehner’s testimony and from General von Behr’s 
testimony, that one of the principal tasks of this division, and for that 
matter of the 69th Corps itself, was the guarding and protection of the 
railroads.  Von Behr said that when an attack was made on a railroad in 
his divisional area, he was held primarily accountable for 
it.  Therefore, we may assume that if the occasion of a given hostage 
execution was railroad sabotage, as most of them were, the retaliatory 
measures for this would be carried out be [sic] the German Division which 
was primarily charged with protecting the railroad. 
 
 A word about the Railroad Security Service.  Both Dehner and Leyser 
now deny that this organization was subordinate to them.  They say that 
it was directly subordinate to the 2nd Panzer Army.  This contention is 
sufficiently far-fetched in Leyser’s case, but in Dehner’s it is utterly 
absurd.  He said himself that one of his main duties, the whole time he 
was in charge of the corps, was the securing of the Zagreb-Belgrade 
railroad.  He said that his troops were used to patrol it.  Yet, it is 
now contended that this Railroad Security Service, which did nothing but 
guard the railroad, was independent.  This contention is obviously an 
afterthought.  General Dehner himself in the course of cross-examination 
made it quite clear who was in charge of these units, when the following 
colloquy took place: 
 
 "Q. Now then, between that time, between the 20 December and the time 
they came back in the middle of March, you were left with only two 
divisions in your area?   
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  "A. I had in my corps area the two reserve divisions, namely the 
173rd and 187th, to which reference was made before.  I also had the 
Cossack division and toward the end of 1943, I had the 367th Division to 
which I also referred on direct examination.  Then I had a number of 
other units, which were attached to the division, such as railway 
security battalions......"  
 
 There is very little else to be said of Dehner.  If there had been 
hostage executions in his area on only a few occasions, it might have 
been necessary to say more.  But during October, November, and December, 
1943 – the period when the Rendulic 50-to-1 order was in force – reports 
of these massacres were coming into him almost every day.  If these 
crimes had been committed by one one [sic] of his divisions, we might be 
able to accept his explanation that hostage executions were solely the 
business of the divisional commanders.  But each of his subordinate units 
was as murderous as the next. 
 
 His initials and signature on some of these necrologies show that 
he knew what was happening.  When he did not read the reports, his Chief 
of Staff told him what was in them.  He testified that he spent half of 
his time personally visiting his subordinate units for the purpose of 
finding out what was going on.  He was as close to the men who pulled the 
triggers and tied the hangman’s knots as any of the defendant here.  It 
was a practical impossibility for one of his divisional commanders to be 
promoted without his approval.  Yet Dehner now wishes us to believe that 
there was nothing he could do by way of restraint. 
 
 Dehner has the dubious distinction of having one of the worst 
records, and the most unconvincing defenses, which have been offered to 
this Tribunal. 
 
 When the war against Russia began, Rendulic was the Commanding 
General of the 52nd Infantry Division.  He denies, of course, that he 
ever executed the Commissar Order.  His testimony is in flat 
contradiction to the official record kept by his staff officers.  On 6 
September 
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1941, the division reported that two commissars had been seized and 
shot.  On 11 September an order was issued to the component regiments of 
the division, stating that "former Red Army men in uniform or civilian 
clothes loafing around, Jews, persons on whom weapons are found, or those 
who can be pronounced as partisans, are to be shot immediately." 
 
 The attitude of Rendulic toward the Jewish question is reflected 
clearly in this report.  Several time [sic] it is reported that Jews were 
used to clean up the streets, evacuated or drafted into the labor 
service.  Along with the two commissars, one Jewish functionary was shot. 
 
 In August, 1943, having meanwhile become a four-star General, 
Rendulic was transferred to Croatia as Commander of the 2nd Panzer 
Army.  He had an overall supervision of the areas occupied by the troops 
of Dehner’s and Leyser’s corps.  In addition to these, the V SS Corps and 
the XXI Mountain Corps were also subordinate to the 2nd Panzer 
Army.  Rendulic is, therefore, accountable not only for the crimes which 
have been enumerated in connection with our discussion of Leyser and 
Dehner but he also bears the joint responsibility for a number of other 
outrages committed in those other corps areas, plus a number which took 
place within the area of the XV Corps before Leyser became its 
commander.  For example, the Prinz Eugen Division hanged twenty partisans 
for an attempt to blow up railroad tracks while this division was 
subordinate to Lueters.  Other reports made during the period of Lueters’ 
command of the XV Corps show that 19 partisans were shot: that hostages 
have been arrested and that the slightest resistance was to be broken by 
ruthless terror; that 27 Chetniks were to be hanged as a reprisal 
measure; that two villages were burned down and eight men hanged in 
another operation;and [sic] the one village was burned and 100 bandits 
shot in another.  From the V SS Corps it was reported that 
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24 hostages were shot and one hanged in retaliation for the death of a 
single German soldier. 
 
 In connection with reprisal measures and particularly the execution 
of hostages carried out in the area of the 2nd Panzer Army, the Rendulic 
order of 15 September, 1943, plays a very important part. 
 
 The explanation for it which Rendulic gave was that he merely was 
making a current compilation of all previous orders on the subject; 
summarizing which was made necessary because of numerous supplements to 
the Keitel directive of two years before.  Rendulic even tried to use 
this order to make himself out to be a humanitarian because it prescribed 
a ration of only 50:1, whereas the Keitel directive had allowed for a 
figure of 100:1. 
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 As in the case of the other defendants, the attempt to exonerate 
himself by pointing to an OKW order is irreconcilable with what he said 
in other connections.  For instance, he claimed on the witness stand to 
have disregarded absolutely the Fuehrerbefehl of 25 July, 1943, which 
provided for the transfer of all captured partisans for work in the 
mines.  He says that since in his judgement the labor shortage was more 
critical in Croatia than it was in the Reich, he simply kept them in 
spite of the mandate of his Supreme Commander.  We have already pointed 
out that th [sic] says he refused to carry out the Commissar Order.  The 
truth is, the hostage order which Rendulic gave was promulgated and 
passed down because Rendulic believed that it was the proper way to meet 
the situation.  If he had not thought so, he would have disregarded the 
Keitel directive with all its supplements just as he disregarded the OKW 
orders when he dis[a]greed with them. 
 
 Leyser and Dehner as well as Rendulic constantly tried to minimize 
the importance of this 50:1 order by saying that it was rescinded early 
in December so that it was only in effect some 2½ months.  That, of 
course, is no answer.  But the significant thing is that during this 
period most of the hanging and shootings took place.  The effect which 
the issuance of this order had on the troop commanders can be clearly 
seen from the standing instructions subsequently issued by [F]ischer and 
Niedholdt during the month of October.  This one order is sufficient in 
itself to convict a dozen men of murder. 
 
 But the long register of crimes ascribable to Rendulic contains an 
infinite variety.  It is not confined simply to the killing of hostages. 
One spectacular item is the conduct of his troops toward their former 
Allies directly after the Italian surrender. 
 
 Mussolini abdicated on 25 July, 1943.  The Germans had been 
apprehensive that the Italian Army would not much longer continue a 
struggle for which it had never displayed a sensational enthusiasm and 
this event confirmed their fears.  The OKW began planning what the German 
troops were to do in the event of an Italian capitulation to the 
Allies.  They knew the location 
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and strength of all the Italian units and in August a series of 
directives were sent out from Berlin alerting the commanding generals in 
the Balkans to the possibility of an Italian surrender so as to allow 
them to make whatever tactical arrangements were necessary in order to 
disarm the Italians and to take over the occupation tasks of the Italian 
troops if that became necessary. 
 
 On the night of 8 September, the surrender terms having been signed 
by the representatives of his government, Marshal Badoglio, the Italian 
Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Italian armed forces, issued 
an order to all Italian troops in the field, informing them of the terms 
of the surrender agreement and giving them directions as to what they 
should do. The gist of these directions was that though they were to take 
no aggressive action against the Germans, the Italian troops were not to 
allow themselves to be disarmed.  Any such attempt on the part of the 
Germans was to be interpreted as hostile act which the Italian forces 
should resist to the fullest extent of their power. 
 
 The Italian troops in the Balkans were all part of Army Group Est 
which was composed of two armies, the 9th stationed in Croatia and 
Albania and the 11th in Greece.  The commander of Army Group Est was 
General Rossi. 
 
 Rendulic, upon learning of the Italian capitulation, acted 
promptly.  
 
 On 9 September, the operation "Axis" was begun and the German units 
moved with synchronized swiftness to their pre-arranged positions.  On 
the 10th, the SS Division "Prinz Eugen" reported that its combat teams 
had "encountered resistance from Italian units" which had refused to 
capitulate and that dive-bombing attacks by German planes had een [sic] 
employed to induce a more reasonable frame of mind. 
 
 Now it was obviously to the best interests of the Germans to 
persuade the highest Italian commander to order all his troops to give in 
and be disarmed by the Germans.  The commander of the Italian Army Group 
Est, General Rossi, was among those who refused to disobey Badoglio’s 
instruction[s] 
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It would not do to have the natural resentment on the part of many of the 
Italian troops toward being ignominiously disarmed and made prisoners of 
way by the Germans stiffened by the attitude of the highest Italian 
commander, so in the very next day, 11 September, a capitulation 
agreement was signed by the Italian General D’Almazzo, the Commander of 
the Italian 9th Army. 
 
 Meanwhile, the day after the Italian surrender to the Allies, 
Keitel had issued an order directing what was to be done with Italian 
soldiers who refused to continue fighting on the German side. After being 
disarmed, they were to be considered as prisoners of war, the skilled 
workers among them to be sent to work in the German armament factories, 
and all the others to be used as slave laborers, on the construction of 
the so-called East Wall. 
 
 On 11 September, the same day that General D’Almazzo signed the 
capitulation agreement, Rendulic ordered that wherever Italian troops 
continued to offer resistance they were to be given a short-term 
ultimatum saying that unless the resistance cessed [sic], the commanders 
responsible for it would be shot as francs tireurs. The next day he 
issued another order to General Lueters, providing that in case of 
destruction of arms, ammunition etc. by the Italians, one officer of the 
divisional staff and fifty men of th[e] division concerned would be shot 
to death, in addition to the culprits. The Italian commanders were to 
remain in charge of their men during the evacuation from the coastal 
areas to certain surrender points designated by the Germans in the 
interior of Croatia. Any Italian soldier who arrived at the entraining 
station without his arms would be shot to death, together with his unit 
leader, and if any motorized vehicle were destroyed, one officer and ten 
men would be shot. 
 
 Another order the next day provided that if any of the Italian 
troops refused to do as they were ordered, "severest measures of 
compulsion, reprisa[l] measures (shootings to death)" were to be applied. 
 
 In spite of the order of D’Almazzo, several Italian divisions 
refused 
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to surrender to the Germans. One of those was the "Bergamo" Division 
stationed at Split and another was the Division "Taurinense" in Albania. 
Various smaller Italian units also refused to lick the German boot. 
 
 The SS Division "Prinz Eugen" was dispatched to Split to subdue the 
"Bergamo Division." Apparently the resistance it encountered was too 
stiff for the 92nd motorized Regiment was dispatched to help out in 
quelling the revolt which centered around the Italian General Roncaglio. 
By 28 September, the XV Mountain Corps to which the "Prinz Eugen" 
Division was subordinated, was able to report that the majority of the 
Roncaglio Division had been taken prisoner and that 300 of its captured 
officers would be executed in accordance with the Keitel order of 15 
September. The entry in the war diary of the XV Mountain Corps for 27 
September reads: "commanding general has called investigation to 
ascertain guilty officers." The reference apparently is to Rendulic. The 
next day the XV Corps again instructed the SS Division "Prinz Eugen" to 
proceed according to previous orders – "officers to be shot to death by 
summary court martial, non-commissioned officers and men to be deported 
East for compulsory labor employment." Accordingly, the division 
delivered 9,400 Italian prisoners for transport to work camps in the 
East. 
 
 General Roncaglio was flown to Belgrade at the special request of 
Rendulic. A number of other Italian officers, including 3 generals, were 
retained for execution. The precise number of Italian officers who were 
shot by the Germans cannot be seen from the captured documents, and, of 
course, Rendulic claims he does not know. On 30 September, however, the 3 
generals were killed at Split and on the following day the shooting of 
"45 additional guilty Italian officers" was reported. On 3 October, an 
"additional 9 officers of the Bergano Division" were reported shot, and 
on 12 October, "4 more officers of the Taurinense were shot as reprisal." 
We need not attempt to catalogue all of the reported executions. They 
continued, however, until at least 26 November when reprisal measures 
were reported to have been carried out against 8 more Italian officers. 
 
 The facts summarized here are not in dispute. What are the excuses 
3 Feb-A-JP-16-5-Maloy  (Int. Schaeffer) 
Court V  Case VII 
 
and explanations which General Rendulic offers? His defense is best 
fundamentally upon the capitulation agreement which D’Almazzo signed 
which, he argues, was a bona fido [sic] contract that D’Almazzo was 
authorized to make so far as he, Rendulic, know [sic] at the time. Of 
course, in order to sustain this argument, Rendulic had to deny that he 
knew anything about Badoglio’s surrender proclamation of 8 September and 
he also had to profess his belief in D’Almazzo’s authority. 
 
 One document which the prosecution introduced in rebuttal blows all 
of these contentions sky-high. It shows that in actuality Rendulic kn[o]w 
[sic] of Badoglio’s surrender on the very day it was announced. On that 
day, 8 September, at 2150 hours, the 2nd Panzer Army informed its three 
subordinate corps that 
 
BLOCK QUOTE START 
 
"according to the declaration of Marshal Badoglio, the Italians are 
fighting together with the Allies and refuse any sort of surrender of 
weapons."  
 
BLOCK QUOTE END 
 
The teletype message went on to say that "according to radio Cairo, 
Italian troops in the Balkans are subordinate to American General 
Wilson." Rendulic, therefore, knew perfectly well that no Italian officer 
in the Balkans could sign an agreement to surrender to the Germans 
without directly violating the order of his superior. 
 
 But here is the amazing thing which this document discloses: It 
appears that on 11 September, three days after the Badoglio proclamation, 
Rendulic personally went to Tirana and Albania by air with a company of 
German parachutists and arrested General Rossi and his Chief of Staff. 
This happened at noon. At two o’clock the diary reveals that General 
D’Almazzo was installed in Rossi’s place "and is to receive his 
instructions concerning concentration and orderly withdrawal of his units 
from the Commander-in-Chief of the 2nd Panzer Army." The installation 
apparently took place at General Bader’s headquarters in Belgrade. 
Rendulic had done a [g]ood day’s work. He had captured and deposed one 
Italian commander, flown to Belgrade and installed D’Almazzo in his stead 
and concluded a surrender agreement all on the same day. 
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 This completely topples the Italian surrender agreement defense 
behind which Rendulic attempted to hide. It incidentally shows that not 
an iota of credence can [b]e placed on any of the testimony he made on 
the witness stand. He knew when he was testifying that this whole story 
was fiction from start to finish and that this vaunted "agreement" with 
the Italian Commander-in-Chief was nothing but a shame. 
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 The introduction of this document into evidence eliminates the 
necessity of a prolonged argument over the law of surrender agreements. 
It is evident that before an agreement can be binding on anyone, both 
parties must act in good faith and have authority or at least colorable 
authority to contract. It would be a simple life indeed if we could 
merely kidnap everyone who would not accede to our terms and install a 
ventriloquist’s dummy in his stead. 
 
 The last action of Rendulic to be noted concerns the devastation of 
northern Norway. The story here is a simple one. The Finns had gotten 
their fill of the war and had decided that further resistance against the 
Russians was stupid. The German troops were given two weeks’ notice to 
evacuate the country. The 20th Mountain Army, under Rendulic, was 
stationed in northern Finland, primarily to secure the airfields and 
ports which had served as bases for German air and sea attacks on Allied 
convoys going to Murmansk and Archangel. Another important task had been 
the protection of the vital nickel mines at Kolosjoki. 
 
 Actually, the Finns did not sign an armistice with Russia until six 
weeks after they had notified the Germans of their intention, but even 
this additional time did not enable the latter to retreat in a 
comfortable and leisurely fashion. 
 
 On 4 October, the OKW ordered that Rendulic have his troops in the 
course of their withdrawal destroy all installations which might be of 




"the entire population of Norway capable of bearing arms is to be taken 
along as far as marches permit and to be turned over to 
 
END 
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  START 
 
"the Reich commissar Norway for compulsory labor employment. 
 
  "Finnish hostages are to be taken along as the situation 
requires." 
 
  END 
 
 Rendulic denied that any Finnish hostages had ever been taken. The 
documents introduced in the course of his cross-examination completely 
disprove this. Apparently they were seized as so-called security hostages 
to be shot in case the Finnish troops interfered with the German 
destruction of bridges and other installations, including the machinery 
of the nickel mines. 
 
 The line of the German march from northern Finland and westward 
into the Norwegian province of Finnmark. The Russians had closed in 
during the latter part of September, but advanced rather slowly. It took 
them almost two weeks to advance the last 100 kilometers before they got 
to the ban[k]s of the Tana River, some 50 miles west of the Norwegian-
Finnish border. The German rear guard patrols lost contact with the 
Russians at that point because the Russians never attempted to penetrate 
any further into Norway. In other words, the main body of the Russians 
halted on approximately the 21st of October. 
 
 On 28 October the OKW issued a second order to Rendulic. It 
provided that since the population of northern Norway had displayed an 
unwillingness to evacuate their homeland, Hitler had agreed to Terboven’s 
suggestion that the evacuation be made compulsory and that all habitable 
dwellings be burned down or destroyed. The next day Rendulic passed down 
a similar order, practically incorporating Jodl’s language, to his 
subordinate units. It contains a remark, "Pity for the civilian 
population is out of place." 
 
 Now since Rendulic seeks to justify the issuance of this order on 
the ground of military necessity, a few points 
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should be considered. First, at the time it was given, none of his troops 
had seen a Russian for more than a week. Second, Rendulic knew that the 
Russians had made no attempt to cross the Tana and that they probably 
would make none. He knew this for a number of reasons. Also, by following 
the Germans as far as they did, the Russians had dangerously extended 
their lines of supply anf [sic] for them to have made an expedition into 
Norway would have necessitated the establishment of a major supply base 
in northern Finland which they had not attempted to do. The number of 
troops which the Russians had committed in northern Finland was 
insufficient to carry out an invasion of Norway. Rendulic knew this not 
only through reports of his spies and agents but also through his aerial 
reconnaissance. It is true that the weather was not favorable for flying 
during this period but, General Dahl testified that during part of the 
day reconnaissance flying was possible and, we know that Rendulic had 
reconnaissance planes at this disposal. Even if he did not, he had other 
sour[c]es of information about the number and movements of the Russian 
troops. The area over which the Russians were advancing had been occupied 
by the Germans for a long time and had only recently been evacuated by 
them. It is safe to assume that it had been liberally sprin[k]led with 
German spies and agents who remained behind for this specific purpose of 
furnishing intelligence about the Russians. The Germans intercepted 
Russian radio messages and had also interrogated Russian prisoners of 
war. 
 
 General Ferdinand Jodl who was one of the corps commanders in the 
20th Mountain Army at that time testified that the order to evacuate 
Finnmark and to apply the scorched earth policy to it was so plainly 
unnecessary 
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from the point of view of military necessity that if he were given the 
order to do it again, he would resign his commission before carrying it 
out. 
 
 At any rate, it was carried out with the throughness [sic] which 
the German Army has always displayed in such actions. Everything was laid 
waste—fisherman’s huts, earthen dugouts of the Laplanders, churches, 
schools, power plants, telephone and telegraph lines, boats and roads. In 
the darkness and cold of the Arctic winter, tens of thousands were driven 
from their homes. The able-bodied were marched off and the old, the sick, 
and the children were transported by ship. "Pity for the population is 
out of place," Rendulic had said. All this Rendulic seeks to justify on 
the ground of military necessity. The only reason for this vandalism 
which could possibly be related to military necessity is the destruction 
of roads and communications. There was only one highway, however, which 
ran from north to south. Yet the Germans acting under this specific order 
of Rendulic not only destroyed every dwelling place, barn and other 
evidence of civilization in the vicinity of the highway but throughout an 
area 40 miles on either side of the highway. The destruction began in 
October, and was continued until the German surrender to the Allies. 
 
 In some instances, a general who puts forward a plea of military 
necessity to charges of wanton devastation makes his accuser appear to be 
substituting afterthought. It is perhaps rare for a case of devastation 
to be so completely unjustifiable as this one. Military necessity has 
been used more than any other excuse to defend the causing of misery to 
non-combatants. In this instance it obviously had no application. Were we 
to explore the inner recesses of a mind brutal capable of ordering this 
senseless waste, 
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we would be leaving the realm of law and entering that of psychiatry. It 
is enough for us to show that the action was futile, vicious and 
unreasonable. 
 
 Part of the clue to this callousness toward his fellow creatures 
may be found in his political credo. We have refrained from dwelling on 
the political and ideological tenets of these defendants to any extent. 
But with Rendulic, to pass over these things is to ignore the very pulse 
of the machine. For politics, and particularly Nazi politics, have played 
quite as important a role in his life as has the pursuit of his 
profession as a soldier. 
 
 Rendulic was attracted by Nazi doctrine from the beginning. He 
joined the Party in 1932 and belonged to it until it was made illegal by 
the Austrian government. Immediately after the Anschluss, he was re-
baptized and soon became one of its outstanding advocates within the 
ranks of the professional soldiers. He enjoyed Hitler’s confidence and 
friendship to an extent that was almost unique. So securely entrenched 
did he feel himself to be in the affections of Hitler that he did not 
hesitate upon occasion to disagree with or even insult one of the other 
royal favorites. He snarled at Kasche, lectured Terboven, screamed at 
Koch and berated Eigruber with impunity. 
 
 He constantly urged that the troops be saturated with Nazi 
concepts. On the witness stand he cynically explained that troops who 
believed in ideology fought better than troops who did not, and that it 
made no difference to him what ideology was used so long as it had the 
desired effect. To discuss all the philosophical implications of that 
remark would require another address the length of this one. 
 
 Rendulic was eminently successful in convincing the 
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Nazi Party leaders of the sincerity of his devotion to their cause. It is 
probably no accident that he, the most active and articulate Nazi in the 
dock, also is by far the most decorated defendant. He was even awarded 
the coveted Golden Party Badge, which was not a military honor at all but 
merely a recognition of usefulness to the Party. 
 
 We are not trying Rendulic for his political affiliations. They are 
significant here only in that if we seek an explanation for the spoor of 
blood and ashes which he left behind him, the only possible answer seems 
to be in the obscene mantlings of the master-philosophers to whose faith 




 After General Hubert Lanz refused to carry out a Hitler order to 
attack when in February 1942 he commanded what amounted to an army in 
Russia, he was relieved of his command and sent home. Significantly 
enough, General Lanz, who almost more than any other defendant made 
superior orders a part of his defense, admitted that other than being 
relieved of his command nothing disastrous happened to him as a result of 
his disobedience. He was not discharged from the Army, his pension was 
not cut off, he was not court martialed [sic] nor were any recriminatory 
measures taken against his family. After rusticating [sic] at home for 
four or five months, Lanz applied for another assignment and on 2[5] 
August 1943, was named Commanding General of the XXII Mountain Corps in 
Greece. Such was the disastrous result of his defiance of a 
Fuehrerbefehl. 
 
 On the 9th of September 1943, Lanz flew to Joannina and took charge 
of the XXIInd Mountain Corps with its subordinate 1st Mountain and 104th 
Light Infantry Divisions. Immediately, Lanz faced the task of disarming 
the Italian 
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units within his corps area. General Vecchiarelli, commander of the 11th 
Italian Army, agreed to the German demands, but the leaders of the 
Italian garrisons on the islands of Cephalonia and Corfu refused to be 
bound by his compant [sic]. Lanz himself flew to Cehpalonia [sic] on the 
12th of September 1943, and talked with Gandin, the Italian commander 
there, who stated that he could not surrender because his orders were 
"unclear". Lanz says that h[e] could see no excuse for Gandin’s 
recalcitrance, because since Gandin was subordinate to Vecchiarelli, he 
was plainly bound by the latter’s capitulation agreement. 
 
 In order to justify his own attitude, Lanz has to pretend that he 
had no knowledge of the terms of the Italian-Allied armistice of 8 
September, though those terms were announced to the German government by 
Badoglio himself and were published in all German newspapers on the 12th 
of September. As we have just seen, Badoglio’s proclamation was known to 
Rendulic and his staff on the same night that it was delivered. Lanz 
could scarcely have been less informed than another segment of the same 
Army Group F. Gandin, in stating that his orders were "unclear", could 
only have meant that he had already received orders from Marshal 
Badoglio, which contradicted the orders which Gandin had received from 
Vecchiarelli. Knowing full well that Vecchiarelli had also received 
orders from Badoglio not to surrender, so that the capitulation agreement 
was void for lack of authority, Gandin did the only thing possible—he 
obeyed the orders of his commander-in-chief and the head of his 
government. Gandin was regarded as pro-German, which indicates that he 
would have been inclined to surrender, had his sinse [sic] of duty not 
overridden his personal predilictions [sic]. 
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 Lanz maintains that following their talk on the 12th of September 
1943, Gandin promised, in return for an "order" from Lanz, to surrender 
his troops and arms, and that in later refusing to do so he broke his 
pledge. We have only Lanz’s testimony with respect to Gandin’s alleged 
"promise", but what we do know is that Lanz himself on both the 14th and 
the 17th of September acted in bad faith towards Gandin. On both of those 
days, Lanz had leaflets dropped to the Italian troops on Cephalonia 
stating that if they surrendered, the Germans would transport all of them 
back to their homeland. Such procedure was, of course, entirely out of 
the question and Lanz knew it. We have already mentioned the Keitel 
orders of 9 and 15 September which provided for the shipment of Italian 
soldiers to the East. If there was, therefore, any violation of an 
agreement on Gandin’s part, Lanz is hardly the one to complain. 
 
 Fighting broke out between the German and Italian units on 
Cephalonia and after bringing up reinforcements, the Germans eventually 
defeated the Italian Detachment. 
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 On 23 September Gandin was captured with all his staff, and on 24 
September Lanz’s own corps report related that Gandin and his entire 
staff had been given "special treatment according to the Fuehrer order". 
Lanz asserts that those Italian officers—their precise numberhe [sic] 
cannot of course recall—were shot only after court martial procedure. His 
report mentions no such procedure. Further, it is evident from merely a 
casual inspection of the documents concerning the Italian surrender that 
a court martial, when it was held, was only a hasty formality with a 
predetermined result. 
 
 The German losses in fighting for Cephalonia were between 80 and 
100 soldiers, while the corresponding Italian losses were, according to 
Lanz’s own report, "600 killed or shot." Lanz maintains that the language 
"killed or shot" is of no particular significance: that all the Italian 
losses were the result of the combat action. This explanation is of 
course patently untrue. Certain of those 600 persons—in addition to 
General Gandin and his entire staff—were shot after their capture. 
 
 The history of what happened to the Italian garrison on Corfu is 
much the same. Again, the commander refused to abide by Vecchiarelli’s 
surrender agreement, and fighting broke out, with disastrous consequences 
for the Italians. Lanz estimated German losses during that action at 
about 250 and Italian losses at about 1000 men. His own reports, however, 
indicate that not only were all Italian soldiers on Corfu executed upon 
capture, but that 4000 other Italians were "killed or shot." Again, the 
small German and huge Italian losses make it quite clear that the greater 
part of the Italian losses were suffered after their capture, and not 
during the course of the fighting. Lanz himself remembered and admitted 
that the island’s Italian commandant had been executed in the same way 
and for the same reasons as General Gandin. But though the 1st Mountain 
Division was primarily 
3 February 48-A-ATD-18-2-Primeau (Int. Schaeffer) 
Court 5, Case 7 
 
employed in the action against Corfu, the Ic officer of that division, 
Colonel Rothfu[c]hs, had the temerity to statein [sic] an affidavit that 
he knew nothing at all about the execution of Italian officers on Corfu. 
The failure of Rothfuchs to appear for cross-examination by the 
Prosecution is understandable. 
 
 Lanz’s excuses for his conduct toward his former Italian allies are 
as numerous as they are illogical and confused. He contends that if it 
had not been for his stand in the matter, more Italian officers would 
have been executed. To support this, he mentions having received a Hitler 
order instructing him to execute all of the Italian members of the Gandin 
division. He flatly refused, he claims, to even consider executing the 
Italian troops and, with an extra burst of magnanimity, even refused to 
execute any but the "guilty" officers responsible for the revolt. But 
this is not borne out by the facts. There is not a single notation in any 
of the reports or war diaries of Army Group E, the XXII Corps or any of 
its subordinate units to confirm Lanz’s references to this imaginary 
Hitler order. The fact is that even the OKW order of 15 September 1943 
limited punishment to those Italian officers who were "responsible" for 
fomenting the Italian resistance against disarmament. 
 
 Lanz also argues that Gandin had a duty to obey Vecchiarelli’s 
orders to surrender. It has already been pointed out that Vecchiarelli’s 
capitulation agreement was the product of bad faith on the part of the 
Germans, who knew that he had no authority to make it. When Gandin knew 
that his immediate superior was guilty of treason, he was not bound to 
tar himself with the same brush. 
 
 Lanz further maintains that Gandin’s actions were criminal because 
he fought, although there had been no declaration of war by Italy against 
Germany. It is difficult to see what is criminal about self-defense. 
These isolated groups of Italians committed no hostile act against the 
Germans. So far as the evidence shows, they were willing 
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to spend the rest of the war vacationing on the isles of Greece. They had 
shown no disposition to start a private war with the Wehrmacht. Every 
shot that they fired wasto  [sic]  defend themselves against the German 
attack. This contention of Lanz is completely illogical. He is saying 
that if the Italians had initiated an offensive against the Germans after 
a declaration of war, he would have treated them better than he did when 
they waited for the Germans to attack them. In other words, he is saying 
that they should be penalized for their pacific behavior. 
 
 Then Lanz maintains that Gandin’s actions were analogous to the 
actions of a prisoner of war who mutinied against his captor. This 
contention, obviously, is expost [sic] facto rationalization. The concept 
of mutiny never entered the picture at all. The OKW orders never 
mentioned the word but talked only of shooting the Italian officers who 
resisted "as francs-tireur". Rendulic’sown  [sic]  reports indicate that 
his treatment of Rencaglia [sic] was based upon the theory that 
Roncaglia’s actions made him a franc-tireur. 
 
 Moreover, if execution after capture was the usual way of dealing 
with a mutineer, why did Lanz’s reports mention that Gandin and his staff 
were being given "special treatment"? 
 
 There must be a relationship of superior and inferior before there 
can be an insubordination which leads to mutiny can take place. The 
Italian resisters were, of course, not subordinate to the German troops. 
If it be argued that Gandin had been guilty of mutiny towards 
Vecchiarelli, then naturally one asks why the Germans had authority to 
punish such mutiny and why no representatives of Vecchiarelli sat on the 
court martials which passed sentence upon Gandin and his staff. 
 
 Certain sections of German law were cited in support of the 
contention that the executed officers were mutineers. Those sections on 
their face are inapplicable to the Italian situation. They relate to acts 
of foreign civilians, not foreign military personnel. Moreover, 
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if those sections do have the meaning ascribed to them, they are flatly 
in contravention of the Hague Rules of Land Warfare regarding the 
criteria prerequisite for belligerent status. 
 
 But even if it is accurate to describe the Italian officers who 
resisted disarmament as prisoners of war who had mutinied, the German 
treatment of them was contrary to the treatment prescribed in the Geneva 
Convention. Every prisoner of war who commits a crime after he has been 
made a prisoner of war had a right to trial by his peers which, of 
course, wasnot  [sic]  the case with Gandin. Moreover, notice of his 
trial must be sent by the detaining power to the protecting power. 
Finally, no death sentence against such a prisoner of war may be executed 
until three months after notice of sentence is given to the protecting 
power. None of these conditions were fulfilled. 
 
 An addition 58 Italian officers were executed upon capture at 
Sarande for being instrumental in allying the units with the partisans. 
As to these men, Lanz admits that they were shot on the theory that they 
were francs-tireur. But, of course, they were not. Even Lanz conceded 
that they fulfilled all of the requirements of Article 1 of the Hague 
Rules for belligerent status. They were in full uniform, they were 
commanded by their own officers, they bore their arms openly and they 
obeyed the rules of war. Lanz now maintains that those 58 officers were 
shot by the 1st Mountain Division in violation of his own orders to the 
contrary. But even forgetting Lanz’s previous treatment of Italian 
officers captured on Cephalonia and Corfu, and assuming that what he says 
is true, why was the commander of the 1st Mountain Division not punished 
for what wasin  [sic] this case unquestionable insubordination? 
 
 Lanz finally contends that his actions against the Italians were 
militarily necessary. It might be conceded that there were compelling 
military reasons for wishing to disarm the Italians. But how could there 
possibly be any military necessity for shooting those who resisted 
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after their capture and after their capacity for doing further damage to 
German security had been removed? 
 
 The true explanation for these killings was given by the highest 
judge at OKW headquarters, Dr. Lehmann, who instructed his subordinate 
judicial officers on 30 September 1943, that the execution of captured 
Italian officers on the basis of the Keitel directive of 16 September 
should be considered "a political measure without judicial competence." 
 
 Before leaving the Italian complex, we should mention that Lanz’s 
corps headquarters issued an order not to take prisoners during operation 
"Verrat" (Treason) the code name for the German action on Cephalonia and 
Corfu, and that one company of the Brandenburg Regiment wasto [sic] 
participate in the attack wearing Italian uniforms. Even Lanz had no 
doubt of the unlawfulness of that tactic. He now claims that the 
Brandenburg unit neveractually [sic] got into action. If so, Lanz can 
claim no credit. He neverlifted [sic] a finger to prevent the scheme from 
being carried out. Of course, he also says now that the "no prisoner" 
order wasissued [sic] by a member of his staff without his knowledge and 
that he himself never knew until he got to Nuremberg of the intentions of 
the Brandenburg detachment. On other occasions, when it suited his 
purposes better, Lanz insisted that he was always alert to punish 
offenses of every nature within his area of command. Is it likely that 
aman [sic] so concerned with maintaining discipline within his corps 
would have no knowledge of an act of gross insubordination on the part of 
a staff officer and of the intended violation of international law by a 
unit attached for special purposes to his command? 
 
 Lanz, like the rest of his colleagues, says that he was violently 
opposed to the whole Nazi regime. He says that he was severely criticized 
by his superiors for the way he conducted the initial surrender 
negotiations with Cecchiarelli [sic], as well as for his attitude towards 
the Italian resisters on Cephalonia and Corfu. But several months after 
the 
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Italian affair, on 1 March 1944, General [L]oehr—then Commander of Army 
Group E—described Lanz as a "National Socialist leader personality" and 
stated that his annihilation of the Italian occupation forces on 
Cephalonia and Corfu were "frequently superior". In spite of the 
"difficulties" which Lanz was supposed to have made for his superiors 
during the Italian actions, Loehr stated that he was "above average" and 
"should be retained in his present assignment". 
 
 Lanz has the blood of an indefinite number, at the very least more 
than a hundred, innocent Italian officers and men on his hands. His 
actions during September and October 1943 were flagrant violations of 
fundamental revisions of international law which will always be 
remembered as one of the most shameful and unchivalrous [sic] chapters in 
the whole history of professional soldiery. 
 
 Mr. Fenstermacher will continue with the Prosecutions closing 
statement 
 
 THE PRESIDENT: We will take our afternoon recess at this time, a 
recessof [sic] ten minutes. 
 
(A recess was taken.) 
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 THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session. 
 
 MR. FENSTERMACHER: After dealing with the Italians, Lanz turned to 
his primary mission of defeating the partisans and maintaining order and 
security in the Epirus section of Greece. In the light of his prior 
performance, one could not expect his methods of keeping order among the 
Greek populace to be remarkable for their gentleness and forebearance 
[sic]. He resorted to the usual Greek technique of the mailed [sic] fist 
and the spiked club—the execution of hostages and the wholesale burning 
of villages. 
 
 Lanz maintains that he opposed the whole idea of taking hostages 
and shooting men in retaliation for acts which were committed by others. 
He was careful not to say that he considered such methods unlawful but 
only that he objected to them for "purely humane reasons." His opposition 
was apparently not very articulate. On the 13th of September 1943 the 
subordinate 1st Mountain Division issued an order providing that "for 
every German soldier wounded or killed by insurgents or civilians, ten 
Greeks from all classes of the population are to be shot to death", and 
that this ratio was to "be carried out consistently in order to achieve a 
deterring effect." Lanz says he never heard of that order prior to seeing 
it for the first time here in Nueremberg [sic]. At the time that the 
order was issued, the headquarters of the XXIInd Mountain Corps and the 
1st Mountain Division were in the very same city. Lanz and General 
Stettner, the Division commander, lived and worked not more than two 
kilometers from each other in the Epirus capital of Joannina. If you 
believe Lanz, he and Stattner [sic] never even discussed the matter of 
hostages. 
 
 Slightly more than a fortnight after the 10:1 order  
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of the 1st Mountain Division, Lanz himself ordered that "30 distinguished 
citizens (Greeks) from Arta", and "10 distinguished citizens (Greeks) 
from Filipias", be arrested and kept as hostages because of repeated 
cable sabotage in the area of Arta. The order stated that "for every 
further act of cable sabotage ten of the forty hostages would be shot to 
death." When it was pointed out to General Lanz on cross examination that 
he himself was adopting a 10:1 hostage ratio just a short time after the 
10:1 ratio was announced by one of his subordinate divisions, he was most 
surprised. Could it have been coincidence or is this an indication that 
the 1st Mountain Division’s order is based on a previous order issued by 
Lanz? 
 
 On 25 October 1943, the 1st Mountain Division issued another hostage 
order of which Lanz also claims to have been uninformed. In that later 
order, the hostage ratio was raised to 50:1 in the case of German losses 
and 10:1 "in case of a murder of a pro-German Greek working for the 
Germans." Application for the actual carrying out of all such executions 
had to be cleared by the Division’s I[o] officer through General Speidel 
who, as Military Commander of Greece represented the executive power. 
Although the 50:1 ratio was decreed even in the event of losses suffered 
by the Germans during band combat, Lanz has no recollection whatever of 
having issued, discussed or heard about this act of obvious illegality on 
the part of the divisional commander whose headquarters were in the same 
town with his own. 
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 On direct examination Lanz insisted that he himself had issued but 
one hostage order, the one dated 3 October. Could he have intentionally 
forgotten the proclamation that he, as Commander of the German troops in 
Epirus, issued on 24 May 1944 for the seizure of hostages in Pogonion and 
their transport to Joannina, 40 kilometers away? 
 
 Lanz, of course, was reluctant to even hazard a guess at the number 
of hostages that were executed within the jurisdiction of his XXII 
Mountain Corps. Even the numerous documents were unable to refresh his 
recollection sufficiently for him to give a rough approximation. The 
situation report of the 1st Mountain Division to the XXII Corps, dated 24 
October 1943, states that 58 hostages were executed for a surprise attack 
on German soldiers in the area near Paramythia. General Lanz felt that 
this particular report was confused with a report stating that 50 Greeks 
had been executed in retaliation for an attack upon German troops. But it 
was General Lanz rather than the Prosecution who was confused. An 
additional report shows that the 50 Greeks were executed on the 29th of 
September for an att ack [sic] which occurred on the 20th of that month. 
From one of General Lanz’s own file notes, dated 18 October 1943, more 
than three weeks after the "50 Greeks" incident, it appears that the 58 
hostages were shot as a reprisal measure for six German soldiers. Again 
one notices, strikingly enough, an adherence to the 10:1 ratio which the 
1st Mountain Division had decreed on the 13th of September and which Lanz 
himself had observed on the 3rd of October 1943. 
 
 Whether or not General Lanz now recalls it, his own corps reported 
to Army Group E on the 12th of December 1943, the execution of five 
hostages in retaliation for the killing of a "nationalist leader" in 
Korea. Earlier, on the 8th of November 1943, Battalion 79 reported to the 
1st Mountain Division that eight hostages had been hanged in retaliation 
for the death of the interpreter Walter Jennewin. 
 
 That General Lanz had personal acquaintance with the execution of 
hostages is readily seen from the reports sent out in connection with 
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the attack upon his own convoy at the time of the Salminger funeral. On 
the 3rd of October, 1943, the 1st Mountain Division reported that in 
retaliation for a partisan attack on the convoy making the trip from 
Joannina to Prevesa "4 hostages were immediately shot as reprisal" and 
that immediate counter-measures were being carried out. The same day the 
1st Mountain Division reported "counter-measures in progress; up to now 4 
civilians shot to death". Fascinated by the magical similarity of the 
figure four here involved, Lanz argues that hostages were not shot at all 
but that the persons killed were simply Greek partisans dressed as 
civilians who were killed in the course of the attack. A more reasonable 
explanation, however, is that immediately after the attack four innocent 
hostages were executed, and that later on four additional persons were 
shot as a counter-measure.  
 
 Though possessing no real knowledge of the execution of "security" 
hostages, Lanz has a slight familiarity with the use of "danger" hostages 
within his corps area. Though his 1st Mountain Division issued orders 
that hostages accompanying German lorries should be taken only from the 
central collection point, and though Lanz himself saw Greek civilians 
patrolling German roads under the threat of being executed in the event 
of attacks on German vehicles using those roads, he saw nothing unlawful 
about the practice, though he did feel that it was not a particularly 
good idea from a purely military point of view.  
 
 Lanz faced both ELAS and EDES partisans during the course of his 
stay in Epirus. He admitted that the testimony of the Greek witness 
Triandaphyllidis, General Zervas’ ADC, was accurate when the latter 
testified that all EDES units wore insignia, that after March 1943, they 
all wore uniforms and that they were not guilty of any violations of the 
laws of war. Perhaps because no member of the ELAS units had testified, 
General Lanz felt safe in contending that those 
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units fulfilled none of the prerequisites of Article 1 of the Hague 
Rules. The many reports which mentioned the military organization of the 
EIAS forces, the names of their leaders, their armament and equipment, 
and their insignia, are authentic written testimony to the contrary. 
 
 But in spite of the fact that both of Lanz’s opponents were 
entitled to full belligerent status, Lanz instructed his units to take 
severe reprisal measures in the event of attacks by those opponents 
against German troops and installations. The most significant order in 
that regard is Lanz’s own order of the day issued after the death of Lt. 
Colonel Salminger, who was killed by a partisan road-trap, a method of 
warfare which outraged Lanz’s own high standards of chivalrous warfare. 
In his order of 1 October 1943, he said that he expected that the 1st 
Mountain Division would "avenge this nefarious bandit murder… by a 
ruthless reprisal action with a circumference of 20 kilometers of the 
place where the murder occurred." On the stand Lanz insisted that by that 
order he was simply instructing the 1st Mountain Division to seek out and 
defeat the partisans in armed combat. Again one notices the resort to 
euphemism which has been so commonplace throughout this proceeding. That 
the troops read the same meaning in to the order as did the Prosecution 
is evident from the reports which came back to the corps two days later. 
Though it was not likely that Salminger’s attackers would loiter very 
long in the neighborhood, the division invaded and burned village after 
village. 
 
 Though there was not a single German loss at Akmotopok, the entire 
village was burned down and all its inhabitants shot. Lanz argues that 
when a report states "all inhabitants shot to death", it really means 
that all of the peaceful inhabitants had left the village prior to the 
entry of the German troops and that the persons actually shot down were 
not inhabitants of the village at all but simply partisans dressed as 
civilians. 
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 One further example of the apparent unintelligibility of the 
language of the reports which came to General Lanz concerns the reprisal 
action carried out against the village of Korea. Though the report 
records that "all men capable of bearing arms were shot", Lanz claims 
that what really happened was that the civilian inhabitants of the 
village had taken up arms and were killed in the course of the fighting 
for the village.  
 
 Another example of this method of documentary interpretation can be 
found in an explanation given in a Lanz affidavit of a report which 
stated that "in the area southeast of Arta the 2nd Company of the 54th 
Artillery Battalion burned down two villages as reprisal for the 
activities of bands during the last few days." The affiant said that not 
two villages but only two houses were really burned. Is it the affiant or 
the report which is erroneous? The Court will recall the Lanz affiant who 
had General Lanz himself accompanying Lt. Colonel Salminger at the time 
the latter was killed. Even General Lanz had to admit that his affiant 
there had "made a mistake." 
 
 Lanz also was a faithful supplier of Greek labor for the war 
industries manned by Sauckel’s slaves. A file note of the Commanding 
General of the XXII Corps for 18 October 1943, already alluded to in 
another connection, mentions that 160 persons had by then been deported 
for labor employment in Germany. The reason - they were "suspected of 
being members of bands and unable to show place of work."  
 
 Lanz admitted that Greek civilians were mobilized to do forced 
labor on Greek roads, but that, he argued, was beneficial not only to the 
Germans but to the civilian population as well. He denied, however, that 
any Greeks were used to construct fortifications. When he was shown on 
cross-examination a report, dated 1 March 1944, from the Steyrer Division 
to his Corps - a report which was received at corps headquarters on 2 
March 1944 - stating that the evacuation of Sarande was in progress but 
that the male population would remain in Sarande for the time being and 
would be "brought up to work on 
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fortifications", Lanz had a unique seizure of speechlessness.  
 
 He also did his bit towards the "final solution" of the Jewish 
question. Though Corfu, following the Italian surrender, was entirely 
within his jurisdiction and control, he permitted a small SS detachment 
to forcibly evacuate almost 1800 of that island’s Jewish inhabitants. 
Lanz admitted not only that there was no military necessity for such an 
action but, as he pointed out to Army Group E, that there was actually 
great danger that such a measure would hamper military defense 
preparations against an Allied attack. Though Lanz contended that he also 
opposed the measure for "reasons of humanity" no word of opposition on 
that ground appears in any of the communications which he had with Army 
Group E on the subject. Lanz conceded, at one point, that it was entirely 
within his power to keep the SS off the island, but at another stage of 
his testimony he said that he was wholly unable to prevent the measure 
and that the only thing he was able to do was to order his staff and his 
men to render no assistance whatever to the visiting SS men. But his men 
did assist the SS in carrying out the operation. As appears from the 
report which the German island commander sent to XXII Corps, the army 
troops did the rounding up of the Jews and set aside barracks space in 
which they could be temporarily housed pending the arrival of ships 
taking them to their eventual destination . Such was the extent of Lanz’s 
intervention against his opposition to the fulfillment of the "purging of 
Europe." 
 
 Even prior to his arrival in Greece, Lanz had a record which was 
sufficiently black. When he received thee Commissar Order as Commander of 
the 1st Mountain Division, he passed it on with the qualification that 
commissars would only be shot in combat. From that day forward he heard 
no more about commissars and he was sure none was ever executed by any of 
the units within his division. He had forgotten about the former 
proclamation which the XXXXIX Mountain Corps had sent to the division on 
29 July 1941. That proclamation, 
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addressed to the Ukrainian population, talked about the liberation "from 
the despotism of Jewish-Bolshevist elements" which the German troops had 
brought, and went on to say that "political commissars and members of the 
Red Army cut off from their units" were to be arrested without delay by 
the local mayors and delivered to the nearest German commander. Lanz 
pretended to have heard "for the first time here in Nurnberg" about such 
a distinction between political commissars and other members of the 
Russian Army.  
 
 He was even more astounded when he was shown an enclosure, dated 12 
August 1941, to the Ic activity report of his very division. That 
enclosure was a graphic description of the capture of 18,000 Russian 
prisoners. The Court will recall the dramatic exposition of the singling 
out of a political commissar from the rest of the prisoners and his 
subsequent three-hour interrogation. Then, according to the account, he 
was "taken aside to a place from whence only the crack of the report" 
came back, "not, however, the faint cry." 
 
 General Lanz believed that the account was an entirely fictitious 
product of some war correspondent’s imagination. He went so far as to 
suggest that the story was wholly inaccurate, a figment of a 
scriptwriter’s brain intended for consumption on the home front. Lanz 
could not explain how the correspondent knew such details as the insignia 
of the commissars, and their well-advised tactic of discarding it after 
capture in chance protection from the prescribed fate.  
 
 Lanz even went so far as to intimate that  political commissars 
were not entitled to the protection of the Geneva Convention because they 
oftentimes shot their own troops to prevent desertion. What relevance 
this completely unsupported accusation has to international law is beyond 
our comprehension.  
 
 Nothing whatever can be said in mitigation of Lanz’s shameful 
record. His Baedeker of crime is as complete as that of any of his 
colleagues.  
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 General Helmuth Felmy is no stranger to a method of thinkind [sic] 
which holds military commanders responsible for the acts of their 
subordinates. In January 1940, one of his lesser officers in the air 
corps was forced down just inside the western boundary of Holland and 
Germany. The polot [sic] had with him plans for the invasion of the Low 
Countries which was in the fact to[o] [sic] occur four months later. The 
plans were, of course, confiscated by the Dutch authorities. Felmy, in 
spite of his exalted rank and his great reputation as a builder of the 
German Luftwaffe was held negligent and dismissed from his high post in 
the Luftwaffe.  
 
 Felmy returned to his home in Brunswick and, with plenty of time to 
ruminate both about his fate and the destiny of western civilization, 
decided in September of that year to join the Nazi Party.  
 
A few months thereafter he returned to active service, but he denies that 
his membership in the party  had anything to do with his reinstatement. 
If Felmy was not, as he asserts, being and opportunist, he must have 
joined the party because he believed in its principles and the practical 
application of its ideology. 
 
 After heading what proved to be a still-born political-military 
commission in Irak, an assignment on which he was sent by Hitler and 
Ribbentrop personally, Felmy, in June 1941, was appointed Commander 
Southern Greece subordinate to Field Marshal List as Commander-in-Chief 
of the Twelfth Army and Armed Forces Commander Southeast.  
 
 When List went on leave during July and August 1941, Felmy, as the 
senior ranking commander in the Southeast, was named his deputy. The 
practice of appointing the senior officer as acting commander-in-Chief 
during the latter’s absence was standard and customary procedure in the 
German Wehrmacht and Felmy is n[o]t [sic] at all reluctant to concede 
that  that was the motivation cause for his appointment on the first 
occasion of List’s absence.  
 
 If it is suggested that Felmy was also named List’s deputy during 
the interregnum between List’s retirement to the hospital and Kuntze’s 
arrival, 
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when the two mass executions at Kraljevo and Kragujevac took place, Felmy 
is aghast at  the idea. There is nothing in the documents naming Felmy as 
List’s deputy at any time, and it therefore seems reasonable to assume 
that if Felmy, as senior ranking commander, automatically became acting 
commander-in-chief of the 12th  Army in July and August, the same thing 
happened in October 1941.  Felmy insists, however, that he was 
specifically named to the post of deputy in July 1941, and urges 
Foertsch’s testimony as confirmation.   This is an interesting 
testimonial interchange. Felmy tries to extract Foertsch from his 
embarrassment by saying that the leadership of the 12th Army from October 
16 until October 27 rested with the individual commander, and not with 
the Chief of Staff. The quid pro quo is that Foertsch must give Felmy a 
hand by testifying that no specific appointment of Felmy had been made. 
The very fact that Felmy denies any knowledge of either of the three 
Serbian massacres which occurred in October 1941 is most indicative of 
his general credibility.  
 
 Shortly after he took over as List’s deputy, Felmy issued, on 29 
July 1941, an order stating that death sentences for sabotage were to be 
carried out by hanging and that, additionally, "all means of intimidation 
which are customary with the residents of the country be employed". 
Felmy, understandably enough, could not explain what he meant by "all 
other means of intimidation" - but in the light of such evidence, would 
it be too much to assume that he meant concentration camps, deportations, 
and the rest of the gamut of crimes which have been discussed so often in 
this proceeding? On the same day, Felmy received a report that 100 Jews 
had been shot to death in Belgrade in reprisal for the throwing of a 
bottle of gasoline on a German motor vehicle four days earlier. Felmy, of 
course, has no recollection whatever of the incident, though he admits 
that Foertsch, as a competent and dutiful Chief of Staff, must have 
informed him about it. On the 15th of August 1941, it was reported to the 
office of the Armed Forces Commander Southeast that the village of Skela 
had been burned and 50 "communists" hanged in retaliation of an attack 
upon a police car on the 
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previous day. Of such type were the incidents which occurred during the 
period General Felmy acted in Field Marshal List’s stead. 
 
 After serving as Commander Southern Greece from June 1941 until 
August 1942, Felmy left Greece for a brief interlude in North Africa. He 
returned in June 1943 as Commander if the LXVIIIth Corps, a post he held 
until the evacuation of Greece in October 1944. Felmy’s major task, of 
course, was the combating of the Greek partisans. Whereas the EDES 
partisans operated for the most part in General Lanz’s territory, Felmy’s 
major opponents were the ELAS units, the so-called "communist" group of 
Andartes. As early as 5 July 1943, the Military Commander of Southern 
Greece, then General Speidel, wrote a very comprehensive report on the 
nature and size and leadership of the ELAS organization. It was reported 
to be 40,000 strong, with all manner of weapons, an efficient general 
staff, and a centeralized[sic] direction in the hands of English officers 
subordinate to the Allied Middle East Command with headquarters in 
Cairo.  As might be expected from such a large organization, uniforms 
were worn by practically all and readily identifiable insignia by 
everyone. Though the last factor is extremely difficult for Felmy to 
accept, even his own Ic officer, Colonel Kleykamp, admitted that the 
Soviet star was uniformly worn.  
 
 Of course, Felmy gave the same lurid testimony regarding partisan 
violations of the rules of war as the rest of the defendants. In his case 
such testimony is particularly untrue. The war diary of his subordinate 
1st Panzer Division shows that on the 2nd of October 1943 twelve hostages 
were seized and threatened with execution if missing German soldiers were 
not returned by the bands. The entry in the war diary for the following 
day states that the soldiers were in fact turned over. As if this example 
were not enough to support the Prosecution’s contention that the 
partisans did not violate the Geneva Convention, there is not a single 
entry in the entirely translated war diary of Felmy’s LXVIIIth Corps for 
the period January - June 1944 which mentions or even hints at the 
killing and mutilating of German prisoners by the partisans. If such 
practices were usual, 
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and as widespread as Felmy and his affiants have asserted, why is there 
not one indication in the whole war diary to that effect? 
 
 Felmy’s partisan opponent was particularly powerful on the 
Peloponnesus peninsula, so powerful in fact that the German occupation 
there was utterly ineffective. In repeated requests to higher 
headquarters for additional troops, vernings appear that the northwest 
part of the Peloponnesus was entirely dominated by the bands "except for 
the coastal areas dominated by the Germans" and that "only a few coastal 
sections and the ports of  Tripolis and Sparta remain in German hands." 
The partisans controlled more of the Peloponnesus then the Germans during 
1943 and 1944.  
 
 To meet the challenge of the partisans, Felmy resorted to the 
firing-squad technique which had been characteristic of the German 
occupation since April 1941. "Danger" hostages were a common-place. The 
entry in the war diary for 5 June 1944 states that as a counter-measure 
for sabotage the railroad line Athens-Lamia, hostage coaches would be 
used. Two months later, on 5 August 1944, it was reported that during an 
attack on the railroad Corinth-Tripolis, cars were derailed and the "18 
hostages taken along" shot to death.  
 
 But even more widespread then "danger" hostages was the taking and 
eventual execution of "security" hostages. In the use of the latter type, 
Felmy was an old and experienced master hand. When he was still Commander 
of Southern Greece, he reported that on 5 June 1942, "in reprisal for 
murders committed in the Messara region, 12 hostages were shot on 3 June 
1942." The report also mentioned that in reprisal for a plot against the 
railroad track Liessia-Athens a German firing squad had that morning shot 
8, and an Italian squad 2, hostages. Though more then one of these 
defendant had tried to place the blame on the Italians for reprisal 
measures carried out in Greece prior to Italy’s surrender in September 
1943, one of Felmy’s own witnesses, the representative of German Foreign 
Office in Greece, Dr. Gunther Altenburg, stated flatly that the railroad 
lines in and about Athens were completely in the hands of the Germans.  
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 Felmy refused to even hazard a guess as to the number of hostages 
executed by units of the LXVIIIth Corps while it was under his command. 
All Felmy would say was that reprisal measures were not carried out for 
every hostile attack upon German occupation power. When it was pointed 
out that the Loehr order of 10 August 1943 demanded that each attack or 
act of sabotage be retaliated for by hanging hostages and burning 
villages, Felmy seemed insulted: He said that he was "not a high school 
boy" and had not been treated as such by General Loehr. HE insisted that 
h e had not been allowed a good deal of latitude by General Loehr in 
carrying out all orders. That was rather an unusual, not to say 
inconsistent, statement for one who makes superior orders an important 
aspect of his defense to advance.  
 
 Although Felmy refused to estimate the number of hostages his corps 
executed, his witness, the Balkan "authority" Professor Stadtmueller, was 
not so laconic. A radical in matters historical but a conversative in 
things mathematical, he opined that between 1500 and 2000 hostages had 
been killed by the LXIII Corps, a figure which he himself volunteered did 
not include the Greek lives lost in the Klissura and Distomon blood 
baths.  
 
 There were so many, repetitious and even contradictory, hostage 
orders that it was impossible for him to recall them individually, Felmy 
said. He did remember receiving, though List, the Keitel directive of 16 
September 1941, a copy of which he passed on to the Commander of Crete 
who was at that time subordinate to him in his capacity as Commander 
Southern Greece. Felmy, always content to assume the lawfulness of orders 
emanating from his superior officers, saw nothing criminal about the 
hostage figures mentioned in the Keitel directive, and went so far as to 
assert that the directive was "necessary" at the time. For one who 
repeatedly insisted, following a party line which List and Kuntze had 
established, that Greece was quiet and peaceful until late 1943, Felmy’s 
assertion that the Keitel directive was a military necessity seems 
peculiarly incomprehensible.  
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 General Felmy, like General Winter, was unable to recall any orders 
mentioning individual hostage figures which he might have issued to his 
subordinate units.   But the Tribunal will remember that on 9 December 
1943, Winter, as Chief of Staff of Army Group E, addressed a conference 
of chiefs of staff in which he specifically stated that the minimum 
hostage ratio had become the maximum, namely, "1:50 if there are dead, 
1:10 if there are wounded".   Is it credible the Felmy’s Chief of Staff 
was not at Winter’s lecture or that a corps commander of Felmy’s 
importance was not schooled on reprisal quotes? Felmy’s remarkable memory 
having been previously demonstrated in his direct examination, it is not 
easy to believe that he could have forgotten such figures. 
 
Felmy denies having himself issued a single hostage order, a statement 
which the testimony of the witness Willy Finger flatly contradicted. 
Shortly after the death of the German General Krech, Finger said that he 
saw posters, signed by Felmy, which mentioned 100: 1 and 50;1 retaliation 
ratios. 
 
 The hostage incidents which occurred within the area of the 
LXVIIIth  Corps are so numerous that in total number of hostages 
executed, Felmy’s records puts him in fifth place behind List, Kuntze, 
Roertsch and Geitner.   On 22 August 1943 the 1st Panzer Division 
reported that ten hostages had been seized in retaliation for the beating 
up of a corporal. The division asked and received the express permission 
of the corps to execute those hostages. A short time later, on 12 
September 1943, Army Group South Greece which Felmy then commanded, 
reported that ten Greeks had been hanged in retaliation for the death of 
a German soldier. 
 
The number of hostage executions which took place in the three-week 
period between 25 November and 16 December is representative of the 
entire period during which time Felmy commanded the LXVIIIth Corps.  On 
November 20, "communists were shot to death in retaliation[sic] for an 
attack at Aighion"; on the 29th of that month 100 hostages were hanged in 
retaliation for an attack on the road Tripolis-Sparta; on 5 December the 
corps reported 
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that 50 hostages had been shot at Aighion; on 6 December 50 hostages were 
shot in retaliation for an attack on the railroad South of Tripolis; and 
on 8 December, in retaliation for an attack southwest of Gythion, 25 
hostages were executed.  During that short span of time 245 hostages were 
killed – 245 murders for Felmy must answer. 
 
 It is difficult to single out particular attention any one of the 
several atrocities which occurred during Felmy’s tenure as commander of 
the LXVIIIth Corps.  But in total number of persons killed, the 
butcheries and devastation which took place during "Operation Kalavritha" 
takes first place.  Twenty-four villages were totally destroyed and more 
than 1400 persons killed before German vengeance had run its 
course.  Even Felmy admit that Kalavritha was a German "excess", and 
"excess" which, oddly enough the Army does not even try to attribute to 
the SS.  But it was an "excess," according to Felmy, not because of the 
ration of Greek to German dead but simply because the devastation and 
murder involved was so indiscriminate.  It was because Kalavritha was 
allegedly a nest of bands, and because 78 German prisoners had supposedly 
been murdered by these bands that General Felmy gave permission to 
General LeSuire, Commander of the 117th Light Infantry Division, to stage 
the whole reprisal action.   Since the operation had previously been 
cleared with Felmy, it is no surprise that, even though now Felmy 
condemns the result, he did not reprimand LeSuire when the undertaking 
had been completed.  Felmy tries to excuse his failure to dismiss LeSuire 
or even to instigate his court martial by admitting that the OKW would 
just not have countenanced such an action 
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 But a few days after the Kalavritha enterprise, Loehr's order of 22 
December 1943 effectuated radical change in German reprisal policy.  In 
recognition of the unfavorable impact of reprisal measures upon the 
Southeastern political situation, fixed reprisal quotes were rescinded 
and Minister Neubacher was charged with German political leadership in 
the entire area.  Since actions like LeSuire’s were precisely the kind 
which were intended to be prevented in the future, it is more than likely 
that Neubacher would not have opposed any application on the part of 
Felmy, and his superiors, General Loehr and Field Marshal von Weichs, to 
have LeSuire replaced.  But Felmy did not try to replace LeSuire: he 
recommended him for promotion to leadership of a corps, and in due course 
the promotion was made. 
 
 The severe reprisal measures taken by the LXVIIIth Corps continued 
unabated throughout the year 1944.  It has been constantly emphasized 
throughout this case that the Prosecution’s excerpts were one-sided and 
give a distorted picture of events as they occurred in 
Southeast.  Felmy’s completely translated war diary proves that 
suggestion to be unfounded.  Even looking at all of the tactical details 
contained in the war diary, the reprisal measures stand out in full 
focus.  On 17 January 1944, 20 communists were executed in retaliation 
for an attack upon an officer; on 7 February 1944, 3 villages and 100 
communists were executed in retaliation for an attack upon an officer; on 
7 February 1944, 3 villages and 100 communists were executed in 
retaliation for an attack near Skala, on 23 February 200 hostages were 
ordered executed in retaliation for 2 attacks.   With respect to the last 
incident, General Felmy was eager to point out that from the war diary 
the number of German dead from those two attacks – 24 dead, 19 wounded 
and 3 missing --- could be ascertained.  Felmy seemed proud of the 
restraint displayed by his troops in this instance.  On 11 March 1944 the 
war diary shows that is retaliation for 
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an attack upon a convoy German losses were 18 dead and 44 wounded.  two 
hundred people from the hostage camps at Tripolis, Sparta and Corinth 
were ordered executed in reprisal.  Felmy admits that LeSuire asked and 
that he gave permission for the carrying out of the action, though he 
hastens to add that, "from what I have been able to gather from 
Prosecution documents" not 200 but 141 hostages were actually 
executed.  According to the entry in the corps war diary, the executions 
themselves were to be carried out "by members of the Greek Volunteer 
Units under German supervision", an observation which will become 
particularly significant in the light of General Felmy’s testimony 
regarding the executions carried out in retaliation for the subsequent 
death of General Krech. 
 
 On 27 April 1944, a German convoy was attacked.  General Krech 
commander of the 41st Fortress Division and three others were killed, 
five German soldiers were wounded and two vehicles destroyed.  The entry 
in the war diary of 1 May announced that in retaliation, "335 communists 
and suspected guerillas were shot" an apparent application of a 50:1ratio 
for the persons killed and a 25:1 ratio for those wounded, plus 10 extra 
hostages shot for good measure.  Felmy shifts the blame for this 
execution to the leader of a Greek "Volunteer" unit, a mythical Colonel 
Popagondinos, who, he claims, rounded up and shot 100 hostages. Felmy 
himself claims no knowledge whatever of the execution of an additional 
l200 hostages which were reported as having been executed in Athens in 
retaliation for the same attack. 
 
 In view of what has already been said concerning the relation of 
indigenous forces to the Whermacht, no extended statement need be made 
here on General Felmy’s testimony, especially since the documents 
explicitly state that the executions by Greek volunteer units were done 
under German supervision.  Moreover, the witness Finger completely 
exploded Felmy’s explanation of this particular reprisal.  Finger himself 
participated in the arresting of the 100 hostage executed on 
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the Peloponnesus in retaliation for the Krech attack, and himself drove 
one of the trucks which transported the hostages to the central hostage 
camp at Patras.  The Tribunal will recall that Finger testified that the 
entire action was carried out by German troops, members of the 999th 
Infantry Division, and not by Greek units at all. 
 
 Felmy’s professed ignorance of the execution of the 200 hostages in 
Athens as part of the same reprisal action is, of course, entirely 
understandable.  Either Felmy or his colleague, General Speidel, Military 
Commander of Greece at the time, arranged that detail. 
 
 When there are no Italians or Greek quislings around on which to 
place responsibility for the crimes mentioned in the German reposts, 
Felmy makes the old standby, the SS, the recipient of 
responsibility.  But when it comes to liability for the activities of SS 
units in Greece, Felmy and Speidel have to be very careful, for in that 
regard theirs is a narrow gauntlet indeed.  Felmy unwarily admitted early 
in his examination that the Higher SS and Police Leader for Greece was 
"officially and in the service regulations" subordinate to Speidel, and 
that the 18th SS Police Regiment received orders for its tactical 
commitment against the bands from Speidel. 
 
 Aware of Speidel’s reaction to this and anticipating his own 
testimony to the effect that even though the 18th SS Police Regiment was 
operating within his corps area, it was not subordinate or responsible to 
him for tactical purposes, Felmy stated that reprisal measures had 
nothing to do with, and formed no part of, tactical operations.  In the 
face of Felber’s testimony that reprisal measures could not be divorced 
from tactical considerations, this unbelievable.  Moreover, it is 
irreconcilable with the Loehr order of 10 August 1943 which expressly 
states that reprisal measures were matters of tactics. 
 
 Finally, General Speidel said flatly that reprisal measures did 
involve questions of tactics and that orders to take or not to take 
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reprisal measures were no less tactical than orders to attack a given 
objective or withdraw from a named position.   Felmy and Speidel did 
however, effect a compromise of their testimonial feud by throwing the 
blame for the SS reprisal measures on Army Group E, which has nor 
representative here.   We will not get entangled in the intricate web 
which they spun in order to reach this happy solution.   It is plain that 
the SS regiment got its commitment orders from Speidel and among those 
orders were instructions concerning reprisal measures.   The regiment 
itself, when it was committed within the corps area of the  LXVIIIth Army 
Corps, was tactically subordinate to Felmy.   At any time he could have 
ordered the regiment not to take reprisal measures and could have 
punished the regimental commander for disobeying him.  Felmy and Speidel 
are both responsible for the reprisal excesses which the 18th SS Regiment 
took during its assignment in Boetia and later on the Peloponnesus. 
 
 Only a few of those excesses need be mentioned here.  On 1 April 
1944, in retaliation for a raid by Greek "bandits" southeast of Levadia 
in which the regiment suffered 2 wounded, 10 hostages were executed.  On 
25 April 1944, in retaliation for an attack on a motor convoy, in which 2 
officers were killed, and 1 officer and 4 men were missing, 50 communists 
were shot.  On 28 April 1944, 60 additional communists, and on 10 May 100 
more communists were shot in retaliation for the very same attack.  In 
all a total of 210 hostages had been executed in reprisal for 7 German 
losses, a reprisal quota of 30:1. 
 
 The Distomen and Klissura incidents throw additional light, not 
only upon German reprisal excesses, but also upon the much discussed 
Army-SS disciplinary relationship.  In what the German account itself 
characterized as the "blood bath of Klissura" 217 completely guiltless 
Greeks were killed and 27 wounded.  Though Felmy was serving as Loehr’s 
deputy in command of Army Group E at the time, 5 April 1944, he claims he 
never even heard of the Klissura affair.  Minister Neubacher, however, 
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heard about it and wrote to Weichs that it was "a most serious infraction 
of an order of reprisal measures issued by the Commander-in-Chief 
Southeast with my agreement"’ a reference to the already referred to 
Loehr order of 22 Decembe[r][sic] 1943.  Felmy advances the unconvincing 
explanation that Neubacher heard of the incident from Greek sources while 
his own sole source of information was the series of official reports 
which he received from the 7th SS Regiment which committed the crime. 
 
 In a parallel incident which occurred two months after Klissura, 
and which also involved the same 7th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 250 to 
300 Greek inhabitants of all ages were killed in the village of 
Distomon.  Distomon, along with Kalavritha and Klissura is the third 
excess to which Felmy has confessed.  But it was not because Distomon was 
an "excess" that General Felmy became concerned.  It was because the SS 
unit had given a false combat report on the affair, stating that the 
Greek dead had been killed in a combat rather than in a reprisal action. 
 
 After Felmy’s corps judge had concluded all of his investigations 
and it was proved beyond doubt that the SS company commander had violated 
not only every law of humanity but has gone beyond even the harsh Germany 
Army orders, the SS regimental commander requested of Felmy " that the 
matter rest with the disciplinary punishment of the case" and that 
"further measures" not be "directed".  Felmy agreed to the suggested 
procedure.  Now if  Felmy had no disciplinary jurisdiction at all over an 
SS unit, just why was his "permission" asked in the first place?  And if 
he could take no steps whatever against an SS leader, why was he asked 
not to "direct further measures"?  Apparently the SS commander was under 
the impression that Felmy had complete authority in the premises.  If 
Felmy was as outraged by the actions of the SS as he now claims to have 
been, why did he consent to mere 
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"disciplinary punishment?"  If he had no jurisdiction to act, why was he 
requested not to do so?  Felmy admits that his hand-written note agreeing 
to the regimental proposal was "illogical" and that, strictly speaking, 
he should have written that he had no authority to act.  Felmy’s only 
explanation for his "illogical" action is that "sometimes one makes 
mistakes".  But the same so-called mistake was made by Field Marshal von 
Weichs, who in his turn agreed to let the matter rest. 
 
 What is even more significant is that the protests of Minister 
Neubacher against the Distomon outrage were addressed not to Himmler, but 
to the Army Commander-in-Chief, Field Marshal von Weichs.  Not only was 
the SS regimental commander, who certainly ought to have known better, 
misled concerning the matter of his subordination to the Army, but 
Minister Neubacher was similarly deceived.  The immunity of SS troops 
from disciplinary measures imposed by the Army seems to be much clearer 
here in Nurnberg than it was in Greece three years ago. 
 
 Felmy is also implicated in the execution of the Commando 
Order.  Though he cannot recall ever having received it --- under oath 
one must be certain of one’s testimony, he points out --- he learned of 
it, because "one always learns about things."   Incidentally, we recall 
that List, the fifth ranking Field Marshall in the German Army, testified 
that he had never heard of the Commissar Order.  An entry in the war 
diary of Army Group E for 15 March 1944 indicates that teletype 
instructions were sent to the LXVIIIth Army Corps emphasizing the 
importance of capturing and obtaining information from British commandos 
and disposing of them in accordance with the Hitler order.  On 18 July 
1944, Army Group E reported to the Commander-in-Chief Southeast that one 
of the commandos wounded during a British Commando operation against the 
island of Calina, a Sergeant John Dryden, had been flown to Athens on 5 
July to be handed over to the SD in accordance with the Fuehrer 
order.  Ever since Speidel’s departure from Athens in May 1944, 
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Felmy was in complete charge of all German agencies stationed and 
operating in that city.  Can there be any doubt that this British 
sergeant was turned over to the SD through General Felmy’s 
headquarters?  Felmy’s, unlike his fellow defendants, was brash enough to 
say that he considered the Commando Order perfectly lawful. 
 
 Felmy also assisted in the work of the peculiarly-Nazi agencies of 
the Third Reich.  His relationship to the Rosenberg detachment, which was 
subordinate to him for economic and disciplinary purposes when he was 
Commander Southern Greece in 1941, has already been touched upon.  He 
believed that the Rosenberg units were simply confiscating subversive 
political literature, an activity in which he saw no harm.  The fact that 
art treasures were also being looted and that literature written by Jews 
was the particular object of confiscation had apparently no significance 
at all in his appraisal of the lawfulness of the activity of Rosenberg’s 
agents.  
 
 Only one reference to Felmy’s slave labor activities need be 
mentioned.  On 31 October 1943 the 1st Panzer Division reported to the 
LXVIIIth Corps that it had arrested about 3,000 persons who were going to 
be sent to the Reich for forced labor.  Felmy, of course, pretends to 
have heard nothing at all about that action though he admits that he sent 
on to his subordinate units every order concerning deportation which he 
ever received from higher agencies.  He blandly admits that he did not 
waste time on considerations of the legality or the illegality of orders 
which he received from his superiors. 
 
 Felmy relies on effect upon military necessity in defense of the 
reprisal measures which he ordered and which were executed by his units. 
But even his own affiants state that Felmy always made difficulties 
concernin[g][sic] reprisal measures because in his opinion " they cost 
more lives if German soldiers".  His witness, Dr. Gunther Altenburg, 
stated that he, Altenburg, considered the German reprisal measures taken 
in Greece to be criminal, and that they were the motivating cause for his 
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application to Ribbentrop to be transferred from his post as 
representative of the Foreign Office in Greece. 
 
 More than 1400 innocent Greeks were killed at Kalavritha, more than 
200 at Klissura, and nearly 300 at Distomon.  Three hundred and twenty-
five hostages were killed in retaliation for the death of General Krech 
and several hundred more in the course of retaliations for German wounded 
in November and December 1943 and the first two months of 
1944.  Professor Stadtmueller’s estimate of the quantum of Felmy’s crime 
leaves no doubt of the diligence and industry with which he worked. 
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BY MR. FENSTERMACHER: 
 
 Mr. Rapp will continue with the Prosecution’s closing argument 
concerning General Speidel. 
 
By Mr. RAPP: 
 
 General Wilhelm Speidel described himself as a man set apart from 
his German colleagues in Greece by his interest and respect for the 
ancient culture on Attica.  He was constantly torn, he says, by a 
conflict between his own ideals and those of Nazism.  There is little 
doubt, however, where Speidel’s true political faiths lay.  As early as 
15 March 1939, even before the outbreak of war, he was characterized by 
his then superior in the Luftwaffe, Albert Kesselring, as an officer "who 
incorporates in himself the ideals of National Socialism". 
 
 Speidel was in Greece continuously for almost two years.  He served 
as Commander South Greece from September 1942 until August 1943 when, 
following the reorganization of the Southeast Command, he was named 
Military Commander Greece, a capacity in which he served until the end of 
May 1944. 
 
 He was not in Greece long before he executed his first batch of 
hostages.  On 10 July 1943 reported to Commander-in-Chief Southeast that 
he had executed 15 hostages in Athens and 3 on the island of Salamis in 
reprisal for several sabotage attacks on the island’s search light 
post.  On the witness stand his excuse for this was that these attacks 
were all part of a centrally directed conspiracy against the 
Germans.  The report itself, however, indicates that the attempts were 
sporadic and unsuccessful and constituted no planned threat to German 
security. 
 
 Speidel had no idea who the hostages were, how they had been 
chosen, or from whence they had been seized. 
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Although he vividly remembered their execution, he could not say whether 
the hostages were from Athens or from the island of Salamis. Speidel of 
course denied that these particular victims were chosen from a hostage 
camp. At the time of the hostage executions the actual perpetrators of 
the attacks were still undiscovered. For all Speidel knew the 
unsuccessful saboteurs might have been British commandos. He admitted 
that the hostages had not been seized beforehand; that their names and 
addresses had not been published; and that no announcement to the 
population that the named individuals were being held as security against 
attacks upon a German installation at Salami had been made. Speidel thus 
even violated the requirements prescribed by even those few German 
commentators on international law who say that hostages may lawfully be 
executed. 
 
 Speidel confessed to a second hostage execution while he was 
Commander Southern Greece. On 5 July 1943, he reported the execution of 
10 hostages on the part of the Germans and 9 by the Italians, in reprisal 
for the explosion of a magnetic mine fastened to the bow of the Italian 
steamer "Citta di Savona" in the harbor of Pireaeus. The only casualties 
from the explosion were 69 horses, but General Speidel did not feel that 
the execution of 19 guiltless individuals was an excessive or 
disproportionate retaliation. These hostages were executed even while 
investigations to ascertain the true culprits were still under way. The 
report mentioned that the mine might have been attached to the ship while 
it was at Patras. Neither Speidel nor anyone else can explain how the 
execution of hostages from Athens could possibly be expected to prevent 
sabotage actions several hundred kilometers away. In this case, too, he 
admitted that the hostages had been seized 
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only after the attack had occurred. 
 
 One of the activities which took up part of Speidel’s time was 
strike-breaking. In a move tantamount to pick out every tenth worker and 
threatening him with execution, Speidel forced the Greeks to remain at 
their jobs by taking hostages from their number. Following the execution 
of the 19 hostages in retaliation from the incident involving the "Citta 
di Savona", Greek labor staged a sit-down strike. Speidel dealt with that 
action by issuing a severe anti-strike decree, dated 27 June 1943, which 
threatened harsh reprisals, including the execution of hostages, if there 
were any additional strikes in the future. 
 
 The report of the Military Commander Greece, dated 18 March 1944, 
stated that partial strikes on railroads and in several plants at the 
beginning of that month were "suppressed by energetic military measures – 
50 communists were shot immediately, while others who were arrested are 
awaiting their sentences." Speidel pointed out that at the time the 50 
communists were actually shot, he was on leave in Germany. That is of no 
importance. When his deputy, General Pflugradt, ordered the executions, 
he was merely carrying our [sic] Speidel’s prior decree, with which he 
was thoroughly familiar. Speidel himself admitted having sent all of his 
anti-strike directives to Pflugradt who as Commander of Administrative 
Sub-Area Headquarters 395 at Saloniki was directly subordinate to him. 
 
 Speidel has a peculiar theory of responsibility for acts ordered 
while his deputy, rather than he, was physically present at headquarters. 
He maintains that even if his deputy was effectuating Speidel’s own 
orders, the deputy was acting upon his own! 
 
 Speidel’s credibility is indicated by his entire 
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disclaimer of knowledge of this incident, though the report was dated the 
day after he returned to his office. Apparently, the execution of 50 
miserable "communists" was not of sufficient importance for him to have 
discussed it with his chief of staff or for it to have aroused his 
attention when he saw it mentioned in his own report.  
 
 From September 1943 until May 1944 General Speidel, as Military 
Commander, was given the task of maintaining peace, order and security in 
Greece. He assigned an area of security to the 18th SS Police Mountain 
Regiment and served as the channel through which tactical orders for the 
combatting of the bands in that area were given. Speidel pointed out on 
direct examination that since the Higher Police and SS Leader in Greece 
had the right to commit Evzone detachments in combat or for police raids, 
he had the right to order reprisals for losses suffered by the Evzones in 
such operations. On his own theory, Speidel is responsible for the 
reprisal excesses which the 18th SS Police Mountain Regiment committed. 
 
 It is for the reprisal measures which were committed by units 
subordinate to Speidel in the sphere of police functions, as opposed to 
tactical or combat tasks, however, that the Prosecution’s case against 
General Speidel is largely based. The Higher Police and SS Leader for 
Greece, General Schimana, was in charge of the organization and training 
of the Greek police forces but it was Speidel who supervised their 
establishment, limited their size and was responsible in the last 
analysis for their performance. It is for the reprisal measures which 
Schimana took to avenge losses of German and Greek police throughout 
Greece, and to combat individual acts of sabotage in and around the city 
of Athens, that we hold Speidel liable. That  
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severe measures of retaliation were taken is clearly evident from 
Speidel’s own war diary. An entry for 30 November states that 19 
communist hostages were shot for the murdering and wounding of Greek 
police and gendarmes; on 18 December 20 hostages were shot as a reprisal 
measure for Evzones murdered and wounded by communists; on 7 January 
1944, 30 communists were shot in reprisal for the murder of one Evzone 
and 3 Gendarmes and for 36 attacks on Greek police since 16 December 
1943; on 10 January 1944, 50 communists were shot as a reprisal measure 
for murdering 2 German police; on 11 January 1944, 10 hostages were shot 
in reprisal for attacks on two Evzones. 
 
 Speidel denies responsibility for these and the literally dozens of 
other measures taken by the Higher SS and Police Leader. He denies that 
Schimana was subordinate to him. But the standard order of procedure for 
the Higher SS and Police Leader in Greece states very clearly that that 
office was "subordinate to the Military Commander Greece for the period 
of its employment in Greece". According to that basic regulation 
Schimana’s duties embraced "all duties which are encumbent [sic] on the 
Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police in the Reich", a 
provision which Speidel maintains is a denial of Schimana’s subordination 
to him but which the Prosecution asserts is simply descriptive of the 
type of functions which Schimana was assigned to fulfill. Were its 
meaning otherwise, the section making the Higher SS and Police Leader 
subordinate to the Military Commander would be meaningless.  
 
 Under that same regulation, Speidel was authorized to issue to 
Schimana such directives as were "necessary to avoid interference with 
Wehrmacht operations and duties", as well as directives which would "take 
precedence over 
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any other ‘other directives". Schimana, of course, was to receive certain 
instructions from the Chief of the German Police concerning the execution 
of his duties, instructions which Bach-Zelewski has testified were simply 
of a technical nature concerning such purely internal matters as 
promotions, awards, salaries and the like. Bach-Zelewski, who was Higher 
SS and Police Leader for central Russia, subordinate at the time to the 
Army Commander in whose area he acted, knows whereof he speaks when he 
says that the regulations issued to Schimana were the standard set issued 
to all Higher SS and Police Leaders. 
 
 Speidel insists that Schimana was responsible only to Himmler in 
police matters. That contention is not only at variance with the order of 
procedure issued to Schimana by Himmler, but is expressly contradicted by 
the standard order of procedure for the Military Commander Greece which 
Speidel himself received from the Military Commander Southeast, his 
superior General Felber. That directive provides for Schimana’s 
subordination by making the Higher SS and Police Leader a member of the 
staff of the Military Commander Greece. General Felber who, as Speidel’s 
superior, ought to know, stated that the regulations covering the 
relationship of the Military Commander Greece to the Higher SS and Police 
Leader for Greece were identical with those covering the relationship 
between himself as Military Commander Southeast and Meyssner, who was 
Higher SS and Police Leader for Serbia. The service instructions for the 
Military Commander Southeast indicate that his staff was identical in 
composition with the staff of the Military Commander Greece. 
 
 Meyssner, as a member of the staff of the Military Commander 
Southeast was, of course, subordinate to General 
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 There is no doubt that Felber could and did give him orders for the 
carrying out of reprisal measures. To give just one example: On 23 
October 1943, Felber ordered the execution of 400 reprisal prisoners in 
retaliation for an attack in which 8 German and Bulgarian Wehrmacht and 
police members were killed and from which 2 German military police were 
missing. The Higher SS and Police Leader for Serbia was charged with 
carrying out the execution. If there was any question as to Meyssner’s 
subordination to Felber, it was completely dispelled by the recent 
testimony of General Felber himself. He admitted that he gave orders to 
Meyssner for the retaliation of losses of German and Serbian police. If 
Felber, whose regulations were identical with those of Speidel, was able 
to give orders to Meyssner, then certainly Speidel was able to deal 
likewise with Schimana. 
 
 Schimana, of course, as Speidel well knows and indeed admitted, 
considered himself subordinate to Speidel. In fact, Speidel himself 
related that in October 1943 Schimana had asked and received permission 
from him to shoot 10 hostages. Why did Schimana go to Speidel if he was 
subordinate only to Himmler? 
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 Dr. Gunther Altenberg, who asked Speidel on at least one occasion 
to stop a hostage execution, also testified that Schimana was subordinate 
to Speidel. Indeed, Speidel’s own affiant General Winter, testified that 
Schimana was "personally subordinate" to Speidel, and expression for 
which Speidel had no explanation. 
 
 Even Speidel himself admitted that on at least one other occasion 
he had stated that in all questions concerning the use of police troops 
to maintain peace and order, particularly questions involving taking of 
retaliation measures for the death of German and Greek police, Schimana 
was subordinate to him. 
 
 By virtue of the Loehr order of 22 December 1943, territorial 
commanders – and Speidel had territorial and executive power in all of 
Greece – were permitted to order "reprisal measures for losses in the Air 
Corps, Navy, Police and the Organization Todt". Of course, Speidel 
ordered and approved the taking of retaliation measures for the death of 
German and Greek police. He himself testified to having been approached 
on numerous occasions by various Greek officials to prevent the execution 
of hostages. Why did such indigenous delegations come if they had not 
been told that Speidel had power and jurisdiction over such matters? 
 
 Altenburg testified that Schimana was an "approachable and 
understanding man" and even Speidel admitted that he was "reasonable" and 
"not the fanatic type of SS leader", both additional indications, if more 
were needed, that Schimana, junior by one rank to Speidel, was 
subordinate to the Military Commander Greece. 
 
 Speidel also had seven administrative sub-area headquarters, 
stationed in the large cities of Greece, subordinate to him. He feigned 
ignorance of reprisal measures which had been carried out by any of those 
agencies, but the documents are sprinckled [sic] profusely with examples. 
On 25 February 1944 Administrative Sub-Area Headquarters Tripolis 
reported that "50 hostages from the hostage camp Tripolis were shot to 
death on 
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23 February in reprisal for the murder of an interpreter; on 4 April 
1944, Administrative Sub-Area Headquarters Larissa reported that for 
railroad sabotage, 10 kilometers south of Larissa, 65 ‘communists’ had 
been shot to death at the scene of the incident; on 4 May 1944, the same 
headquarters reported that 25 Greeks had been hanged in reprisal for an 
attack on the railroad near Dexara; on 13 May 1944, Adminstrative Sub-
Area Headquarters Corinth reported that 10 communists had been hanged in 
Patras in reprisal for an attack." 
 
 In spite of Speidel’s disclaimer of knowledge, his seven 
administrative sub-area headquarters were the hub of the entire Greek 
reprisal wheel. Those units ran the hostage camps. On 18 December 1943, 
Speidel reported having to discontinue the erection of new camps for lack 
of the requisite number of security forces. Speidel’s own war diary of 
March 1944 contains an entry for the 10th of March, 1944 which states 
that in reprisal for an attack on an expresstrain [sic] near Larissa, 
"100 active communists from the Saloniki and Larissa hostage camps were 
shot." 
 
 The much-quoted Loehr order of 22 December 1943 makes the 
relationship between the administrative sub-area headquarters and the 
troop units with respect to reprisal measures most clear. Before reprisal 
measures could be taken by troop units, the consent of the competent 
administrative sub-area headquarters had to be given. If no agreement 
could be reached, then the competent territorial commander who, for 
Greece, was General Speidel, had to decide. Loehr’s order was nothing 
now. General Stettner, who was subordinate to General Lanz as Commander 
of the 1st Mountain Division, stated quite clearly in his 50:1 order of 
25 October 1941 that application for the execution of reprisal measures 
had to "be made through the Military Commander Greece who represents the 
executive power." 
 
 Apparently, however, troop units and administrative sub-area 
headquarters did, on occasion, have trouble because of over-lapping 
jurisdiction in the matter of reprisal measures. One such dispute is 
apparent  
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from the activity report of LeSuire’s 117th Light Infantry Division for 
the month of November 1943. The division reported that the execution of 
effective reprisal measures had come to naught because administrative 
Sub-Area Headquarters 1042 had claimed, on the basis of a Speidel decree, 
that it had authority to execute such measures. The division was annoyed 
because, though the Administrative sub-area headquarters insisted upon 
its jurisdiction in the matter, it did not have sufficient forces 
available to carry out reprisal executions in behalf of the Division. 
After rather extended negotiations, however – the report continued – the 
administrative sub-area headquarters "was persuaded to transfer to the 
division their obligations and duties regarding reprisal measures."  
 
 It was apparently this rivalry and competition for jurisdiction 
that prompted Speidel himself to issue his order of 29 November 1943 to 
his subordinate administrative sub-area headquarters. Speidel there 
ordered that if a troop unit had issued orders contrary to those which he 
had issued, representations were to be made to the troop immediately and, 
if the latter further insisted on carrying out its orders, then the 
administrative sub-area headquarters was to submit a report to him on the 
matter. 
 
 Under the arrangement set forth under the Loehr order, the 
administrative sub-area headquarters would furnish the neighboring troop 
unit with the requisite number of hostages the troop needed for its 
reprisal executions. Correspondingly, if the administrative headquarters 
needed firing squads to carry out its retaliatory actions, the troop 
operating in the vicinity were to oblige. As was also pointed out in the 
Loehr order, the organs of the Higher SS and Police Leader, along with 
the SD detachments, were "likewise to participate in the selecting of 
reprisal prisoners and hostages." 
 
 Speidel tries to place the blame for the reprisal executions which 
were reported by his administrative sub-area headquarters on the troop 
and the SS units operating in the vicinity. The hand in glove relation- 
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ship, however, is too obvious for that explanation to suffice. And on 
cross-examination, several reprisal incidents were brought up which even 
the astute General Speidel could not attribute to the tactical troops or 
SS detachments. On the 3rd of April 1944, an entry in his own war diary 
states that in reprisal for an attack on the head of a Greek labor office 
in Trikkata, 4 communists were shot. On 10 December 1943, another entry 
noted the execution of 10 hostages in reprisal for the murder of Frau 
Mayor, the wife of a German civilian official. Even Speidel assumed that 
one of his administrative sub-area headquarters was involved when he came 
across that incident in the Prosecution’s documents. 
 
 But then "by chance" an affiant wrote to him and reminded him that 
he had refused to permit reprisals to be taken in that instance. After 
having received the "chance" affidavit, Speidel presumed that units of 
the tactical troops and of the SS had arranged to carry out the reprisal. 
But in the entry in his own war diary for 7 December 1943, with which he 
apparently first became acquainted when it was submitted to him on cross-
examination -- though the diary was among the documents sent from 
Washington – it is expressly stated that reprisal measures were "being 
initiated in retaliation for that attack." Throughout Speidel’s war diary 
when reprisal measures were taken or ordered by the Higher SS and Police 
Leader that fact is always specifically stated. If a Schimana or a troop 
unit had had anything whatever to do with the shooting of these 10 
hostages, the entry in Speidel’s own war diary would have said so. It was 
not only Speidel who perjured himself on this incident; his "chance" 
affiant did so too. 
 
 Speidel further tries to disassociate his administrative sub-area 
headquarters from reprisal measures by assertingthat [sic] their staffs 
were so small that they would have been unable to carry out such 
measures. But it was precisely for that reason that they were entitled to 
demand the assistance of troop units stationed nearby. Moreover, if what 
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Speidel says about the physical incapacity of his administrative sub-area 
headquarters were true, why, then, was he so concerned about passing on 
to them the 50:1 order which he testified he received from Felber 
sometime in October 1943. If his subordinate units were not able to carry 
out reprisal measures, why send them any reprisal orders at all. Speidel 
testified that before he passed on the Felber 50:1 order he added all 
reprisal executions carried out under it be first cleared with him. 
Speidel claims he modified the Felber order in this manner because he had 
"misgivings" about the order and because he felt that it was 
psychologically unwise as to technique for pacifying the Greeks. This 
particular Felber order, with Speidel’s alleged limitations, has, 
strangely enough, never been found. Speidel’s testimony concerning it, 
however, is just one further admission that such orders, rather than 
being militarily necessary, constituted military masochism. 
 
 Speidel further lent a willing hand to the slave labor program of 
the Third Reich. His attitude on the question of the deportation of Greek 
civilians was particularly interesting. He said there were no forced 
deportations; but that if there were, it wasnot [sic] his concern; but if 
there were and they were his concern, then they were not forced but 
voluntary. The Tribunal will, of course, draw its own conclusions from 
such equivocating testimony. But in order to give one further example of 
Speidel’s credibility in this regard, brief reference should be made to 
his own report to the Military Commander Southeast. The report, dated 14 
April 1944 stated: 
 
"In March and up until 6 April 1944, a total of 1424 workers were sent to 
Germany. In the first quarter of 1944 a total of 2499 new workers were 
conscripted for the German armament industries." 
 
Speidel attempted to translate his way out of the difficulty; he 
suggested that the word "conscription" should really be translated as 
"contracted". The Tribunal’s interpreters, however, rejected Speidel’s 
proffer of liquistic [sic] expertness.  
 
 If you believe histestimony [sic], Speidel did his best to make the 
lot 
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of the Greek Jew much easier. An example of his good works in this regard 
washis [sic] confiscation of the fortunes of those Greek Jews who failed 
to comply with a directive of the Higher SS and Police Leader to report 
to their respective Jewish communities for deportation to the East. 
Speidel gives as his reason for the transference of those monies to the 
Greek "puppet" government his belief that the Jews would some day return 
to Greece whereupon the State would disgorge what it had held as trustee. 
Speidel’s naivte [sic] regarding the German Government’s attitude towards 
the Jews borders on the boundless. Though he was in Greece constantly 
from September 1942 until May 1944, he did not hear about the deportation 
of Jews from Salonika in the spring of 1943, nor did he know until his 
own report of 14 April 1944 was shown to him on cross-examination that 
during the period 23-25 March 1944, the sudden arrest of all Jews in 
Athens had been carried out by offices of the SD. Speidel maintained that 
he had no power or authority to intervene of the actions against the Jews 
of Greece though, of course, he, like all the other defendants supposedly 
abhorred such un-German conduct. Speidel’s Pontius Pilate-like attitude, 
however, did not prevent him from interferring [sic] when it was a 
question of what he called "saving" the fortunes, rather than the lives, 
of the Greek Jews. 
 
 Speidel’s defense is a conglomeration of military necessity and 
sentimentally [sic]. He apparently does not pleas [sic] superior orders 
because he denied having refused to disobey orders out of fear of a court 
martial. What is even more abject and cynical is his statement that he 
received the orders of his superiors as a matter of course and "in no 
instance" ever considered them "contrary to law or international law." 
 
 For all of his interest in philosophy, the arts, and the pursuit of 
the good, the true and the beautiful, Speidel read but failed to really 
understand the meaning of Goethe’s words: 
 
"He only earns his freedom and existence, who daily conquers them anew." 
 
 Though he likened himself to Bryon [sic] and professed the 
instincts 
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of a Winckelmann; he behaved like a satrap of Darius. 
 
MR. RAPP: Mr. Fenstermacher will now read the conclusion. 
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 These tHen are the wicked men and this the depraved record of their 
crime in five countries for four years.  
 
 Since the various aspects of the legal issues involved in this 
proceedings [sic] have already been stated in the Prosecution’s two 
memoranda, there is no need here to tread that ground again. The 
defendants would have this Tribunal deny the right of a people to fight 
back against a temporary conqueror, no matter how flagrant his aggressor 
or how cruel the regime of his occupation. Such a result would surely 
encourage some future tyrant to make his bid for world domination. 
Moreover, it is not for the defendants now to complain of violations of 
international law which were allegedly committed against them. It was 
their own violations of international law -- the mass executions, 
exploitation, destruction -- to say nothing of the initial violation of 
Greek and Yugoslavia sovereignty -- which gave rise be resistance which 
these defendants now contend was beyond the pale.  
 
 The rights and privileges of an occupier under international law do 
not accrue simply because a land is declared conquered and occupied. The 
occupation must be effectively maintained. It is precisely on that issue 
that the legal arguments of the defense on the unlawfulness of partisan 
resistence [sic] breaks down. One need not go into all of the details 
here. But the fact does remain that the initial conquest of Greece and 
Yugoslavia was not maintained. If what the defendants say is true that 
they could leave, at any given moment and for any given place, subdued 
the partisan opposition, one naturally asks why that was not done. They 
[sic] very fact that each of the defendants has testified to having 
loudly and continuously pleaded for troop reinforcements is in itself a 
complete admission of the military failure of the German occupation.  
 
 After the plenititude [sic] of documentary evidence submitted here, 
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it would be supererogation to set forth again all the reasons why the 
Greek and Yugoslav guerilla forces were entitled to recognition as lawful 
enemy belligerents. That they were, that they were recognized by the 
Allied forces as such, and indeed that these defendants themselves urged 
similar recognition upon their own government is much too clear to 
necessitate further argument. 
 
 The prosecution has also argued that the execution of hostages is 
unlawful per se. That fact is recognized not only by the specific statute 
under which this proceeding is brought, but by pre-existing, 
international law as well. 
 
 The defense has attempted to dispute our contention that Control 
Council Law No. 10 is a correct statement of existing international law 
on the hostage by the Allies during the last war. But none of the 
evidence which has been brought forward proves what it was advanced to 
prove. The rebuttal witness David Bernstein made the defense testimony 
regarding an alleged Americanannouncement [sic] threatening the execution 
of hostages at a 200:1 ratio complete perjury, and the affidavit of Franz 
Karl Naier did likewise with respect to the supposed. -- 
 
 THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me; it will be necessary to take a brief 
recess in order to – 
 
 MR. FENSTERMACHER: Put in more tape? 
 
 THE PRESIDENT: Put in more tape -- mechanical matters. We will take 
a brief recess. 
 
 THE MARSHAL: The Court will be in recess for five minutes. 
 
 (A recess was taken.) 
 THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session. 
 
 MR. FENSTERMACHER: The defense has attempted to dispute our 
contention that Control Council Law No. 1p is a correct statement of 
existing international law on the hostage question by introducing 
evidence of alleged executions of hostages by the Allies during the last 
war; but noe [sic] of the evidence which has been brought forward proves 
what was advanced to prove. 
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The rebuttal witness David Bernstein made the defense testimony regarding 
an alleged American announcement threatening the execution of the 
hostages at a 200:1 ratio complete perjury and the affidavit of Franz 
Karl Maier did likewise respect to the supposed 5:1 hostage order said to 
have been publicly posted in Stuttgart by the French occupation 
authorities. 
 
 The evidence indicating that four hostages were executed by French 
troops in the village of [eutlingen] in retaliation for the death of a 
French soldier is ambiguous and indefinite at best. The placard which was 
posted following that supposed execution of hostages stated that "those 
responsible" for the shooting had been apprehended and shot. It is 
certainly not clear beyond doubt that any hostages were ever executed by 
the French at all. Moreover, if hostages were really shot on that 
occasion, it was in flagrant violation of section 21 of the French Army 
regulations which provides only for the taking and not for the execution 
of hostages. 
 
 The attempt to prove that the Control Council Law is an inaccurate 
statement of international law by demonstrating that the American Army 
considers the execution of hostages not to be unlawful met with a similar 
lack of success. The entire file of the American 6th Army Group on the 
question of the American attitude towards the order of the French General 
LeClerc in Strassbourg which provided for the execution of five hostages 
for each French soldier killed by snipers in that city is a complete 
refutation of the defense attempt. The LeClerc proclamation was in effect 
not more than twenty-four hours at most. As soon as American authorities 
heard of it, it was rescinded for the very reason that it was in 
violation of international law. 
 
 A supposed execution of hostages in the city of Markdorf was also 
alluded to. But in that case too the evidence of the defense is on its 
face irrelevant. One affiant stated that no hostages were executed at 
Markdorf but rather that German soldiers dressed in civilian clothes had 
been captured and dealt with obviously as spies. 
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 It is apparent, therefore, that not one single hostage execution 
was proved to have been carried out by the enemies of Germany during the 
entire war. But even assuming for the sake of argument that there had 
been violations of international law on the part of Germany’s opponents, 
that still would not destroy the validity of the law under which we are 
proceeding. It is a common place to say that two wrongs do not make a 
right. To assume that the organized planned and governmentally-authorized 
executions of hostages which the Germans committed can, even if 
individual, sporadic, unroganized [sic] and unauthorized hostages 
killings were carried out by the Allies, could rescind or make 
ineffective international law upon the subject is, of course, illogical 
in the extreme. If international law ceases to be such because of 
sporadic violations, there will never be any such law, no legal system 
could survive such a theory. Under the defense theory of how 
international law is made the criminal himself could prevent the 
enactment of the very law which would make his act unlawful. The criminal 
then, by his negative action, could in fact annual [sic] any attempt by 
the rest of society to make him responsible for his deed. 
 
 But even if the execution of a single hostage were not a crime in 
itself, the evidence of the numbers of hostahes [sic] killed and the 
ratios employed which has occupied the attention of this Tribunal for 
these seven months would sustain convictions against each one of these 
defendants. The defense here has sought to avoid the application of 
hostages law to this evidence by advancing the theory that these 
executions are justifiable under the doctrine of reprisal. But not a 
single one of the criteria which govern the taking of reprisals was met 
in the case of these defendants. By their own testimony, the questions of 
the lawfulness of their measures was completely irrelevant. Every minor 
German officer was permitted to order reprisals that were not only 
completely disproportionate, but based solely on revenge as well.  
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 Our interruption of the law with respect to superior orders and 
military necessity has also been set forth in great detail elsewhere. The 
number of cases in which the defense of superior orders has been held not 
to confer immunity from criminal responsibility are legion. And General 
Winter, a defense witness, gave the lie to the plea of military necessity 
when he told the conference of chiefs of staff on 9 December 1943 that if 
reprisal measures were to be made effective, then the "really" guilty had 
to be sought out, and that the execution of hostages and the levelling 
[sic] of entire innocent villages would merely bring about an increase in 
the bands. It is precisely because of the military stupidity of the 
heavy-handed policy that the Germans were eventually forced to withdraw 
from the Balkans. 
 
 There, then are the facts, the law and the men with which we have 
been cincerned [sic] over this extended period. How they shall be 
punished for their ruthless offenses against humanity is to be decided by 
this Tribunal in its wisdom. It may be true that the defendants did not 
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each commit crime [sic] in the same degree or to the same extent. Murder 
is murder whether it be committed singly, by tens or by tens of 
thousands. It is no defense to Leyser that he did not kill on the same 
scale as List and Kuntze. Each executed commissar is still an open 
violation of the most fundamental precept in the soldier’s code -- an 
enemy who has laid down his arms in surrender may not be killed because 
he wears a particular emplem [sic] on his sleeve.  
 
 If the Tribunal believes that comparisons between this case and 
others is instructive, there are many examples and precedents which merit 
examination. A number of the colleagues and subordinates of these 
defendants have had to answer for similar crimes or similar charges -- 
Loehr and Kuebler and Neidholdt in Yugoslavia, Brauer and Mueller and 
Andrae in Greece. Others have been called to very severe account on 
charges very much narrower then [sic] those which have been brought, and 
we submit, amply proved in this case. Field Marshal Kesselring and 
Generals Mackensen and Maeltzer were sentenced to death, and then 
reprieved to a life sentence, because of a single large hostage execution 
at a ratio of 10-to-1 in Rome in 1944 and because of certain general 
orders with respect to the treatment of Italian partisans which were in 
effect for only a short time and were not nearly as want only brutal as 
the orders issued and enforced by these defendants. Other generals have 
been convicted of capital offenses because of their responsibility for 
the killing of Allied airmen who had been forced down in Germany, and 
General Anton Doestler has been tried and shot for the execution of 
American rangers in compliance with the criminal mandate of the Commando 
Order. 
 
 The task of making the punishment fit the crime is the task of this 
Tribunal not of the prosecution; but the prosecution cannot say that it 
believes the action taken in these other cases to have been unreasonable 
or unduly severe, and we suggest that willful participation in a 
systematic and preconceived program of crime, such as has been proved in 
this case, is, from the standpoint of world society, a far more serious 
offense than responsibility for isolated or spasmodic criminal outbursts. 
Charity and 
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forgiveness are among the divine attributes of man, but they, like all 
other capacities, must be exercised with intelligence and discrimination 
or they lose their meaning. We must not allow false mercy here to insult 
the hundreds of thousands who lie buried in Greece, Yufoslavia [sic] and 
Norway because of what these men did; Justice must be wise and firm as 
well as merciful.  
 
 One might perhaps have been more moved to feel pity for their fate 
had any one of them shown the slightest sign of remorse or given the 
gaintest [sic] indication of repentance for what they have done. But in 
explanation and excuse they have only pointed out the personal, national, 
and international tragedies which intruded upon their lives. They, all of 
whom served in the first World War, say that they returned to a milieu of 
hopelessness and collapse, that they were subjects to political, economic 
and social forces fof [sic] crushing impact and titantic [sic] magnitude, 
and that they are the hapless victims and the whipped and unresponsible 
[sic] products of a confused people in a disturbed and bewildered world. 
It is this philosophy of emotional fatalism which has made their 
profeered [sic] excuses of individual and collective guilt so cowardly 
and contemptible.  
 
 Their fault, like Brutus1, lay in themselves and not in theit [sic] 
stars. It was their individual response to their own individual 
situations which marked their failure. It is not because they were 
soldier, nor because they have lost, but because they were not men, that 
we ask now that they be permitted to the [sic] reap the full harvest of 
that which they so conscientiously sowed. 
 
 These men have disgraced themselves, so shamed their own profession 
and their country that it will be decades before the world will be able 
to think again in terms of the Germany of Schiller and Heine and 
Mendelsohn and Brahms. It is not their individual fates for which we now 
feel concern. Their power for evil has already been broken. None of them 
will ever lead the legions of the Wehrmacht again. But if what they have 
done is not branded as criminall [sic] if the mythe [sic] they seek so 
desperately to perpetuate are not 
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clearly labeled as such; if the facade of starched respectability behind 
which they seek to hide is not disclosed -- then another generation of 
Germans may rise to revere them, accept their ethics, and say they did no 
wrong. 
 
 The real complainant at this bar is civilization [sic]. Let its 
plea be granted, lot [sic] those who would destroy it be punished, let 
its laws be upheld. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT: I take it that you have concluded your presentation 
of the argument on behalf of the prosecution? 
 
 MR. FENSTERMACHER: That is right, your Honor. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will be in recess until 9:30 tomorrow 
morning. 
 
 (The Tribunal adjourned until 4 February 1948, at 0930 hours.) 
